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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the theory of cooperative behavior in the presence of asym-
metric information. 
Traditionally, the core has been a powerful and much used solution concept to de-
scribe cooperative outcomes. In settings where agents have some private information, 
it may be appropriate to include the opportunity for communication in the devel-
opment of the core. I study the relationship of various core solution concepts with 
prevalent noncooperative solution concepts for environments with asymmetric infor-
mation. The core definitions examined vary by the level of communication assumed. 
In Chapter 2, I investigate the welfare properties of market equilibria. I demon-
strate that appropriate communication restrictions can be placed on the core (and 
efficiency) in order to obtain first and second welfare theorems. In Chapter 3, I discuss 
the Bayesian implementation of core solutions. If full communication is assumed, Pal-
frey and Srivastava (1987) have shown that the core is not Bayesian implementable: a 
game cannot be constructed that has only core allocations as its equilibria. I demon-
strate that communication restrictions on the core are sufficient to obtain positive 
Bayesian implementation results in the environment studied by Palfrey and Srivas-
tava. In other words, a game can be constructed that entices noncooperative players 
to choose strategies that are cooperative under limited communication. 
In Chapter 4, I examine cooperation between bidders in private value, sealed bid 
auctions. I assume that bidders can overcome their one period temptation to break 
any collusive agreement, and that they attempt to formulate a collusive mechanism. 
However, each bidder's valuations are still his own, private information. If he is not 
given the proper incentives, he may lie about his values in order to increase his prof-
its. Therefore, any collusive mechanism must be incentive compatible and is likely 
to be, at a minimum, interim efficient. I demonstrate that the theory provides some 
predictions about the set of collusive mechanisms chosen by bidders and that, when 
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moving to a setting where multiple objects are for sale, the set of feasible collusive 
mechanisms grows. When multiple objects are for sale, there exist incentive compat-
ible mechanisms that are preferred by all bidders to the only incentive compatible 
mechanisms in the single object case. Laboratory experiments indicate that these 
predictions are often consistent with actual behavior. However, deviations by some 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
What decisions will a group of privately informed agents arrive at? This question 
obviously has many possible answers depending on the specific environments exam-
ined and the assumptions on behavior. In this thesis, two distinct approaches are 
taken. First, in Chapter 2 and 3 the core is examined in economies with asymmetric 
information. The core has been a popular description of cooperative behavior. The 
core is compared with two prominent noncooperative solution concepts for asymmet-
ric information economies: rational expectations equilibrium (REE), and Bayes Nash 
equilibrium. I study the conditions under which cooperative behavior, described by 
the core, is supported by noncooperative behavior. Second, a particular setting where 
cooperation is of considerable interest is in auctions. Possible cooperative (collusive) 
strategies for a private informed bidders are suggested and studied in experiments. 
A first step in approaching this topic is to understand exactly what is meant 
by the two terms in the title. First, asymmetric information is a description of 
the distribution of information in the economy. At least one agent possesses some 
information about preferences, endowments, or other relevant information that other 
agents do not know. It is also assumed that this information is truly private: it is 
impossible for an agent to credibly prove that he has some particular information. 
Second, cooperation is defined as coordinated behavior between agents. When agents 
are acting noncooperatively, they are assumed to act unilaterally in their own self-
interest. However, this unilateral action by all agents can lead to decisions that are 
inferior to some other feasible choices for all agents. Therefore, cooperative behavior 
may allow them to obtain preferred outcomes through coordinated action. 
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1.1 A Brief History of the Core 
While the concept of the core was originally introduced by Edgeworth (1881), and 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) studied similar notions of coalitional stability, 
the formal definition of, and use of the term, the core was first provided by Gillies 
(1959) and Shubik (1959). In its broadest sense, the core is defined as any outcome 
that is not blocked (or dominated)1 by any coalition. 
The core is meant to represent a kind of coalitional (or cooperative) stability: if at 
a core point, then no individual, or group, would want to move away from that point. 
However, at any point not in the core, at least one group would have an incentive to 
coordinate their activities in order to reap greater utility. 
At any [allocation] in the core all players obtain at least as much as they 
are able to enforce in any coalition. By means of n-person game analysis 
and an examination of the core, we can give meaning to such vague ideas 
as "a world of monopolies." In any economy, any [allocation] of wealth 
which does not lie in the core implies that some group of individuals is 
profiting at the expense of another group. (Shubik 1959) 
As Aumann (1961) describes, in order to transform this intuitive definition of the 
core into a formal mathematical notion, it is necessary to answer three questions: 
1. What is the setting? (i.e., Is this an exchange economy, noncooperative game, 
cooperative game, etc.?) 
2. What are the possible 'outcomes'? 
3. What does it mean for a coalition to 'block'? 
Different answers to these three question can lead to widely varying results. 
For example, Gillies (1959) originally defined the core in the same setting as von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) seminal analysis of cooperative games. The abil-
ity of agents to completely transfer utility amongst themselves is assumed. Therefore, 
1Shapley (1972) has criticized the use of the term blocked in favor other terms such as dominated. 
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the value, V(S), of any coalition can be represented by a single number and any allo-
cation such that Ls Xi < V(S) is blocked by coalition S. In this transferable utility 
(TU) setting, the core is a subset of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set. 
The von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set requires that any allocation not in the 
set be blocked by some allocation in the set, and that any allocation in the set not be 
blocked by any other allocation in the set. Aumann (1961) studied the core in a more 
restrictive class of situations known as non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The 
set of feasible allocations for a coalition can no longer be characterized by a single 
number. Instead, V(S) is the set of possible allocations for coalition S. 
One of the primary reasons for the historical success of the core solution is the 
role it has played in describing competitive equilibrium behavior in large economies.2 
Edgeworth was the first to describe this feature. In a two agent exchange economy, 
the set of mutually beneficial trades (the contract curve) is much larger than the set 
of competitive equilibria. However, as the economy grows (under some reasonable 
assumptions) and bargaining between more than two players is allowed, this "range 
of indeterminacy" or contract curve shrinks. In the limit, the contract curve is iden-
tical to the competitive allocation. His conjecture was formalized and proven first by 
Shubik (1959) in a limited setting, and proven in a more general setting by Debreu 
and Scarf (1963).3 The core limit theorem provides a strong justification for compet-
itive equilibrium: for extremely large economies the difference between competitive 
equilibria and cooperative equilibria is negligible. In other words, in the limit, the 
price taking assumption of competitive equilibrium is justified. No agent or group of 
agents can benefit by choosing some other set of feasible trades. 
Most of the utilization of the core described up to this point is in games with 
transferable utility and pure exchange economies. In these settings, it is fairly obvi-
ous how to define the set of outcomes for each coalition. For example, in an exchange 
economy, a coalition can obtain any allocation that is equal to their endowment 
(Ls Xi :S Ls ei)· However, in more complex environments defining the set of fea-
2Schotter (1973) provides an in depth survey of the core's relation to competitive equilibria. 
3Numerous other studies have extended limit results in even less restrictive settings. 
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sible outcomes becomes more difficult. In economies with production, production is 
typically introduced by the inclusion of a set Y that describes how inputs may be 
turned into output for the whole economy. What can a coalition produce? In order 
to define feasible outcomes for a coalition, a production possibilities set, Y8 , for each 
coalition must be defined. The addition of externalities can cause similar difficulties. 
If a coalition breaks off, do they enjoy the externality provided by the whole economy? 
Or, are they to be treated as a completely separate economy? Foley (1970) discusses 
versions of the core that assume different possibilities for coalitions. Even the setting 
of noncooperative games complicates the discussion of outcomes. Suppose that a 
coalition decides on a particular strategy in the game. Then their payoff will vary by 
the choices of strategies by the other N - S players. The a-core and (3-core are the 
prominent methods for rectifying this difficulty (Aumann 1961). In the a-core the 
payoff to a coalition for any strategy is assumed to be the minimum feasible payoff: 
the N - S coalition chooses a strategy which punishes the deviating coalition to the 
greatest extent possible. The (3-core makes the opposite assumption. Of course, a 
problem with both these core versions is that they may not make sense for the N - S 
coalition to actually follow such strategies. 
The setting that is of primary interest in this thesis is where agents have private 
information. In all the settings discussed previously, it was assumed that all the agents 
knew everything there is to know about the other agents. However, in most realistic 
economic situations, there is significant asymmetric information. For example, I know 
things about my preferences that you do not know, and it is impossible, without the 
proper incentives, to force me to truthfully reveal this information. A classic and 
simple example of such a setting is known as a lemons market originally due to Akerlof 
(1970). In this setting a seller has some private information about the quality of the 
product he is selling. The potential buyer has to consider the fact that the product 
may be of a high or low quality when deciding to make a purchase at a particular price. 
The existence of private information can lead to new difficulties in defining the core. 
First, it is not necessarily reasonable to assume full communication. Agents may not 
want to fully communicate all of their private information. For example, a seller with 
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a high quality product would want to announce the quality of his product. However, 
holders of low quality products would not be so willing to communicate. Second, what 
is a feasible outcome at any given time can vary according to the private information 
of the agents. Wilson (1978) tackled the first issue in his seminal discussion of the 
application of the core to asymmetric information exchange economies. He defined 
the fine core, which assumes full communication between agents, and the coarse core, 
which assumes no communication between agents. Yannelis (1991) and Allen (1991) 
represented these communication restrictions by measurability restrictions on the set 
of attainable outcomes for coalitions. They also described a new core concept known 
as the private core. While numerous other variants of the core have been developed for 
asymmetric information economies (see (Hahn and Yannelis 1997b, Lee 1997, Lee and 
Volij 1997, Volij 1997, Vohra 1997)), much of the focus has been placed on formulating 
new variations of the core rather than demonstrating the efficacy, or usefulness, of 
a particular version. My intention here is to begin to unlock the conundrum of the 
core with asymmetric information by identifying the properties the core must satisfy 
in order to obtain results that the core (in perfect information settings) naturally 
satisfies. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the core in pure exchange, differential information 
economies. I take a similar approach to Yannelis and Allen in utilizing measurability 
restrictions to define different levels of assumed communication. Given a particular 
communication structure for each coalition, outcomes are required to be consistent 
with this level of communication: if, after communication, an agent still cannot distin-
guish two states, then his allocation should not vary over those states. I also examine 
some features of the definition of blocking for these economies. In Chapter 2, I look at 
the difference between strong and weak blocking, and in Chapter 3 I discuss the use 
of a one state deviation principle instead of the typical requirement that an allocation 
must be preferred in all states. 
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1.2 Would I Lie to You? 
An assumption of most of the literature on the core with asymmetric information is 
that, if agents communicate, then they communicate truthfully. This is a strong as-
sumption about cooperation between agents. However, as the lemons market example 
indicates, some agents may be more than willing to lie about their information: the 
low quality seller may be willing to communicate but he would undoubtedly never 
acknowledge that he had a low quality product. A more realistic assumption might be 
that agents need to be given the proper incentives in order to truthfully reveal their 
information. There are two justifications for the imposition of an incentive compati-
bility constraint. First, if agents are making a group decision and they do not know 
that the information revealed by all agents is truthful then they have to discount what 
they say (or not use their information). Second, the Revelation Principle guarantees 
that any outcome which can be attained as a Bayes Nash equilibrium of some game 
can also be attained through a direct revelation mechanism (Gibbard 1973, Dasgupta, 
Hammond, and Maskin 1979). In other words, any noncooperative equilibrium can 
be replicated by a mechanism that is incentive compatible. 
In Chapter 4, I focus on how incentive compatibility limits the choice of possible 
strategies by bidders in an auctfon. Bidders would ideally like to arrive at an alloca-
tion which maximizes their joint surplus, but these incentive constraints limit their 
effectiveness. While in single object auctions these restrictions can be quite severe 
(at least when side payments are not allowed), in multiple object auctions a larger 
variety of uniformly more profitable collusive strategies are possible. 
1.3 Notational and Mathematical Preliminaries 
Every effort has been made to keep notation consistent across chapters.4 Each chapter 
contains a section that describes the notation used, assumptions made, and other 
particular features. A few preliminary notational conventions are worthy of mention. 
4However, Chapter 4 contains notation that is significantly different than that of the preceding 
two chapters. 
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Let x and y be two vectors with Xi and Yi specific elements within the vector. The 
following operators are defined as follows: 
x > y if and only if Xi > Yi for all i 
x ;:::: y if and only if Xi ;:::: Yi for all i 
x = y if and only if Xi = Yi for all i 
The vector containing a zero in all of its elements is given by 0. Let A be a finite set. 
Then #A indicates the cardinality of the set. 
I define terms that are used without definition but may be unfamiliar to the reader. 
Aliprantis and Border (1994) is a common reference for most of these definitions and 
provides a more thorough investigation into their properties. 
Let F and G be two cumulative distribution functions on the same space X. The 
distribution F first-order stochastic dominates G if it is always more likely to take on 
higher values. 
1.3.1 Definition F first-order stochastic dominates G if 
F(x):::; G(x) for allx EX. 
Let (X, E1) and (Y, E2) be two measurable spaces where E 1 and E2 are both 
a-fields of X and Y respectively. Let f be a function mapping (X, E1) to (Y, E2). 
1.3.2 Definition A function f is (E1 , E2) measurable if for all SE E2 , 1-1(8) E E1 . 
1.3.3 Definition A vector space X and an order relation ;:::: is a Riesz space if: 
1. x;:::: y implies x + z;:::: y + z for all z EX, 
2. x ;:::: y implies ax 2:: ay for all a 2:: 0, and 
3. If each pair of elements x, y EX has a supremum and an infimum. 
8 
1.3.4 Definition A space X is a Banach Lattice if it is a norm complete Riesz space. 
1.3.5 Definition A real function, II · II, on a vector space X is a norm if: 
1. 11 x + Y 11:::;11 x II + II Y II, 
2. II ax II= !al II x II for all a~ 0, and 
3. II x II= 0 if and only if x = 0. 
Let Xa be a net. Then we can define an order continuous norm. 
1.3.6 Definition A norm 11 · II is order continuous if Xa -J, 0 implies 11 Xa 11-J- 0. 
Let (Y, I:, µ) be a measure space and X be a Banach lattice. A function, g : Y -+ X 
is simple if there exists (finite) x1 , x 2 , ••• , Xn E X and S1 , S2 , ••• , Sn E I: such that 
g = E~=l XiXsi where Xsi is an indicator function (Xs; 1 if y E Si)· 
1.3. 7 Definition A measurable function f : Y -+ X is Bochner integrable if there 
exists a sequence of simple functions Un)';:=1 such that 
lim { 11 fn(Y) - f(y) 11 dµ(y) = o 
n->oo }y 
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Chapter 2 The Welfare Properties of Rational 
Expectations Equilibria: The Core 
10 
Abstract 
By utilizing restrictions on the measurability of allocations, the welfare properties of 
REE are clarified. Measurability restrictions may be thought of as exogenous con-
straints on the level of communication between differently informed agents. I present 
first and second welfare theorems for REE. The measurability restrictions necessary 
to obtain these results highlight both the sources of inefficiency for REE and the in-
formation processing embodied in REE. In simple replica economies, core equivalence 
cannot be obtained. Finally, I present a new market equilibrium concept, pseudo ra-
tional expectations equilibrium (PREE), which yields positive welfare theorems and 
core equivalence. 
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2 .1 Introduction 
Rational expectations equilibria (REE) may not be ex post, interim, or ex ante effi-
cient (Laffont 1985). On the other hand, fully revealing REE are generally ex post 
efficient but may not be interim efficient (Allen 1981, Grossman 1981). The exis-
tence of partially revealing REE may eliminate insurance opportunities and Pareto 
improving trades. Jordan (1983) has demonstrated that only for limited parametric 
classes of utility functions are all REE efficient. What more positive can be said 
about the welfare properties of REE? Can some allocations be ruled out as possible 
REE? What properties must an allocation have in order for it to be a REE? In perfect 
information economies, these questions are answered by the first and second welfare 
theorems which say that all Walrasian equilibria are efficient (and in the core) and 
that any efficient allocation can become a Walrasian equilibrium. 
In this chapter, I study one possible technique for obtaining similar results in 
asymmetric information exchange economies: the use of measurability restrictions. In 
these economies, where there are multiple possible states of nature, how an allocation 
varies over these states may be related to the information agents possess. For example, 
if agents are unable to distinguish between two states, then they should not contract 
different allocations in each state (just as a player in an extensive form game cannot 
choose different actions at different nodes in the same information set). Recently, 
such an approach has been used to provide constrained definitions of efficiency and 
the core in differential information economies (Hahn and Yannelis 1997b, Yannelis 
1991, Koutsougeras and Yannelis 1993, Allen 1993). Using measurability restrictions 
can be thought of as exogenously imposing communication restrictions on agents 
and coalitions (Wilson 1978). Classical versions of ex ante and interim efficiency 
necessarily imply full communication between all agents by allowing allocations to 
vary over every state. Measurability constrained versions enlarge the set of 'efficient' 
or 'core' allocations by shrinking the set of blocking allocations. 
In addition to measurability restrictions, in asymmetric information economies the 
informational stage becomes a relevant concern. There are three primary stages of 
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interest: ex ante, interim, and ex post. At the ex ante stage agents do not yet possess 
their private information, yet are aware of what their preferences, endowments, etc. 
would be if they did know the state of the world. At the interim stage, each agent 
has observed some private information which allows him to rule out certain events. 
Finally, at the ex post stage all relevant uncertainty is revealed and each agent knows 
the state of the world. Much of the analysis of measurability constrained core and 
efficiency solutions has focused on evaluations made at the ex ante stage (Hahn and 
Yannelis 1997b, Koutsougeras and Yannelis 1993, Page 1997, Srivastava 1984). Anal-
ysis at the ex post stage becomes equivalent to a discussion of perfect information 
economies (since all private information is revealed). When discussing the welfare 
properties of REE, the interim informational stage seems most appropriate. REE 
is, at least implicitly, an interim concept: agents make choices of quantities to de-
mand having learned their private information and additional information revealed by 
prices. Therefore, interim welfare concepts which consider what agents prefer given 
their private information are examined. 
I present measurability restrictions which are sufficient to obtain first and second 
welfare theorems in the interim stage. All REE fall within the set of allocations 
which are not blocked by coalitions of agents where each agent uses only his private 
information (the fine private core). However, in order to construct an allocation which 
is itself a REE, one must also know that it is not blocked by the grand coalition using 
its pooled information (fine efficient). The measurability restrictions required for the 
second welfare theorem are more restrictive than those required for the first welfare 
theorem. This suggests that, while it is only possible to make minimal inferences 
about the level of communication necessary to yield REE, strong communication 
assumptions must be made in order to find sufficient conditions for an allocation to 
be a REE. The inconsistency between these two results suggests a new critique of the 
REE concept, since it calls into question how a market process (or auctioneer) might 
arrive at the allocations and prices described by REE. 
I relax the measurability assumptions of REE and describe a new market equilib-
rium concept called pseudo rational expectations equilibrium (PREE). While agents 
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still only use the information revealed by prices in order to update their preferences, 
there are no information restrictions on the set of feasible allocations. The measur-
ability restrictions needed for welfare theorems for PREE do not share the previous 
inadequacy. They also demonstrate that a weakening of fully revealing REE is suffi-
cient to obtain ex post efficient allocations. 
Replica economies are generalized to differential information economies. After 
demonstrating that the fine private core does not converge to the set of REE, I show 
that core equivalence for PREE can be obtained. 
In Section 2.2 I present the basic model of a Radner differential information econ-
omy. In Section 2.3, I describe how measurability restrictions are used to provide 
constrained efficiency and core definitions. I also note an important difference be-
tween weak and strong blocking in these environments. Section 2.4 presents first and 
second welfare theorems for REE and PREE. Finally, in Section 2.5 I discuss core 
convergence in replica economies. General sufficient conditions are provided for core 
definitions to satisfy equal treatment. 
2.2 The Model 
The model of an exchange economy presented here is the same as that used by Page 
(1997) and Yannelis (1991). Let N = {1, 2, ... , n} be the number of agents in an 
exchange economy. The commodity space is given by Y = :!Re with positive or-
thant Y+ R~. 1 Let (n, 9=', µ)be the probability space describing uncertainty in the 
model where µ is a probability measure representing ex ante probabilities and 9=' is 
a O"-field over n. Let the set of all possible state contingent allocations be given by 
L1 (S1, 9=', µ; Y) or the space of equivalence classes of 9='-measurable, (Bochner) inte-
grable functions x : n -+ Y. An agent, i, is a five-tuple (Yi, s=-i, Ui, ei, µi) where: 
Yi : n -+ 2Y+ is the state dependent consumption set correspondence of agent 
i, 
1 All the results of this chapter remain true if Y is a Banach lattice with order continuous norm. 
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S:-i is a sub-er-field of 9=' that represents agent i's private information, 
Ui : Y X Sl-+ JR is agent i's state contingent utility function, 
ei : St-+ Y+ is a function denoting agent i's state contingent initial endowment 
of commodities, and 
µi is a probability measure on (St, 9=') that represents agent i's prior beliefs. 
An economy with asymmetric information E = ((Yi, S:-i, ui, ei, µi)iEN) is a finite col-
lection of agents. The following assumptions are imposed on the model. 
2.2.1 Assumption For each w E n, Y(w) c Y+ is a nonempty, convex, and se-
quentially closed set. 
2.2.2 Assumption For all i E N 
i. ui is (9=', '.By) measurable where '.By is the Borel cr-fi.eld ofY, 
ii. For all w E n ui(w, ·) is concave, sequentially weakly upper semicontinuous on 
Y+, and 
iii. ui(·, ·) is integrably bounded. 
Measurability of the utility function assures that 9=' captures all relevant information 
in the economy. Utility is also assumed to be integrably bounded in order to ensure 
existence of an expected utility representation. 
2.2.3 Assumption For all i E N 
i. ei is S:-i measurable, 
ii. ei is (Bochner) integrable, and 
iii. ei(w) E Yi(w) a.e.[µ]. 
15 
Assuming that endowments are measurable with respect to private information is 
standard (Koutsougeras and Yannelis 1993, Page 1997). If the endowment were not 
9='i measurable, then an agent could use the fact that his endowment varies over states 
which he previously could not distinguish to refine his information. 
I also make a variety of assumptions on the structure of information (9='i) and 
beliefs (µi) for each agent. A class of subsets, 9, of n are said to generate ~if 9=' is 
the smallest a-field containing 9. 
2.2.4 Assumption 9=' is finitely generated. 
Finitely generated a-fields can be generated by finite partitions. 2 Therefore, finitely 
generated a-fields represent finite information structures where each atom, denoted 
by F(w ), represents the smallest discernible event. 
2.2.5 Assumption ~ = a(LJiEN 9='i)· 
This is the same assumption used by Allen (1981) to eliminate the possibility that 
prices may depend on more information than all the agents jointly possess. In other 
words, sun spot equilibria, i.e., equilibria which depend on information which none 
of the agents have are ruled out. 
Each agent's prior is assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to µ. 
2.2.6 Assumption For each i E N, and for E E 9=', µ(E) = 0 if and only if 
µi(E) = 0. 
In order to ensure that interim expected utilities are well defined, measures are 
assumed to be purely atomic. 
2.2.7 Assumption µ(F(w)) > 0 for all w En. 
There are no events to which any agent assigns zero probability. Under Assump-
tion 2.2.6, this assumption is without loss of generality: any economy for which 
there are states to which all agents assign zero prior probability, a modified economy 
2The partition formed by the a-field's atoms will generate the a-field. 
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which excludes these states and satisfies Assumption 2.2. 7 can be constructed. Since 
these excluded states were assigned zero probability, they could not have effected any 
agent's preferences. 
A bundle for agent i is a function Xi : n --+ Y+ that assigns to agent i a commodity 
vector in each state of the world. The set of bundles for agent i is denoted by JIBi, 
where JIBi = {xi : xi(w) E Yi(w) a.e.[µ]}. An allocation for a coalition S ~ N is a 
vector x E (JIBi)iES denoted by xs. I denote the set of all feasible allocations for this 
coalition by JIB(S) where 
JIB(S) = {xsl :Lxi(w) = :Lei(w) a.e.[µ]}. 
iES iES 
Let G be the set of all possible sub-O"-fields of 1' satisfying the assumptions given 
above. The interim expected utility function Vi : JIBi x n x G --+ JR of agent i is defined 
by 
When not explicitly stated, interim expected utility will be assumed to be taken with 
respect to agent i's private information, '.Ii, and will be denoted Vi(xi,w). 
2.2.8 Lemma For all i EN, ifui(w, ·)is upper semicontinuous and concave for every 
w E 0, then Vi(·, w, 1') is weakly upper semicontinuous and concave for all w E f2. 
Proof: See Theorem 2.8 in Balder and Yannelis (1993). II 
2.2.9 Lemma For all i E N, if ui(w, ·) is strictly concave for every w E n, then 
Vi(w, ·)is strictly concave for all w En. 
Proof: See Allen (1993). II 
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2.3 Information Restrictions, Efficiency, and the 
Core 
If an agent or set of agents cannot distinguish two states of the world, then it is 
reasonable to expect that their actions should not vary between those states. At the 
interim stage, agents possess their private information J'i. In other words, one would 
expect their choices to remain constant for Fi ( w). However, in the process of coming 
to a group decision (which implicitly the core is) agents may communicate some of 
this private information. Since agents are asymmetrically informed, each agent may 
be able to improve his information (distinguish between more states). Unconstrained 
versions of interim efficiency and the core allow allocations to vary over any state 
(see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)). Thus, it is as if the agents in N (the grand 
coalition) fully communicate their information to each other. Constrained versions of 
efficiency and the core can be developed by placing measurability restrictions upon 
the definitions. Under the assumptions made on the probability space, the extent of 
communication between agents is representable by measurability restrictions on the 
set of allocations. A function f : n -+ X is measurable with respect to 9 if: 
f(w') = f(w), for all w' E G(w), for all w En 
where G(w) is an atom. For example, unconstrained core and efficiency concepts 
allow each agent's allocation, Xi, to be J' measurable. This approach has been used 
extensively in the developing literature on the core in economies with differential 
information (Yannelis 1991, Allen 1993, Srivastava 1984) and has also recently been 
applied to definitions of efficiency by Morris (1994) and Hahn and Yannelis (1997b). 
There are two types of restrictions that may be imposed: restrictions on the final 
allocation, and restrictions on the allocations which coalitions use to block. Let 9i be 
the o--field with respect to which the final allocation, Xi, is assumed to be measurable 
for each i. Let 9i(S) be the o--field with respect to which blocking allocations, Yi, 
for i E S can be measurable. By restricting 9i to a sub-o--field of S:-, the number of 
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available allocations shrinks. However, restricting 9i(S) to a sub-u-field of J' decreases 
the number of blocking allocations, thus potentially increasing the set of solutions. 
An allocation is blocked if there is a coalition, S, and a state of the world such 
that all agents in the coalition strictly prefer some other feasible allocation at that 
state. 
2.3.1 Definition An allocation, x, is 9i(S) blocked by S if there exists an w E n 
and a y E IIB(S) such that Yi is 9i(S) measurable for all i E S and Vi(yi, w) > Vi(xi, w) 
for all i ES. 
2.3.2 Definition xis (9i, 9i(N)) efficient if: 
1. Xi is 9i measurable for each i E N, 
11. x E IIB(N), and 
iii. x is not 9i(N) blocked by N. 
A general definition for the core with measurability restrictions is as follows. 
2.3.3 Definition xis in the (9i, 9i(S)) core if: 
i. Xi is 9i measurable for each i EN, 
ii. x E IIB(N), and 
iii. For all S ~ N, xis not 9i(S) blocked by S. 
A variety of combinations of measurability restrictions on both the allocation, 9i, 
and the blocking allocations, 9i(S), may be used to formulate alternative versions of 
efficiency and the core. Represent coarse information sharing by J's = u(nies J'i): 
the largest u-field common to all u-fields J'i. All events E E u(nies J'i) are said to be 
common knowledge for coalition S. Also, let 378 = u(LJies J'i) be the coarsest u-field 
containing all the u-fields J'i representing distributed (or pooled) information of coali-
tion S. Hahn and Yannelis (1997b) have extensively discussed various constrained 
versions of efficiency. One such definition is that of fine efficiency which requires that 
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9i S:-i and 9i(N) = 9=' N for all i EN. While the final allocation for each agent may 
only be measurable with respect to his private information, blocking allocations may 
be measurable with respect to the agents' pooled information implying full commu-
nication. Versions of the coarse and fine core originally defined by Wilson (1978) and 
presented in terms of measurability restrictions by Yannelis (1991) can also be cap-
tured using this approach. The coarse core encompasses the restriction that coalitions 
can only make decisions over those events which are commonly known to the coalition. 
Therefore, 9i(S) equals S:-s for each coalition. In keeping with Yannelis' presentation, 
the final allocation is allowed to be measurable with respect to each agent's private 
information (or 9i = S:-i). The fine core describes the case where coalitions are able to 
fully communicate. Therefore, it is assumed that 9i(S) = 9='8 for each coalition. The 
most common version of the core is one where agents may only choose allocations 
which vary with respect to their private information (9i(S) = S:-i)· This private or 
publicly predictable information core (PC(£)) has been used extensively by Yannelis 
(1991), Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), and Allen (1992b, 1993). While the coarse 
and private cores are non-empty under the assumptions made here, it can be easily 
shown that the fine core is empty in many reasonable situations. 
2.3.1 Weak vs. Strong Blocking 
The definition of blocking given in Definition 2.3.l makes the strong requirement that 
all agents in a coalition strictly prefer the blocking allocation. A weaker definition may 
be more reasonable: a coalition will block an allocation if it can find an alternative 
which all agents weakly prefer and at least one agent strictly prefers. 
2.3.4 Definition (Weak Blocking) An allocation, x, is weakly 9i(S) blocked by 
S if there exists an w E n and a y E IB\(S) such that Yi is 9i(S) measurable for all 
i ES and Vi(Yi,w) ~ Vi(xi,w) for all i ES, with strict inequality for some j ES. 
A general definition of efficiency using weak blocking can then be given. 
2.3.5 Definition xis (9i, 9i(N)) efficient with weak blocking if: 
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1. Xi is 9i measurable for each i E N, 
ii. x E IBl( N), and 
iii. x is not weakly 9i(N) blocked by N. 
Then a general definition for the core with weak blocking is as follows. 
2.3.6 Definition xis in the (9i, 9i(S)) core with weak blocking if: 
i. Xi is 9i measurable for each i E N, 
ii. x E IBl(N), and 
iii. For all S ~ N, x is not weakly 9i ( S) blocked by S. 
In perfect ~nformation exchange economies, weak blocking and the earlier strong 
notion of blocking are identical under minimal assumptions: strong monotonicity and 
continuity of preferences are sufficient for strong and weak blocking to be equivalent. 
But, in differential information economies, weak blocking may allow more blocking 
allocations thus shrinking the size of the efficient allocations or the core. The following 
example illustrates this with state-independent preferences that are monotonic and 
continuous. 
2.3.7 Example Consider an economy with three types of agents (denoted by 1, 2, 
and 3) and two agents of each type (labeled A and B respectively). Let there be 
three states of nature denoted by a, b, c. There are two goods in each state, and each 
agent has a state-independent utility function given by Ui x~[2xi{2 . All agents 
assign equal prior probability to each state of nature. The agents' endowments and 
information are described by Table 2.1. The allocation described in Table 2.2 is a 
feasible allocation. However, if blocking allocations are allowed to be measurable 
with respect to private information, i.e., 9i(S) = S:-i, the allocation is weakly blocked 
by the coalition S = {lB, 2B, 3B}. Table 2.3 gives the weakly blocking allocation. 
However, S cannot strongly block the original allocation, since that would require 
that agent 2B transfer a small amount of positive allocation to agent lB in states 
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a and b. Since the original allocation gives 2B zero of both goods in state b, this is 
impossible. !:::,. 
Endowments 
Agent i s=-i State: a b c 
1 {a,b},{c} (2,0) (2,0) (1,3) 
2 {a},{b,c} (0,2) (0,0) (0,0) 
3 {a},{b},{c} (0,0) (0,2) (3,1) 
Table 2.1: Endowments and Information for Example 2.3.7 
The problem rests in the requirement that each agent's blocking allocation be mea-
surable with respect to 9i(S). An agent who is made strictly better by an allocation 
which is weakly blocking must be able to redistribute the allocation in a manner that 
is 9i(S) measurable for each agent. A sufficient technique is for the agent to give 
each other agent an increase in his allocation over an event which is measurable with 
respect to o-(niES 9i(S)), the finest o--field for which the allocation is measurable with 
respect to 9i(S) for all i in S. As the example illustrates, agents may have a zero 
allocation at some state in this event, prohibiting this redistribution. However, as 
long as allocations are strictly positive, weak and strong blocking are equivalent. 
2.3.8 Proposition Let preferences be continuous, strongly monotonic and x* and x 
be feasible allocations. If x 9i(S) weakly blocks x* for coalition Sand xi(w) > 0 for 
all w E fl, then x* is strongly blocked by S. 
Proof: Let x weakly block x* for some coalition S. Then, for some w*, Vi(xi,w*) 2:: 
Vi(xi, w*) for all i E S, with strict inequality somewhere. Let j be an agent such that 
Vj(xi, w*) > Vj(xi, w*). Let F s(w*) be the atom generated by the coarsening o--field 
o-(niES 9i(S)). Define a strong blocking allocation, x', as follows. 
For all i E S\ {j} 
x~(w) = 
xi(w) + E w E Fs(w*) 
Xi ( w) otherwise 
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Allocation 
Agent i State: a b c 
lA (1, 1) (1, 1) (2,2) 
lB (1, 1) (1, 1) (2, 2) 
2A (2,2) (0,0) (0, 0) 
2B (0,0) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
3A (0, 0) (1,1) (2,2) 
3B (0,0) (1, 1) (2,2) 
Table 2.2: A Weakly Blocked Allocation for Example 2.3.7 
Allocation 
Agent i State: a b c 
lB (1, 1) (1, 1) (2, 2) 
2B (1, 1) (0,0) (0, 0) 
3B (0, 0) (1,1) (2, 2) 
Table 2.3: A Weakly Blocking Allocation for Example 2.3.7 
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and for j 
Xj(w) - ISie w E Fs(w*) 
x j ( w) otherwise 
where e > 0 is such that 
i. Xj(w) - ISie > 0 for all w E Fs(w*), 
ii. Vj(xj ISie, w*) > Vj(xj, w*), 
iii. Vi(xi + e, w*) > Vi(xi, w*). 
Since Xj(w) > 0 for all w En and preferences are continuous, an e > 0 exists which 
satisfies the first two conditions. Strong monotonicity ensures that the third condition 
holds. Clearly, x' is still 9i(S) measurable for all i E S. Thus, x' strongly blocks x*. 
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As the proof of Proposition 2.3.8 makes clear, positivity of blocking allocations is 
necessary to ensure that an agent who strictly prefers x to x* can offer a new block-
ing allocation which is measurable for each member of the coalition. On the other 
hand, there are natural measurability restrictions under which every weakly blocked 
allocation is also strongly blocked. One such condition is that each agent in S be able 
to obtain blocking allocations which are measurable with respect to the same a-field. 
2.3.9 Proposition Let x* and x be feasible allocations. Assume preferences are 
continuous, strongly monotonic and 9i(S) 9j(S) for all i, j ES. If x weakly blocks 
x* for coalition S, then x* is strongly blocked by S. 
Proof: Notice that by strong monotonicity, in order for Vj(xj, w*) > Vj(xj, w*) it 
must be that xj(w) > 0 for all w E Fi(S)(w*), and that a(niES 9i(S)) = 9i(S) for all 
i ES. Then, apply the proof for Proposition 2.3.8. I 
In standard general equilibrium theory with perfect information, the difference 
between strong and weak blocking can be mitigated with a few simple assumptions. 
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In differential information economies, without making the additional assumption of 
strictly positive endowments, the choice of blocking technique can change the set of 
core allocations when 9i(S) =J. 9j(S) for some i,j. In Section 2.5, this difference 
will become relevant when discussing equal treatment. Except when noted, strong 
blocldng (as in Definition 2.3.1) is assumed. 
2.4 Welfare Theorems 
Rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is meant to capture the fact that prices may 
convey information. For example, if an agent observes a high price for a particular 
good, he may be able to rule out certain states of the world where such a high price 
would not be consistent with utility maximization by the other agents. Therefore, a 
REE is a fixed point not only over the space of feasible allocations, but also over the 
information that prices (and possibly the allocation) transmit. 
A price vector is a measurable function p: n-+ Y~ where Y~ is the dual space of 
positive linear functionals. The information conveyed by the prices is the partition 
of n given by Pp such that Pp(w) = {w' E Olp(w) = p(w')}. Let 1'p be the O"-field 
generated by this partition. Given a price vector, each agent may be able to improve 
his private information. Thus 9='iup = 0"(9='i U 1'p) is agent i's information refined by 
prices. 
The definition of rational expectations equilibrium I use is equivalent to that used 
by Allen (1981) and Radner (1979). 
2.4.1 Definition A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for an economy, E, is 
a (p, x) such that for all i E N, 
i. Xi is 1'iup measurable, 
ii. For all w E n, there does not exist a Yi such that Yi is 1'iup measurable, 
p(w)yi(w)::; p(w)ei(w), and Vi(Yi, w, 9='iup) > Vi(xi, w, 9='iup), and 
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The requirement that the allocations only be measurable with respect to each agent's 
private information and the prices ensures that the allocation does not provide agents 
with additional information. If the allocation were not 3='iup measurable for each agent, 
there would be states of the world which agents could distinguish by the fact that 
they received different allocations. It would then be reasonable to assume that agents 
may refine their information with respect to the allocation which may change their 
preferences and lead to the allocation no longer being an equilibrium. Therefore, 
this definition captures the notion that the allocation as well as prices may reveal 
information. 
One of the classical results in general equilibrium theory is the first welfare the-
orem: under weak assumptions, the set of Walrasian equilibria is contained in the 
core. Since the first welfare theorem implies that a decentralized price process leads 
to core allocations, this result provides a compelling argument in favor of Walrasian 
equilibria. Laffont (1985) has shown that REE are not always unconstrained interim 
efficient. However, it is possible to use exogenously imposed communication restric-
tions in order to find a constrained version of the core containing all REE. In order to 
obtain a first welfare theorem, the private core must be weakened to the fine private 
core :FPC(£) where the final allocations are measurable with respect to the grand 
coalition's pooled information (9i = 3=' N ). 
2.4.2 Definition (Fine Private Core) An allocation x is in the fine private core 
for £ if the followings conditions hold: 
i. each Xi is 3=' N measurable, 
ii. x E IIB(N), and 
iii. For all w E n, there does not exist a coalition S and an allocation, Ys, such 
that Ys E IIB(S), Yi is 3='i measurable for all i ES, and Vi(yi,w) > Vi(xi,w) for 
all i E S. 
Since more allocations are allowed, it is clear that PC(£) ~ :FPC(e). The fine private 
core is nonempty since it satisfies the no-insider condition in Page (1997) which is 
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sufficient for existence. 
Using the fine private core, I provide a constrained first welfare theorem for REE. 
2.4.3 Theorem If ( x*, p) is a REE then x* is in the fi.ne private core. 
Proof: Suppose not. Two possible cases must be checked. 
Case 1: 
xi is not measurable with respect to o-(LJiEN :Yi)· Since (x*,p) is a REE, it must 
be that xi is :Yiup measurable. Since o-(LJiEN :Yi) :r, xi must be measurable with 
respect to :r N· A contradiction. 
Case 2: 
There exists a coalition S and some feasible allocation x', with x~ measurable with 
respect to :ri, for all i E S, such that for all i E Sand for some w E n, 
(2.1) 
and 
I:x~(w) L ei(w) a.e.[µ]. (2.2) 
iES iES 
(2.1) implies that there exists some w" E Fi(w) such that Vi(x~,w",:Yi U :J'p) > 
Vi(xi, w", :Yi U :J'p), but by the definition of REE it must be that p(w')x~(w') > 
p(w')ei(w') for all i E S and for w' since x~ measurable with respect to :Yi implies 
that it is also measurable with respect to o-(:J'i U :J'p) (See Lemma A.0.1). However, 
this implies that for some w' E r2 
p(w') L x~(w') > p(w') L ei(w'). (2.3) 
iES iES 
Since both p and x' are :r measurable it must be that (2.3) holds for all w E F(w'). 
Since the probability measures are assumed to be purely atomic, it must be that for 
all i E S, µi(F(w')) > 0 which contradicts (2.2). I 
The proof is similar to the standard proof of the first welfare theorem for Walrasian 
equilibria except that the measurability of blocking allocations becomes important. 
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Since the blocking allocation is measurable with respect to 1'i, it must also be measur-
able with respect to 1'iup which tells us, by the definition of REE, that the blocking 
allocation cannot be affordable. On the other hand, any measurability restriction 
which is not a coarsening of 1'i may not be measurable with respect to 1'iup· 
An obvious corollary to Theorem 2.4.3 is that the set of REE also fall within the 
set of fine private efficient (Qi = 1', 9i(N) = 1'i) allocations. A more traditional first 
welfare theorem is then: 
2.4.4 Corollary If (x*,p) is a REE then x* is fi.ne private efficient. 
Is the fine private core the smallest core concept which contains the set of REE? 
The following two examples demonstrate that for two common refinements of the fine 
private core there are REE which fall outside them. 
2.4.5 Example There exist economies such that REE i. PC(£). Consider an econ-
omy with two agents (denoted by 1,2) and three states of nature (denoted by a, b, c). 
There are two goods in each state, and each agent has a state-independent utility 
function given by ui xi[2 xi£2 • All agents assign equal prior probability to each 
state of nature. The agents' endowment and information are described by Table 2.4. 
The allocation and prices in Table 2.5 are a REE. The prices fully reveal the state 
of nature and, therefore, the allocation varies over every state. Thus, the allocation 
is not measurable with respect to 1'i for some agents, implying that it cannot be a 
private core allocation. 6. 
Endowments 
Agent i g:'i State: a b c 
1 {a},{b,c} (4,0) (6,3) (6,3) 
2 {a, b}, {c} (0,4) (0,4) (3,6) 
Table 2.4: Endowments and Information for Example 2.4.5 
Another core concept, the weak fine core (Koutsougeras and Yannelis 1993), is a 
weakening of the fine core to allow the actual allocation to be 1' N measurable. 
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Allocation 
Agent i State: a b c 
1 (2, 2) (4~,5) (4!,4!) 
2 (2, 2) (1¥,2) (4!,4!) 
Prices (!,!) (l~' 163) (!, !) 
Table 2.5: REE for Example 2.4.5 
2.4.6 Definition (Weak Fine Core) An allocation xis in the weak E.ne core for£ 
if the followings conditions hold: 
1. each Xi is S: N measurable, 
ii. x E JIB(N), and 
iii. For all w E n, there does not exist a coalition S and an allocation, Ys E JIB(S), 
such that Yi is S:-8 measurable for all i ES, and Vi(yi,w) > Vi(xi,w) for all 
i ES. 
The set of allocations in the fine core for economy£ is denoted by WFC(£). Unlike 
the fine core, the weak fine core exists under the assumptions made here. Also, since 
more allocations can block under this definition, WFC(E) ~ FPC(E). 
2.4.7 Example There exist economies such that REE ~ WFC(E). Consider an 
economy with two agents (denoted by 1,2) and two states of nature (denoted by a, b). 
There are two goods in each state. Agent 1 has a state-independent utility function 
given by u1 x11 + x 12 . Agent 2's state-dependent utility function is given by: 
u2(x, w) 
~ log X21 + ~ log X22 w a 
~ log x21 + ~ log X22 w = b 
The agents' endowments and information are described by Table 2.6. The allocation 












Table 2.6: Endowments and Information for Example 2.4. 7 
Allocation 
Agent i State: a b 
1 (2!, 2!) (7!, 2!) 
2 (2!, 2!) (2!, 2!) 
Prices (!, !) (!, !) 
Table 2.7: REE for Example 2.4.7 
for an allocation that does not vary within his information is given by 
1 1 
U2 = 2 log X21 + 2 log X22. 
However, this allocation is not in the weak fine core. The allocation given in Table 2.8 
is measurable with respect to the agents' distributed information, and is strictly 
preferred in all states by both agents. 
In fact, the two examples show something more: for any strict refinement of the 
fine private core there are always economies such that REE are not contained in the 
core. Example 2.4.5 is an example of a fully revealing REE (FRREE). Since FRREE 
will always be measurable with respect to 1', regardless of the restrictions on 9i(S) 








Table 2.8: Blocking Allocation for Example 2.4. 7 
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the core allocations, 9i, must be likewise measurable (see Section 2.4.1 for a more 
complete discussion of FRREE). In the economy constructed for Example 2.4.7, the 
only possible refinement of the fine private core via changes in 9i(S) comes from re-
fining agent 2's information. However, as the example illustrates, there exist partially 
revealing REE that would then be blocked with this improved information. 
2.4.8 Theorem For any (9i, 9i(S)) core such that 9i is coarser than S:-and/or 9i(S) 
is fi.ner than S:-i for all i in S, there exist economies such that the set of REE is not 
contained in that solution. 
Whereas previous results have only shown that REE, in general, fall outside clas-
sical (no measurability restrictions) efficiency and core solutions, I have demonstrated 
that there exists a welfare concept, the fine private core, in which all rational expec-
tations equilibria are contained. Due to the existence of partially revealing REE, the 
constrained welfare concept used cannot imply full communication. Instead, agents 
can be presumed to use only their own private information in blocking allocations. 
Furthermore, I have shown (Theorem 2.4.8) that there is no refinement, at least 
in terms of measurability conditions, of the fine private core which yields a similar 
inclusion for all economies. 
A second classical result in general equilibrium theory is the second welfare theo-
rem: for any Pareto optimal allocation, prices can be constructed such that it is also 
a Walrasian equilibrium for a modified economy. While the first welfare theorem es-
tablishes that all Walrasian equilibria are Pareto optimal, the second welfare theorem 
allows us to conclude that there are endowments (given a fixed set of agents) that 
lead to all Pareto optimal allocations being Walrasian equilibria. Thus, Walrasian 
equilibria are unbiased: all Pareto optimal allocations can be decentralized by prices. 
I ask whether some notion of interim efficiency yields a similar result for rational 
expectations equilibria. If so, then any allocation in this set can be decentralized via 
market prices described by REE. This turns out to be the case for the definition of 
fine efficiency introduced earlier. 
2.4.9 Definition x is fi.ne efficient if x E Iffi(N), Xi is S:-i measurable for all i E N, 
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there does not exist another allocation x' E JIB( N) that is ~ N measurable, and for 
some wand for all i EN, Vi(x~,w) > Vi(xi,w). 
2.4.10 Theorem Let preferences be strictly monotonic. If x* is a fine efficient allo-
cation such that xi(w) > 0 for all i EN and for all w En, then there exists a price 
vector, p such that ( x*, p) is a REE for the initial endowment e = x*. 
Proof: Let x* be a fine efficient allocation. Define a correspondence f3i n --» 
Li (n, ~' µ; Y) as follows: 
which indicates the set of allocations which agent i strictly prefers to xi- Note that 
f3i ( w) is convex as long as ui is concave and integrably bounded. Let (3 : n --» 
Li (n, ~' µ; Y) be defined as the sum of individual allocations in f3i or, 
(3(w) {z E Li(n, ~' µ; Y) I z L::xi and Xi E f3i(w) Vi EN}. 
iEN 
This is the set of all allocations which at w can be redistributed to the agents so 
they will strictly prefer it to x*. Being the sum of convex sets, (3(w) is convex. Let 
e = .Z:::::iEN xi. Since x* is fine efficient, it is clear that for all w E n there does not exist 
an allocation x' such that .Z:::::iEN x~ = e, x~ is ~ measurable, and Vi ( x~, w) > Vi (xi, w) 
for all i EN. Thus, e tt (3(w) for all w En. 
Define the correspondence <p : n --» Y' where Y' is the dual space of linear 
functionals on Y, by 
cp(w) = {p E Y' Ip· z(w) ~ p · e(w), Vz E (3(w)}. 
Note that if (3(w) is convex and nonempty then the set B(w) {x E YI x = 
z(w) for some z E (3(w)} is also convex and nonempty. Let x and x' be two points 
in B(w). Then there exist z and z' such that x = z(w) and x' = z'(w). Since (3(w) 
is convex, it is obvious that z"(w) = az(w) + (1 - a)z'(w) E (3(w), which implies 
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that B(w) is convex. Therefore, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, <p(w) is 
nonempty. <p(w) is closed-valued by Lemma A.0.2, and it is weakly measurable by 
Lemma A.0.3. Therefore, we can apply the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection 
Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1994) p. 505) to find a measurable selector 
p : fl-+ Y' such that for all w E fl and for all z E {J(w) 
p(w) · z(w) 2 p(w) · e(w) 
or 
p(w) · (z(w) - 2.:x;(w)) 2 0. 
iEN 
The proof proceeds in five steps: 
1: I first show that p(w) is a positive linear functional for all w En. 
Let 8 > 0. Then, by monotonicity, e(w) + 8 E {J(w), which implies that 
p(w) · (e(w) + 8 - e(w)) 2 0 
and 
p(w) · (8) 2 0 
which implies that p( w) is positive. 
2: Show that for all w E n, Xi E f3i(w) implies that p(w). Xi(w) > p(w). 
x;(w) for all i EN. 
By strong monotonicity, there exist a 8 > 0 such that 
and for all j i- i, 
( ) *( ) 8xi(w) Zj w xj w + N _ 1 
and z is ~measurable, integrably bounded, and Zi E f3i(w) for all i E N. Thus, 
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z = ~iENzi is in {J(w). Therefore, 
p(w) · z(w) > p(w) · x*(w), 
p(w) · ((1- 8)xi(w) + L:xi(w) + 8xi(w)) > p(w) · (L:xi(w)), and 
#i iEN 
p(w) · xi(w) > p(w) · xi(w). 
3: Show that for all w E n, Xi E f3i(w) implies that p(w). Xi(w) > p(w). 
x;(w). 
From step 2 I know that p(w) · xi(w) ~ p(w) · xi(w). Since preferences are upper 
semicontinuous, there exists some 0 < e < 1 such that Vi ( exi' w' '.fi) > v ( xt' w' '.fi). 
Thus it must be that 
p(w) · (Bxi(w)) ~ p(w) · xi(w) 
or 
B(p(w) · Xi(w)) ~ p(w) · xi(w). (2.4) 
Since xi(w) > 0 and p(w) is a positive linear functional, p(w) · xi(w) > 0. Thus, 
if p(w) · xi(w) = p(w) · xi(w), it must be that B(p(w) · xi(w)) < p(w) · xi(w), which 
contradicts (2.4). 
4: Show that the set of allocations which are preferred under agents' 
updated information, !fiup, is still not affordable. 
Let f3i(w) be the better than correspondence using the O"-field '.fiup, or 
If Xi E {3[ ( w), then there exists an allocation xi such that xi E f3i ( w) and Xi ( w') = 
xi(w') for allw' E Fiup(w). Let Xi E {J[(w). Then Vi(xi,w,'.fiup) > Vi(xt,w,'.fiup), or 
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Since g:-i is a sub O"-field of g:-iup, Fiup(w) ~ Fi(w). Define a new allocation, x~, as 
x~(w') = 
xi ( w') otherwise 
which by (2.5) is strictly greater than Vi(xi, w, g:'i), implying x~ E f3i(w ). This result 
obviously implies that B*(w) ~ B(w). Thus, for all xi E f3i(w), p(w) · xi(w) > 
p(w) · xi(w). 
5: 
By the definition of a REE I am only interested in allocations, xi, that are g:'iup 
measurable as opposed to those that are g:' measurable. Therefore, these allocations 
are a subset of f3i ( w) which implies that the previous steps apply for this restriction. 
Finally, since xi is assumed to be g:'i measurable for all i E N, it must be that it is 
g:iup measurable for all i EN. Thus, I have constructed a REE. II 
While the proof is similar in style to the standard proof of the second welfare theorem 
for Walrasian equilibria, there are some added complications due to measurability re-
quirements. First, it is necessary for the price function to be measurable. However, 
since the correspondence of possible prices at each state is non-empty, closed-valued 
and weakly measurable, there exists a measurable price function. Second, the mea-
surability restrictions of fine efficiency (9i(N) = g:', and Qi = g:'i) are necessary. If 
9i(N) =I- g:', one could not be certain that the set of allocations which are preferred 
to x* under agents' private information contains the set of allocations preferred to x* 
when information is refined by prices. In Example 2.4.7, if 9i(N) = g:'i, the allocation 
(3, 1 {0 ) in both states {a, b} would not be preferred to (2~, 2~) in both states for 
agent 2. However, if p(a) =I- p(b), then (3, 1 {0 ) would be preferred to (2~, 2~) in state 
a. The restriction of Qi g:i ensures that x* satisfies the measurability requirement 
for endowments (Assumption 2.2.3) as well as the requirement that REE be g:'iup 
measurable. 
Constrained versions of efficiency and the core can be developed in order to pro-
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vide first and second welfare theorems for REE. Unfortunately, the informational 
constraints needed in order to obtain these two results are different. The fine private 
core allows the allocations to be :-f N measurable whereas fine efficiency requires the 
allocation to be privately measurable (:-Yi)· Under fine efficiency the grand coalition 
can block with its pooled information :-f N· The fine private core only allows privately 
measurable blocking for each coalition including the grand coalition. Therefore, fine 
efficient allocations are a subset of fine private efficient allocations. Putting the two 
welfare theorems together suggests a large degree of indeterminacy. The set of alloca-
tions which can be rationalized as a REE for some endowment (given fixed preferences 
and private information) will always include fine efficient allocations, but may vary 
between fine efficient and fine private efficient allocations. Therefore, REE do not, in 
general, satisfy the same unbiasedness property that Walrasian equilibria naturally 
satisfy, i.e., some fine private efficient allocations may not be REE. Why is this the 
case? In the case of the first welfare theorem, without specific knowledge of the prices, 
it is impossible to tell the amount of information revealed by a REE. The only allo-
cations which can be ruled out for certain are those that use each individual's private 
information (:-Yi)· In terms of the second welfare theorem, lack of specific knowledge 
of prices works in the opposite direction. In order to be certain that prices and the 
allocation will be a fixed point in both preferences and information, one must know 
that the allocation would be efficient for any possible refinement of private informa-
tion which the prices might cause. Therefore, without the use of parameters that 
vary between economies (such as particular classes of preferences), it is not possible 
to say much more about the welfare properties of REE. 
This inconsistency between the two welfare theorems for REE is another critique 
of REE as a solution concept. As with Walrasian equilibria, one would like to imagine 
some decentralized mechanism (the auctioneer) leading to equilibrium prices. How-
ever, as Theorem 2.4.10 indicates, this decentralized price setter would need to possess 
the grand coalition's pooled information in order to come up with equilibrium prices. 
In reality, the most appealing REE may be those which do not fully reveal private 
information (precisely those which drive the result in Theorem 2.4.3). Unfortunately, 
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it is not yet clear how those solutions might be arrived at. 
2.4.1 PREE and FRREE 
I can provide an alternative equilibrium notion which does not suffer from the same 
information inconsistencies between the first and second welfare theorems as REE. 
· It turns out that in order to do this one must allow allocations to be measurable 
only with respect to distributed information. This is the distinguishing feature of the 
pseudo rational expectations equilibrium. 
2.4.11 Definition A pseudo rational expectations equilibrium (PREE) for an econ-
omy£ is a (p, x) such that for all i EN, 
i. Xi is ::f N measurable, 
ii. For all w E n, there does not exist a Yi such that Yi is ::f N measurable, 
p(w)yi(w) :S p(w)ei(w), and Vi(Yi,w, ::fiup) > Vi(xi,w, ::fiup), and 
iii. L:iEN Xi = L:iEN ei a.e. [µ]. 
A PREE may be thought of as a competitive equilibrium of a market, in the interim 
stage, for futures contracts. While agents can use only their private information 
(refined by prices) to make market decisions, the actual trades will occur in the ex 
post stage. Since all private information will be revealed at that stage, the actual 
allocation may vary across any state. 3 
PREE are included in the weak fine core discussed earlier (9i = ::f and 9i(S) = 
::f 8). This core solution is smaller than the fine private core used for Theorem 2.4.3 
since coalitions are now assumed to pool their information. 
2.4.12 Theorem If (x*,p) is a PREE then x* is in the weak fine core. 
3It is interesting to note that each agent's maximal allocation (in the interim stage) will be :f'iup 
measurable, but that the easing of the measurability restrictions allows agents to propose trades that, 
while not maximal, may be improving and feasible for all agents. In this manner, more information 
is also captured by the prices. 
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Proof: Simply apply the proof of Theorem 2.4.3 with the necessary changes in mea-
surability restrictions. II 
As a corollary to Theorem 2.4.12, PREE are weak fine efficient. This version of 
efficiency permits more final allocations than fine efficiency (9i S: as opposed to 
9i = S:-i). Weak fine core allocations are a subset of the weak fine efficient allocations. 
2.4.13 Definition x is weak fine efH.cient if x E JR(N), Xi is S:N measurable for all 
i EN, there does not exist another allocation x' E JR(N) that is S:N measurable, and 
Vi(x~,w) > Vi(xi,w) for some w for all i EN. 
2.4.14 Corollary If (x*,p) is a PREE then x* is weak fine efH.cient. 
A second welfare theorem can be developed for PREE by utilizing weak fine effi-
ciency as opposed to the fine efficiency of Theorem 2.4.10. 
2.4.15 Theorem Let x* be a weak fine efH.cient allocation such that xi(w) > O for 
all i E N and for all w E n and preferences are strictly monotonic. Then there exists 
a price fuaction p such that ( x*, p) is a PREE for the initial endowment e = x*. 
Proof: The proof follows as in Theorem 2.4.10 except that step 5 may be omitted. I 
These two concepts, the weak fine core and weak fine efficiency, are congruent. 
For both solutions 9i = S: and 9i(N) = S: N· Therefore, at least for PREE, I obtain 
the desired result: the set of pseudo rational expectations equilibria and weak fine 
efficient allocations are essentially equivalent. 
Fully revealing rational expectations equilibria have received substantial attention. 
Particularly, Radner (1979) and Allen (1981) have demonstrated that FRREE gener-
ically exist under the assumptions made here. Likewise, since all knowable private 
information is assumed to be the private information of some agent (see Assump-
tion 2.2.5), FRREE are ex post Pareto optimal. Prices are said to fully reveal S: 
if 
Pp(w) = F(w) a.e.[µ]. 
FRREE is the result of refining REE by asking that prices fully reveal S:-. 
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2.4.16 Definition A Fully Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium (FRREE) 
for an economy, E, is a REE such that p fully reveals '.f. 
Since FRREE are a subset of PREE, a version of the first welfare theorem follows as 
a Corollary to Theorem 2.4.12. 
2 .4.17 Corollary If ( x*, p) is a FRREE then x* is in the weak flne core. 
Unfortunately, t,he development of a second welfare theorem is not as easy. While 
there exists a measurable price function which separates preferred allocations from 
the endowment, it is impossible to say anything about its specific measurability prop-
erties. In fact, prices may not vary over some atoms of '.f (i.e., p(w) = p(w') for some 
F(w) #- F(w')). While prices would still be '.f measurable, they would no longer 
necessarily be fully revealing. 
Since fine information sharing can be thought to lead to the ex post efficient 
allocations, the results for PREE suggest that full revelation need not be necessary 
for ex post efficiency. 
2.5 Replica Economies 
A classical result about Walrasian equilibria is that as the economy grows, the set of 
core allocations which are not Walrasian equilibria shrinks (Debreu and Scarf 1963, 
Hildenbrand and Kirman 1988). This is typically interpreted as: in large economies, 
the difference between cooperative bartering, the core, and decentralized (noncooper-
ative) markets, Walrasian equilibria, is negligible. 
I begin by extending the standard definition of replica economies to economies with 
differential information. Let E = (N, (Yi*, '.ti, ui, ei, µi)iEN) be the original economy. 
Then an r replica economy, Er = (Nr, (Yi, '.ti, ui, ei, µi)iENr), is constructed as follows: 
i. Nr = UnEN N~ where for all n, n', N~ n N~, = f/J. 
ii. IN~I = r for all n EN. 
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This replication procedure is the simplest process one could imagine (and that orig-
inally used by Debreu and Scarf (1963)). If this simple procedure does not lead to 
positive convergence results, then there is little reason to suspect that more compli-
cated techniques will yield positive results. Notice that each agent's private informa-
tion is also replicated. While simple replication of information is certainly the most 
straight-forward application of Debreu-Scarf type replica economies to situations with 
differential information, it eliminates each agent's informational advantage. As soon 
as the economy is replicated once, someone in the economy knows everything that 
each agent already knows. 4 
The first step in examining core convergence is determining what it means for two 
solutions to converge. To measure the difference between two allocations, the uniform 
metric is used. Let Xi, Yi be two individual allocations then 
d(xi,Yi) =sup II xi(w)-yi(w) II· 
wEO 
Then, as in Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), the difference between two sets (the 
core and REE) for a given economy is defined as 8(£): the smallest 8 such that for 
every x E :FPC(£)5 there exists an allocation y E REE(£) such that d(xi, Yi) :::; 8 for 
all i EN, or 
8(£) = sup inf sup d(xi, Yi)· 
xE:F'PC(t:) yEREE(t:) iEN 
In order to demonstrate convergence, I would like to show that for the sequence of 
economies defined by the replication technology, 8(£r) -2+.o, or the maximal difference 
between any allocation in the core and any allocation that is a REE is becoming 
arbitrarily small. 
4Palfrey and Srivastava (1986) suggest a stochastic replication procedure that may be more rea-
sonable here. In each replication, while each agent's preferences and endowments are replicated, his 
private information is drawn randomly. Therefore, each agent retains some informational advantage. 
However, such a procedure leads to the possibility that the set of REE may also change with each 
replication. I leave the discussion of convergence under stochastic replication to future work. 
5 Any alternative core definition could be used. 
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2. 5 .1 Equal Treatment 
Equal treatment is the cornerstone of core convergence. Price equilibria, such as REE, 
PREE, and FRREE, obviously satisfy equal treatment when preferences are strictly 
concave.6 Hence, if a core definition does not satisfy equal treatment, there will always 
be core allocations which cannot be the same as those of the price equilibrium. 
2.5.1 Definition (Equal Treatment) An allocation, x, satisfies equal treatment 
if, for all n EN and for all i,j EN~, xi(w) = Xj(w) a.e.[µ]. 
Srivastava (1984) showed that a version of the ex ante core with differential informa-
tion satisfies equal treatment. Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) have suggested that 
the ex ante private core does not satisfy equal treatment. In the interim stage, equal 
treatment cannot be obtained for the fine private core. The problem lies in the mea-
surability requirements of the definition. If a fine private core allocation treats two 
identical agents differently in some state, the agents will not necessarily be able to find 
a privately measurable allocation for some coalition that will be blocking. If the fine 
private core consists of more than one allocation for r = 1, then unequal treatment 
allocations can be constructed by assigning each complete set of N agents a different 
allocation from the r 1 fine private core. The following example demonstrates the 
failure of equal treatment. 
2.5.2 Example Consider an economy with two types of agents (denoted by 1 and 2) 
and two agents of each type (labeled A and B respectively). Let there be three states 
of nature (denoted by a, b, c). There are two goods in each state, and each agent has 
a state-independent utility function given by ui = xi{2 xi£2 • All agents assign equal 
prior probability to each state of nature. The agents' endowments and information 
are described by Table 2.9. The allocation described in Table 2.10 is a fine private 
core allocation. The allocation is obviously S:- measurable. However, agents of both 
types are treated unequally. There are no privately measurable allocations for the 
6Since each agent of identical type is maximizing his utility with respect to the same prices, strict 
concavity implies the existence of a unique maximizer for each type. 
41 
agents which improve them in all states of the world. Therefore, any 9=' measurable 








a b c 
(5,3) (5,3) (3,5) 
(3,5) (5,3) (5,3) 
Table 2.9: Endowments and Information for Example 2.5.2 
The fact that coalitions can only use their private information to block leads to 
asymmetries. Is it that, in the limit, these differences are small? Unfortunately, the 
answer is no. In Appendix A I construct an economy similar to the one described in 
Example 2.5.2. 
2.5.3 Proposition There exist economies £ such that the difference between the 
B.ne private core and the set of REE does not tend to zero, i.e., 
Proof: Let (n, 9=', µ)be an arbitrary probability space satisfying the original assump-
tions. Define the original economy as follows. Let N = {1, 2} and Yi(w) = Y+ for all 
w E n and i E N. Let (Fk)k=I be the finite collection of m atoms for 9='. Then there 
are two cases: m is even, and m is odd. First, let m be even. Let S:-1 = 9=' and let S:-2 
Allocation 
Agent i State: a b c 
lA (5, 3) (5, 3) (3, 5) 
lB (4, 4) (5,3) (4,4) 
2A (4,4) (5, 3) (4,4) 
2B (3, 5) (5, 3) (5,3) 
Table 2.10: An Unequal Fine Private Core Allocation for Example 2.5.2 
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be generated by the collection of m/2 atoms given by: 
Let both agents have state independent utility functions given by 
( ) 1/2 ( ) 1/2 ( ) f ll n ui x, w xi1 w xi2 w or a w EH. 
Endowments are given as follows: 
el(w) = 
and 
( ) Um/2 pk 3, 5 w E k=l 1 
(5, 3) otherwise 
e2(w) = (5,3)for allw E r2. 
Let µi be any absolutely continuous measure. 
Given this economy, the unique REE is characterized by the following fully re-
vealing prices: 
p(w) = 
and the following allocation: 
(1 1) um/2 pk 2, 2 w E k=l 1 
( 1 18) th . 19 , 19 o erw1se 
( ) Um/2 pk 4, 4 w E k=l 1 
(5, 3) otherwise 
for i = 1, 2. Notice that there are no partially revealing REE for this example due 
to the symmetry of the problem: any prices that do not vary on one of agent 2's 
information sets will necessarily lead to excess demand by agent 1 in one of the 
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states. 
However, for each replication r the allocation given by the endowment is in the 
fine private core since there is no privately measurable allocation which improves 
a coalition. Then, d(xi, Yi) = .../2 for all i, and for all r. Thus, it must be that 
o(£r) 2: .../2 for all r, or limr_,00 0(£r) ::f. 0. 
If m is odd, the same construction will work except each agent has an additional 
partition element. For 2, FJm/2)+1 = F(m/2)+i, and endowments can be assumed to 
be (5, 3) for both agents. I 
The measurability of blocking allocations plays a prominent role in obtaining core 
definitions which satisfy equal treatment. I proceed by abstracting from the specific 
core concepts presented earlier and provide general sufficient conditions for equal 
treatment of interim core concepts. Along with the standard requirement of strict 
concavity, blocking allocations being at least as fine as the final allocation is sufficient 
to obtain equal treatment in the interim stage with weak blocking. 
2.5.4 Lemma If preferences are strictly concave and for all i E N, 9i(N) ~ 9i, then 
the ( 9i, 9i ( S)) core with weak blocking exhibits equal treatment. 
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists a measurable event, G, such that for some 
n EN and i,j EN~, xi(w) ::f. Xj(w) for all w E G. Fix w* E G. By the measurability 
assumptions of the (9i, 9i(S)) core and the information structure, there exists an 
atom Gi(w*) ~ G and for all w' E Gi(w*), xi(w') Xi(w*), for all i E N~, for all 
n EN. Likewise, uk(·,w') uk(·,w). 
Form a blocking coalition, S, as follows. Let S be composed of one agent from 
each type (N~) such that for each n EN, 
Since x is feasible for a.e. [µ], 




L en(w) a.e.[µ]. 
nEN 
Thus, xs E IIB(S). Since for all i E S, Vi(xi, w*) ::::; Vi(xj, w*) for all j E N~. By strict 
concavity of u, Vi(xi, w*) ~ Vi(xi, w*) for all i E S, with strict inequality for some 
agent. As constructed, xis 9i(S) measurable. Therefore, x blocks x, contradicting 
the assumption that x E (9i, 9i(S)) core. I 
Using Propositions 2.3.8 and 2.3.9, I can use Lemma 2.5.4 in order to obtain sufficient 
conditions for equal treatment under strong blocking. 
2.5.5 Theorem Let preferences be strictly concave, strongly monotonic, and con-
tinuous. If for all i EN, 9i(N) :J 9i, and either 
i. ei(w) > 0 for all i EN and for all w En, or 
n. 9i(N) = 9j(N) for all i, j E N, 
then the (9i, 9i(S)) core exhibits equal treatment. 
Proof: Case 1: 
If ei(w) ~ 0 for all i E N then xi(w) is obviously strictly positive. Thus, Proposi-
tion 2.3.8 obviously allows us to apply Lemma 2.5.4. 
Case 2: 
If 9i(N) = 'Jj(N) for all i, j E N then Proposition 2.3.9 and Theorem 2.5.4 can be 
applied. I 
As a consequence of Theorem 2.5.5, equal treatment can be easily obtained for the 
weak fine core. 
2.5.6 Corollary Let preferences be strictly concave, strongly monotonic, and con-
tinuous. Then the weak fine core satisfies the equal treatment property. 
Since PREE are contained in the weak fine core, PREE obviously satisfy equal treat-
ment as well. The standard arguments of Debreu and Scarf (1963) can then be applied 
to obtain a core convergence result. 
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2.5. 7 Theorem The difference between the weak fine core and the set of PREE 
tends to zero, i.e., 
lim 8(£T) = 0. 
T->00 
Under the assumptions made here, the weak fine core is non-empty. Unfortunately, 
the conditions sufficient to obtain equal treatment, and, thus, core convergence are 
only rarely consistent with the sufficient conditions given by Page (1997) for existence 
of the core. His no-insider condition requires that for all S C N, and for all i E 
S, 9i(S) c 9i- Therefore, non-emptiness and equal treatment are simultaneously 
satisfied only when for all i E N, 9i(N) 9i. In order to provide sufficient conditions 
for existence, Page finds conditions which make the implied game balanced. In order 
for balancedness to be obtained, feasible blocking allocations for coalitions must be 
translatable to final allocations. If the information of the coalition is finer (or better) 
than that of the final allocation, it is possible that balancedness will not be obtained. 
However, in order to obtain equal treatment, it must be that any allocation which 
can be a final allocation is no finer than the information the grand coalition can use 
to block. 
2.6 Conclusion 
I have demonstrated that there are measurability restricted definitions of efficiency 
and the core which yield first and second welfare theorems for REE and PREE. Two 
observations come out of this exercise. First, the restrictions on core allocations nec-
essary to obtain a first welfare theorem are incompatible with those needed for a 
second welfare theorem for generic rational expectations equilibria. In environments 
without private information, the standard definition of the core is an obvious subset 
of the set of efficient allocations. Walrasian equilibria are always in the core and any 
Pareto optimal point can be turned into a Walrasian equilibrium. But, when alloca-
tions are observed to be REE, one can only conclude that they have not been blocked 
by each agent's private information; one cannot presume that prices have managed 
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to completely reveal individual information. However, any allocation that cannot be 
improved upon by any allocation which is measurable with respect to agents' pooled 
information (S:-N) can be rationalized as a REE. The stringent informational require-
ments of fine efficiency make constructing a REE simple. 
Second, a new market equilibrium concept, PREE, can be developed which does 
not share these difficulties. Ironically, removing the restriction that allocations be 
measurable with respect to prices (implying that agents do not use observations of 
the allocation to refine their information), I obtain first and second welfare theorems 
which necessarily imply full communication. Core equivalence can also be demon-
strated for PREE. 
I have imposed measurability restrictions as an exogenous constraint on the set 
of feasible allocations. Therefore, the difference in informational requirements for the 
first and second welfare theorems should not be that surprising: there are economies 
where agents may want to share their information and others where they may not. The 
information revealed by REE is at least partially endogenous: individuals change their 
preferences based on information revealed by prices which, in turn, must change to 
reflect these changes until a fixed point in terms of both information and preferences is 
reached. Can a more endogenous, yet well defined, welfare concept be developed which 
more consistently captures these variations? One possible approach is to incorporate 
incentive compatibility as a restriction on allocations as opposed to measurability 
restrictions. Allen (1992a) has examined incentive compatible versions of the core, 
and Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) have suggested that in exchange economies 
private measurability implies incentive compatibility. Such a restriction might allow 
different information to be revealed when it is consistent with individual incentives. 
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I examine the implementation of core allocations when agents are differently informed. 
A one state deviation principle (an allocation cannot be improved at any state) and 
measurability restrictions (blocking allocations may only be measurable with respect 
to each agent's private information) are sufficient to yield interim core solutions that 
are Bayesian implementable. Private measurability of blocking allocations is neces-
sary for implementation. Similar results hold for interim efficiency. However, the 
results cannot be extended to exclusive information environments. 
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3 .1 Introduction 
In complete information environments, core allocations are Nash implementable (Maskin 
1998, Repullo 1987). In other words, a game can be constructed such that the set of 
Nash equilibria exactly coincide with the core. The power of such a result is that it 
reveals that the difference between cooperative behavior (ostensibly described by the 
core) and noncooperative behavior (described by Nash equilibria) in complete infor-
mation settings is nonexistent. However, when agents have some private information, 
the results are not as satisfying. Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) demonstrated that 
even in a very limited class of asymmetric information environments similar results 
do not hold. For any game there will be Bayes Nash equilibria that are not ex ante, 
interim, or ex post core allocations. The addition of even limited private informa-
tion creates enough problems that there will always be outcomes such that there is 
room for cooperative agreements to be made. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) even 
describe a simple environment where all possible Nash equilibria are inefficient.1 
While the proper definition of the core under complete information (and no ex-
ternalities) is not in dispute, defining the core under incomplete information is more 
contentious. Should full communication be assumed? When would a coalition decide 
to block an allocation? These are all relevant questions in settings with private infor-
mation. The definition of the core which Palfrey and Srivastava use is consistent with 
Holmstrom and Myerson's (1983) original definition for efficient allocations. The ob-
ject of this chapter is to investigate alternative candidate definitions of the core in this 
setting. I will demonstrate that some particular changes from Holmstrom and Myer-
son's (1983) original version are necessary and sufficient to obtain positive Bayesian 
implementation results. The fact that such cores are Bayesian implementable should 
not be justification on its own for them to be used as a description of cooperative 
behavior, but the results suggest which assumptions must be made if one wants an 
equivalence between cooperative and noncooperative behavior. 
Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) demonstrate that another solution concept, rational 
1Their example, however, does not satisfy the assumption I make in this paper. 
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expectations equilibrium (REE), is implementable under conditions of Non-Exclusive 
Information (NEI) and state-independent endowments. What leads to REE being 
implementable but core allocations not? Two salient features appear to separate 
REE from the standard definition of the core. First, in a REE, the allocation each 
agent demands does not vary between states he cannot distinguish. No restrictions 
are placed on how allocations in the core may vary. Second, in order to demonstrate 
that an allocation is not a REE it is only necessary to demonstrate that, at one state, 
prices do not separate the strictly preferred allocations for some agents. On the other 
hand, an allocation is not in the core only if there exists an allocation that at least 
weakly improves all agents for all states. 
I develop a class of alternative core definitions by incorporating features similar 
to REE. First, blocking allocations are required to satisfy certain measurability re-
strictions. Specifically, only allocations that do not vary across each agent's private 
information are allowed to block. Despite the fact that, even in the interim stage, two 
states of the world may be indistinguishable for an agent, the classical definition of 
the core permits the agent to choose different allocations in each state. Second, a one 
state deviation principle is imposed. A core allocation satisfies the one state deviation 
principle if it cannot be improved upon at any state. This principle is similar to the 
notion of durability originally presented by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). While 
core allocations that are not durable describe the set of allocations that may not be 
blocked, durable allocations are those that will definitely not be blocked. 
While neither of these changes are sufficient on their own to produce imple-
mentable allocations, when combined they lead to positive results. Under the same 
environment restrictions used by Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), I demonstrate that 
core definitions that require blocking allocations to be privately measurable and final 
allocations to satisfy the one state deviation principle are Bayesian implementable. 
Private measurability is also necessary for an implementable core definition. Similar 
results also follow for efficient allocations. 
Since implementation investigates when a social choice set can be rationalized 
as the equilibrium of a game, it is logical that making a social choice set more like 
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a noncooperative equilibrium will improve its chances of being implemented. The 
one state deviation principle requires that there is no feasible deviation at one point 
(state) that improves some agents. In games, a strategy is not an equilibrium if there 
is a single beneficial deviation. Second, measurability restrictions are analogous to 
the obvious requirement that, in a game, players cannot choose different actions in 
the same information set. 
There are three informational stages at which welfare can be evaluated: ex ante, 
interim, and ex post. At the ex ante stage agents do not yet possess their private 
information but they are aware of what their preferences, endowments, etc., would be 
if they did know the state of the world. At the interim stage, each agent has observed 
some private information which allows him to rule out certain events. Finally, at the 
ex post stage all relevant uncertainty is revealed and each agent knows the state of the 
world. Palfrey and Srivastava show that core allocations are not implementable with 
respect to preferences in any of these informational stages. I focus on the interim 
stage for two reasons. First, Bayes Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in the 
interim stage: players choose strategies having observed their private information. 
Second, the one state deviation principle is only meaningful in the interim stage. 
Hahn and Yannelis (1997a) also study the implementation of measurability con-
strained core allocations in differential information economies. However, they define 
a new solution concept, coalitional Bayes Nash equilibrium, and find core allocations 
that are implementable using that solution. Their solution concept is explicitly co-
operative: no coalition can unilaterally move to a new strategy. While their results 
describe allocations that can be obtained as the cooperative outcome of a game, it 
is of interest to examine whether explicitly cooperative social choice sets (the core) 
can be implemented by noncooperative solution concepts (Bayes Nash equilibrium). 
Also, Hahn and Yannelis only demonstrate that one core solution, the private core, 
is implementable in coalitional Bayes Nash equilibria. The implementation results 
presented here describe a large class of implementable social choice sets. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the basic model and 
definitions. Section 3.3 briefly describes and provides intuition for the use of mea-
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surability restrictions and the one state deviation ·principle. The implementability of 
welfare allocations with durability and measurability restrictions is then proven in 
Section 3.4. 
3.2 The Model and Definitions 
The model of a differential information exchange economy used here is similar to that 
used by Palfrey and Srivastava (1987). Let N = {1, 2, ... , n} be the number of agents 
in the exchange economy. The commodity space is given by Y = ]Rm with positive 
orthant Y+ = JR+. Let (r!, J', µ) be the probability space describing uncertainty in 
the model where µ is a probability measure representing ex ante (prior) probabilities 
and J' is a O"-field. Let the set of all possible state contingent allocations be given 
by L1 (r!, J', µ;]Rm) or the space of equivalence classes of J'-measurable, integrable 
functions x : 0, -+ Y. An agent, i, is a fivetuple (Yi, J'i, ui, ei, µi) where: 
Yi : 0, -+ 2Y+ is the state dependent consumption set correspondence of agent 
i, 
J'i is a sub-0"-field of J' that represents agent i's private information, 
ui : Y x 0, -+ JR is agent i's state contingent utility function, 
ei : 0, -+ Y+ is a function denoting agent i's state contingent initial endowment 
of commodities, and 
µi is a probability measure on (r!, J') that represents agent i's prior beliefs. 
An economy with asymmetric information £ = ((Yi, J'i, ui, ei, µi)iEN) is a finite 
collection of agents. 
Impose the following assumptions on the model. 
3.2.1 Assumption For each i EN and w Er!, Y(w) =JR+. 
There are no allocations that are automatically ruled out by consumption require-
ments including the 0 allocation which assigns an agent 0 in each state. 
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3.2.2 Assumption For all i E N 
i. ui is (J', '.By) measurable where '.By is the Borel a-field of Y. 
ii. For all w En, ui(·,w) is concave, strictly increasing, and bounded below. 
iii. For all w En, Ui(O,w) = 0. 
Measurability of the utility function assures that J' captures all relevant information 
in the economy. Agents' utility functions are normalized to equal 0 when they receive 
the 0 allocation. Given that ui is assumed to be strictly increasing and bounded 
below, this assumption is without loss of generality. 
3.2.3 Assumption (State Independent Endowments) For all i EN and for all 
w E r2, ei(w) = ei » 0. 
Endowments are assumed to be state independent and strictly positive. This re-
quirement ensures that a feasible allocation in one state is also feasible in any other 
state. 
I make a variety of assumptions on the structure of information (J'i) and beliefs 
(µi) for each agent. 
3.2.4 Assumption n is finite. 
Since n is assumed to be finite, J' must be generated by a finite collection of atoms. 
Let F(w) represent the smallest discernible event at w, and F (F(w))wEn is the 
finite collection of distinct atoms that form a partition of n. For notational simplicity, 
assume, without loss of generality, that F(w) = {w}. For each agent, Fi(w) is the 
collection of states viewed as possible at w, and Fi= (Fi(w))wEn is a finite partition 
of n.2 
3.2.5 Assumption (No Redundant States) J' = a(LJiEN J'i)· 
2 As in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), agents' private information is a function of n. Alternatively, 
agents' private information could be treated as the primitive, and states determined as a collection 
of private information. Harsanyi (1967) shows these approaches to be equivalent. 
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This is identical to the requirement of no redundant states used by Palfrey and Sri-
vastava (1987). In other words, {w} = niENFi(w). This assumption insures that all 
relevant private information is held by some agent in the economy. Each agent's prior 
is assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to µ. 
3.2.6 Assumption For each i EN, µ(E) = 0 if and only if µi(E) = 0. 
In order to ensure that interim expected utilities are well defined, measures are 
assumed to have full support. 
3.2. 7 Assumption For all w E 0, µ( { w}) > 0. 
There are no events to which any agent assigns zero probability. Under Assump-
tion 3.2.6, this assumption is without loss of generality: in any economy for which 
there are states to which all agents assign zero prior probability, one can simply con-
struct a modified economy which excludes these states and satisfies Assumption 3.2.7. 
Since these states were originally assigned zero probability, they could not have ef-
fected individuals' expected utility calculations. 
The set of feasible allocations for coalition S is denoted by 
where s = #S. An allocation for agent i is a function Xi : n --+ JR+ that assigns 
to agent i a commodity vector in each state of the world. The set feasible (state-
contingent) allocations are then given by 
JIB(S) {x : n--+ A(S)}. 
Let G be the set of all possible sub-e7-fields of 9=' satisfying the assumptions given 
above. The interim expected utility function Vi : JIBi x n x G --+ JR of agent i is defined 
by 
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When not explicitly stated, interim expected utility will be assumed to be taken with 
respect to agent i's private information, 3='i, and will be denoted "Vi (Xi, w). 
Denote the set of economies that satisfy Assumptions 3.2.1-3.2.7 as E where£ is 
a particular economy. 
3.2.1 Implementation 
I use the same terminology as Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) to describe a collection 
of implicitly desirable allocations. The structure of the economy is assumed to be 
common knowledge among all agents. The only uncertainty is contained in the private 
information of agents. Given a particular economy £ ((Yi, 9='i, ui, ei, µi)iEN), a social 
choice set C is a subset of IIB(S): a collection of feasible state-contingent allocations. A 
social choice set describes a set of "desirable" allocations given a particular economy. 
In this paper, the social choice sets of interest are different variants of interim efficient 
and core allocations. 
A social choice set is Bayesian implementable if the full set can be obtained as 
the set of Bayes Nash equilibrium outcomes of some noncooperative game (or mech-
anism). In this chapter, I use the necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian 
implementation provided in Palfrey and Srivastava (1989). 
Define a mechanism for a given economy as a pair (M, g) where M = M1 x M2 x 
· · · x Mn is a list of messages for each agent, and g : M--+ A(N) is a function which 
maps lists of messages to outcomes. 
Since the only unknown information in the economy is each agent's private infor-
mation, a strategy for agent i is a function that maps from information partitions Fi 
to a message ai : Fi--+ Mi.3 Given a state of the world w, 
is the collection of messages by each agent. A strategy is a Bayes Nash equilibrium 
if for all w no agent would want to unilaterally deviate from his strategy. 
3 As is common in the implementation literature, only pure strategies are allowed. 
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3.2.8 Definition (Bayes Nash Equilibrium) O' is a Bayes Nash equilibrium to 
(M, g) if for all i EN, and for all w E n 
Since O' is a function of w, g(O') determines a feasible state-contingent allocation. 
Given an economy £, say that a mechanism (fully) Bayesian implements a social 
choice set C if an allocation is in C if and only if it is the outcome of some (pure 
strategy) Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. 
3.2.9 Definition Given an economy£, a mechanism (M, g) Bayesian implements C 
if 
i. For all x E C, there exists a Bayes Nash equilibrium O' to (M, g) such that 
g(O') x. 
ii. If O' is a Bayes Nash equilibrium to (M, g) then g(O') EC. 
A social choice set C is then said to be Bayesian implementable if there exists a 
mechanism which Bayesian implements C. 
Let a = { ai, ... , an} be a list of functions where ai : Fi -+ Fi. A deception, ai, is 
the private information each agent reports at each of his true private information sets. 
Deceptions describe all possible equilibrium strategies. Discussion can be restricted 
to deceptions that are compatible with the underlying information structure. 
3.2.10 Definition a is compatible with F if for all (E1, ... , En) with Ei E Fi for all 
i, niENEi =/= 0 implies niENai(Ei) =/= 0. 
For a that are not compatible with F (i.e., niENEi 0 but niENai(Ei) 0), it is 
easy to construct payoffs that make incompatible strategies dominated. For example, 
give 0 to the agents who make incompatible reports. Given Assumption 3.2.5 of no 
redundant states, it is clear that niENai(Ei) =/= 0 if and only if it is an atom of 9=' (an 
57 
element of F). For any a compatible with F define the following terms: 
a(w) = n ai(Fi(w)) 
iEN 
is the atom of 9=' that the compatible a leads to at w. If agents truthfully report at 
w, then a(w) = F(w) = {w}. For compatible a define 
xa(w) = x(a(w)) 
and 
Maskin (1998) demonstrated that monotonicity is a necessary condition for imple-
mentation in Nash equilibria. Roughly speaking, monotonicity requires that if an 
allocation is in a social choice set at one state, and at another state it is preferred 
to more allocations, then it should be in the social choice set at that state as well. 
Monotonicity can be generalized to differential information environments. 
3.2.11 Definition (Bayesian Monotonicity) A social choice set C satisfies Bayesian 
Monotonicity if for all a compatible with F, if 
i. x EC 
ii. For all i, for all w, and for ally E JIB(N), 
then Xa EC. 
A key assumption needed to obtain implementable allocations is Non-Exclusivity 
of Information (NEI). Information is non-exclusive if any agent's private information 
is known by the other N - 1 agents' pooled information. In NEI environments, 
incentive compatibility becomes unimportant. If one agent lies about his private 
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information and the N - 1 other agents tell the truth, it will be obvious that the 
agent is lying (his report will be inconsistent with the report of the other agents). 
As in implementation in Nash strategies, any deviation by one agent can be detected 
(and punished) by the other agents. Therefore, it is never in the interest of agents to 
unilaterally deviate. 
3.2.12 Assumption (Non-Exclusivity of Information) Fi(w) ~ n#i Fj(w) for 
all i E N and w E S1 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability are then given as follows. 
3.2.13 Theorem (Palfrey and Srivastava (1989)) If C is Bayesian implement-
able, then C satisfi.es Bayesian Monotonicity. If N ;:=: 3, C satisfi.es Bayesian Mono-
tonicity, NEI is satisfi.ed, and C =f. 0, then C is Bayesian implementable. 
C =f. 0 if for all x EC, xi(w) =f. 0 for all i and w. 
If Dis a collection of economies, then a social choice correspondence (SCC) on D, 
c, is a set-valued function assigning for every £ E D a social choice set c(£) c IIB(N). 
3.2.14 Definition A SCC c is Bayesian implementable on D if for all£ E D, c(£) 
is Bayesian implementable. 
In other words, there exists a mechanism for each £ E D such that the set of pure 
strategy Bayes Nash equilibria of that mechanism exactly coincide with the socially 
desirable outcomes for that economy as described by c(£). The mechanism used to 
implement each c(£) will obviously depend upon the particular commonly known 
features of £. 
In this chapter, the collection of economies that I will be concerned with Bayesian 
implementation on are those which satisfy the Non-Exclusivity of Information as-
sumption. Let E 1 be the subset of E such that Assumption 3.2.12 is satisfied and 
N;:::3. 
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3.3 Welfare, Deviations, and Measurability 
I begin by presenting the notion of interim efficiency originally used by Holmstrom 
and Myerson (1983). It is also the welfare concept discussed by Palfrey and Srivastava 
(1987) and has become standard. 
An allocation is dominated if there exists an alternative allocation that is preferred 
by all agents (at least weakly) for all possible states. 
3.3.1 Definition x is interim dominated for S if there exists a y E IIB(S) such that 
Vi(yi,w) 2: Vi(xi,w) for all i ES, for all w En with strict for at least one·i and w. 
Using this notion of domination, define interim efficiency. The HM is added to 
delineate this version from others that will be discussed later. 
3.3.2 Definition xis HM interim efficient if x E Iffi(N) and xis interim undominated 
for N. 
Although HM did not specifically discuss core allocations, their interim efficiency 
concept can logically be extended to coalitional deviations. 
3.3.3 Definition xis in the HM interim core if x E IIB(N), and for all S ~ N, xis 
interim undominated for S. 
Palfrey and Srivastava demonstrate, using an example, that both HM interim 
efficient and HM interim core allocation cannot be globally implemented. I replicate 
the example here for completeness. It will be used later to motivate changes in the 
definition of interim efficiency and the core. 
3.3.4 Example Consider an economy with four agents (denoted by 1, 2, 3, and 4). 
Let there be three states of nature denoted by a, b, c. There is one good in each state. 
Agents 1 and 2 are completely informed and have strictly increasing preferences over 
the good in each state. Neither agents 3 nor 4 can distinguish the states b and c 
( {a}, {b, c}). State dependent preferences are given as follows: 
ui(xi(w ), w) = /3i(w) log(xi(w)) 
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Allocation 
Agent i State: a b c 
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
3 1.0 0.5 1.5 
4 1.0 1.5 0.5 
Table 3.1: A HM Interim Efficient Allocation for Example 3.3.4 
with {33 (a) = 0.5, f33 (b) = 0.25, f33(c) = 0.75, and f34(a) = 0.5, {34(b) 0.75, {34(c) = 
0.25. The allocation described in Table 3.1 is HM interim efficient. The following a is 
compatible with F: ai(Fi(w)) = Fi(a) for all i,w and a(w) ={a} for all w. Consider 
the Bayesian Monotonicity condition for agent 3 is as follows: 
0.5 log(l) 2 0.5 log(y( a)) 
implies 
0.5[0.25 log(l)] + 0.5[0.75 log(l)] 2 0.5[0.25 log(y(a))] 0.5[0.75 log(y(a))]. 
Both expressions are identical. The same holds true for agent 4. Therefore, Bayesian 
Monotonicity would require the allocation (1, 1, 1, 1) for all agents be HM interim 
efficient. However, the allocation given in Table 3.1 interim dominates this allocation. 
Thus, HM interim efficiency is not Bayesian Monotonic, and, therefore, it cannot be 
globally implementable. 
3.3.1 One State Deviations 
The definition of domination presented in the previous section is a stringent require-
ment on improving allocations. In order for agents to pick one allocation over another 
it must be common knowledge that they prefer that allocation. However, there may 
be states of the world where all agents know that they prefer another allocation yet 
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it is not common knowledge. The one state deviation principle incorporates these 
allocations: if it is ever the case that all agents prefer one allocation to another then 
that allocation will not be a feasible outcome. I incorporate this principle into the 
definition of blocking. 
3.3.5 Definition xis interim blocked by S if there exists an w E n, and a y E JIB(S), 
such that Vi(Yi, w) > Vi(xi, w) for all i E S. 
Replace domination (Definition 3.3.1) with blocking (Definition 3.3.5) to obtain an 
alternative version of the interim core. 
3.3.6 Definition x is in the interim core if x E JIB(N), and for all S ~ N, x is not 
interim blocked by S. 
Define the set of allocations that are not blocked for the grand coalition N as being 
interim efficient. 
3.3.7 Definition xis interim efficient if x E JIB(N), and xis not interim blocked by 
N. 
The one state deviation principle can greatly reduce the set of feasible allocations. 
In abstract environments, such a stringent requirement may lead to the social choice 
set being empty. In economic environments, however, sufficient conditions for exis-
tence of core allocations are satisfied. Page (1997) shows that as long as any coalition 
cannot block with better (inside) information than is assumed to be available for the 
grand coalition, a balanced characteristic form game can be constructed, satisfying 
the sufficient conditions for a non-empty core. The core makes no restrictions on 
information sharing for any coalition. 
The one state deviation principle used here is not equivalent to the notion of dura-
bility defined by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). In their construction, an allocation 
is durable if it is never an equilibrium, in a voting game, for agents to unanimously 
approve another allocation over it. Their definition allows for information leakage: 
each agent bases his approval decision on the fact that the other N - 1 agents also 
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approved the change. Blocking (Definition 3.3.5) does not imply such sophisticated 
contingent logic. The following example demonstrates that the two concepts are not 
the same. 
3.3.8 Example Consider an economy with two agents (denoted 1, and 2). Let there 
be three states of nature denoted by a, b, c. Both agents view each state as being 
equally likely. There are two goods in each state. Agent 1 has the following state 
dependent preferences: 
.9logx11 + .llogx12 w=a 
.25 log X11 + .75 log X12 w E {b, c }. 




.9logx21 + .llogx22 w =a 
.5logx21 + .5logx22 w E {b,c}. 
g:-i State: 









Table 3.2: A Blocked Allocation in Example 3.3.8 
Consider the information structure and allocation given in Table 3.2. The alloca-
tion is interim blocked (as in Definition 3.3.5) by coalition N. If w = b the allocation 
(4, 4) for both agents in all states is strictly preferred by both 1 and 2. However, 
this blocking allocation would not block under the HM version of durability. The 
allocation (5, 3) is strictly preferred by agent 2 to (4, 4) in state a. Therefore, agent 
1 can infer that unanimous approval of ( 4, 4) in all states must mean that state b 
has occurred (agent 1 has learned). Given that 1 now knows that b has occurred, 
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he strictly prefers the allocation (3, 5) in b to (4, 4) in b. Both agents would never 
unanimously approve ( 4, 4) in all states. 6 
The one state deviation concept used here is more correctly thought of as naive dura-
bility. It would be ideal to include a more sophisticated definition of blocking similar 
to Holmstrom and Myerson's (1983) durability. However, these blocking allocations 
are extremely difficult to characterize since it requires accounting for agents refining 
their information based upon the approval of the other agents: an allocation would 
block if all agents in a coalition were improved at state w given their information 
refined by the approval of the S - 1 other agents. Volij (1997) presents a core defini-
tion that allows for this advanced logic: preference for one allocation over the other 
"become[s] common knowledge after a long handshake." 
If one selects an allocation that satisfies the one state deviation principle, he can be 
certain that the agents will never move away from it: there will be no information such 
that another allocation is thought to be preferred. Undominated allocations provide 
an upper bound on the set of allocations one can expect: there is no allocation 
that is always preferred. Naively durable allocations are closer to the outcome of 
equilibrium play of a noncooperative game. If, at any state, there is a strategy, Cti, for 
some individual such that Vi(gi(Cti,cr-i),w) > Vi(gi(cr),w), then the original strategy 
cannot be an equilibrium. 
Prohibiting one state deviations by itself is not enough. In Example 3.3.4, the 
HM interim efficient allocation is also unblocked, demonstrating that interim core 
and efficient allocations are also not globally implementable. 
The definition of blocking presented here uses a strong form of blocking: all agents 
in a coalition must strictly prefer an alternative allocation for it to block. Alterna-
tively, one may wish to use a weaker form of blocking in which all agents in a coalition 
must weakly prefer an alternative allocation (with at least one agent strictly prefer-
ring it) to be willing to switch. In Chapter 2, I show that strictly positive endowments 
is sufficient to obtain equivalence of these blocking notions. 
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3.3.2 Measurability 
Another change to the classical versions of interim welfare allocations can come in 
the imposition of measurability restrictions. A function f : n -+ X is measurable 
with respect to 9 if: 
f(w') = f(w), for all w' E G(w), for all w E fl 
where G(w) is an atom. Thus, measurability restrictions constrain allocations to not 
vary over certain states. Both versions of the interim core and efficiency presented 
earlier allow any S:- measurable allocation. A more thorough justification for the use 
of measurability restrictions is given in Section 2.3. 
It is this lack of information restrictions that makes the HM interim efficient 
allocation in Example 3.3.4 troubling. Agents 3 and 4 are asked to contract different 
allocations in states b and c. However, at the interim stage (when the decision is 
assumed to be made) neither agent can distinguish between these two states. This is 
equivalent to asking players in an extensive form game to choose different strategies 
in the same information set. The following example demonstrates this. 
3.3.9 Example Consider the extensive form game described in Figure 3.1 in which 
nature plays T with probability p and B with probability 1 - p in the first stage: 
Then, player 1, who cannot distinguish between the two states of the world, then 
chooses U or D. Player 2, who knows either Tor B and U or D, then picks either 
u or d in each node. If p ;::: 1/3, then a Bayes Nash equilibrium for this game is 1 
plays U and 2 plays u, d, u, d (from the top node to the bottom). However, if Player 
1 could choose strategies contingent on T and B, he would choose U in T and D in 
B, increasing both players' payoff in state B from (5, 10) to (6, 11). While this new 
outcome would clearly block the previous outcome, Bayes Nash equilibrium requires 
that each agent pick a strategy that is consistent with his private information: O"i 
maps from Fi to messages, not from n to messages. 6. 










Figure 3.1: A Game with Incomplete Information 
final allocation, and on the allocations that coalitions use to block. Let 9i be the 
O"-field with respect to which the final allocation, xi, is assumed to be measurable for 
each i. Let 9i(S) be the O"-field with respect to which blocking allocations, Yi, for i E S 
can be measurable. By restricting 9i to a sub-O"-field of 37, the number of available 
allocations shrinks. However, restricting 9i(S) to a sub-O"-field of 97 decreases the 
number of blocldng allocations thus potentially increasing the set of solutions. 
3.3.10 Definition An allocation, x, is 9i(S) interim blocked by S if there exists 
an w E n and a y E B(S) such that Yi is 9i(S) measurable for all i E S and 
Vi(Yi, w) > Vi(xi, w) for all i E S. 
In addition to the one state deviation principle, blocking is restricted to a subset of all 
feasible allocations. This form of blocking defines a class of social choice correspon-
dences that depend upon the measurability restrictions imposed. A general definition 
for the class of core allocations with measurability restrictions is as follows. 
3.3.11 Definition x is in the (9i, 9i(S)) interim core if: 
i. Xi is 9i measurable for each i E N. 
ii. x E Jffi(N) 
66 
iii. For all S ~ N, xis not 9i(S) interim blocked by S. 
3.3.12 Definition x is (9i, 9i(N)) interim efficient if: 
i. Xi is 9i measurable for each i E N. 
ii. x E JIB(N) 
iii. x is not 9i(N) interim blocked by N. 
Interim efficient and core allocations as defined in Section 3.3.1 are then just one 
element of this class of social choice sets given by the restriction that 9i = 9i(S) = S:-
for all S, and for all i E S. 
Sub-o--fields of S:- can be partially ordered by the at least as fine as relation. We 
say that 
9 is at least as fine as S:- {:::? S:- ~ 9 
Therefore, if 9 is at least as fine as S:- and f is S:- measurable then f is also 9 measurable. 
As long as 9i is at least as fine as 9i(S) for all i and S, the core will be non-empty 
(Page 1997). Since ei » 0 for all i, 0 will not be in the set of (9;, 9i(N)) efficient or 
core allocations (See Chapter 2). 
3.4 Implementation 
These changes to interim efficiency and the core lead to positive results. By altering 
the social choice set to exhibit more game theoretic-like properties, Bayesian Mono-
tonicity is satisfied. 
3.4.1 Theorem If for all S, S:-i is at least as fine as 9i(S) for all i E S then the 
(9;, 9i(S)) interim core is Bayesian implementable on E 1. 
Proof: Let x E C. Let a be compatible with F and suppose that the Bayesian 
Monotonicity conditions are satisfied. Suppose that Xa is not in the (9i, 9i(S)) core. 
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Therefore, there exists a coalition S, a state w and an allocation z E JIB(S) with Zi 
9i(S) measurable for each i E S such that 
Vi(z,w) > Vi(xa,w) for all i ES. (3.1) 
Let w' = a(w). Then xa(w) = x(w'). Let a-(niES 9i(S)) be the smallest common 
coarsening of 9i(S) where Gi(S)(w) is an atom. Define a new allocation for coalition 
Sas follows: 
Yi(w") 
zi(w) w" E Gi(S)(w') 
ei otherwise 
which is feasible by the assumption of state independent endowments. Also, notice 
that for all i E S for all w E Fi(w) implies that a(w) E Fi(w'). Therefore, for all 
w E Fi(w), Ya(w) = zi(w) since S:-i is at least as fine as 9i(S). Then, by (3.1) 
which by Bayesian Monotonicity implies that 
Vi(y, w') > Vi(x, w') for all i E S. 
However, since Yi is 9i(S) measurable, this contradicts the assumption that x is in 
the (9i, 9i(S)) core. I 
The logic behind the result is similar to the reason that REE are implementable 
(Palfrey and Srivastava 1987). If there is an allocation that blocks the allocation 
attained via some deception, then a new allocation can be constructed that blocks 
the original allocation. Private measurability and state independent endowments 
ensure that this new allocation can be feasibly constructed. 
A similar result can be stated for efficient allocations. 
68 
3.4.2 Corollary If 97i is at least as fine as 9i(N) for all i E N, then (9i, 9i(N)) 
interim efficient allocations are Bayesian implementable on E 1 . 
Measurability restrictions must only be placed on blocking allocations. Consider 
Example 3.3.4. Forcing blocking allocations to be privately measurable ensures that 
(1, 1) in all states will not be blocked. However, there is no need in terms of imple-
mentation to eliminate the original, non-37i measurable, allocation. When 37i = 97 for 
all i, these results are equivalent to the results for Nash implementation of efficient 
and core allocations (Masldn 1998). 
By restricting the set of blocking allocations to be at least privately measurable, 
the size of the social choice set has increased. Therefore, more allocations are optimal 
under this version of interim efficiency. Is private measurability the finest possible 
measurability restriction? 
3.4.3 Proposition If the (9i, 9i(S)) interim core is Bayesian implementable on E 1, 
then 97i is at least as fine as 9i(S) for all S, and for all i E S. 
Proof: Let the (9i, 9i(S)) core be implementable and suppose that for some S and 
some i ES, 9i(S) Z 37i. Therefore, there exists an w En such that Fi(w) Z Gi(S)(w). 
Construct an economy for which Bayesian Monotonicity fails for the (9i, 9i(S)) core. 
Assume that Fi(w) =/::. n, and assume that for all j =/::. i, 97j = 97, or all agents other 
than i are perfectly informed. Assume that for all i E N, ei = (1, 1). Let the j i 
agents have state independent preferences given by: 
Define the following two events: 
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where Gi(S)(w) is an atom of the a-field 9i(S). Let i have state-dependent preferences 
as follows: 
.75logxi1(w) + .25logxi2(w) w EA 
ui(x,w) = .25logxi1 (w) + .75logxi2(w) w EB 
.5 log Xi1 (w) + .5 log Xi2 (w) otherwise 
Also, let i's prior be such that 
Consider the compatible a such that a(w) = w' for all w En, where w' ¢:. Fi(w). If xis 
in the (9i, 9i(S)) core, then it must be that xi(w') = Xj(w') = (1, 1). Bayesian Mono-
tonicity then implies that Xi(w) = Xj(w) = (1, 1) for all w E f2, is in the (9i, 9i(S)) 
core. However, this allocation is blocked by coalition S at w by the following alloca-
tion: 
(1.2, .7) w E Gi(S)(w) 
(1, 1) otherwise 
and for j =I- i in S 
(1 - .2/#S, 1 + .3/#S) w E Gi(S)(w) 
Yi(w) = (1+.3/#S,1 - .2/#S) w E Uw"EB Gi(S)(w") 
(1, 1) otherwise. 
This implies that the ( 9i, 9i ( S)) core cannot be implementable. I 
If coalitions can propose blocking allocations which are not consistent with their 
private information, there will be economies for which Bayesian Monotonicity fails. 
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If a social choice set in the class of ( 9i, 9i ( S)) interim cores, or ( 9i, 9i ( N)) interim 
efficient allocations is either not g:i measurable or finer than g:'i, then there are ex-
ample economies such that the social choice set cannot be implemented. However, 
Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) and Blume and Easley (1990) show that, in this class of 
economies, expectations equilibria will be implementable. Any expectations equilibria 
uses some statistic (prices in REE or any arbitrary statistic in Blume and Easley's for-
mulation) that agents can refine their information with respect to. Let 'Y be a random 
variable (such as prices). The partition formed by variation in 'Y generates a O"-field 
g:'1 , and agents refine their private information by this statistic. Therefore, blocking 
allocations that are finer than private information are permitted. Theorem 3.4.3 can 
be altered to allow for the discussion of expectations equilibria: take g:'~ = O"(g:'iLJg:'1 ) to 
be each agent's private information refined by the statistic. Given this new informa-
tion structure, private measurability will be necessary for implementation. Without 
knowledge of the exact features of 'Y, one cannot infer any blocking besides private 
information. If g:'i is at least as fine as g:'1 , then the statistic will be uninformative. In 
Chapter 2, I demonstrated that expectations equilibria will be contained in the fine 
private core (9i g:', 9i(S) = g:'i)· Therefore, the implementable allocations outlined 
here contain all expectations equilibria. If one is interested in examining situations in 
which prices are unknown or irrelevant, then this result demonstrates what efficiency 
properties can be induced via a noncooperative game (mechanism). 
Blume and Easley (1990) show that the Non-Exclusivity of Information is neces-
sary for expectations equilibria to be implementable. Given the similarity between 
expectations equilibria and measurability constrained welfare allocations discussed 
here, it would be surprising if the same result did not hold here. At least for a subset 
of social choice sets identified earlier, NEI is necessary. 
3.4.4 Proposition Let g:i be at least as fine as 9i(S), and 9i be finer than g:i· If 
the (9i, 9i(S)) core is Bayesian implementable on D, then all£ ED satisfy NEI. 
In order for a social choice set to be implementable in exclusive information environ-
ments, an incentive compatibility condition must be satisfied (Palfrey and Srivastava 
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1989). However, as long as the final allocation is allowed to be finer than each agent's 
private information, non-incentive compatible allocations will be in the social choice 
set. If 9i = 9=', then all rational expectations equilibria will be in the solution in-
cluding fully revealing REE. However, fully revealing REE are not generally incentive 
compatible (Palfrey and Srivastava 1986, Blume and Easley 1990). 
3.5 Conclusion 
The results presented here are mixed. There are changes to the definition of optimal 
allocations in the interim stage that yield a class of implementable social choice sets. 
Before, even in the most limited economic environments, the same could not be said 
of HM interim efficiency or the core. If we imagine that decisions on allocations are 
actually made at the interim stage, then these changes seem reasonable. First, the one 
state deviation principle recognizes that, having observed their private information, 
agents will not care about the allocation at states they can rule out (w' t:j_ Fi(w)). 
Second, measurability restrictions impose the requirement that agents do not demand 
different allocations at states they cannot distinguish. However, the results cannot be 
extended to a larger set of environments in which the NEI condition is not satisfied. 
Most differential information settings include at least some exclusive information. 
When NEI holds, no agent has truly private information: there is some subset of the 
other agents who know at least what he knows. 
The analysis here has focused only on changes to the set of blocking allocations. 
These appear to be the changes that are important for Bayesian Monotonicity to 
be satisfied since monotonicity is related to the set of blocking allocations across 
possible deceptions. However, in order to obtain positive implementation results in 
exchange economies, incentive compatibility must also be satisfied which appears to 
be related to the set of admissible final allocations. For example, Koutsougeras and 
Yannelis (1993) show that the private core (9i s='i and 9i(S) s:'i) is incentive com-
patible. Therefore, checking the more stringent Bayesian Monotonicity requirement 
for exclusive information environments is the only difficulty in order to demonstrate 
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implementability in exclusive information environments. 
The requirement that endowments be state independent (Assumption 3.2.3) greatly 
simplifies the proofs. In order to prove global implementability of (9i, 9i(N)) interim 
efficient allocations, it is only necessary to assume that the sum of the endowments 
be constant across states. It is worthwhile to examine whether similar results can be 
obtained when the endowments vary across states. 
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Chapter 4 Collusion in Multiple Object 
Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments 
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Abstract 
The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is 
studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communi-
cation between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous first-price auctions 
are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side pay-
ments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that rely only 
on bidders' ordinal ranking of markets, incentive compatibility is characterized and 
the ranking mechanism of Pesendorfer (1996) is interim incentive efficient. Labora-
tory experiments were completed to investigate the existence, stability, and effect on 
bidder and seller surplus of cooperative agreements in multiple object simultaneous 
first-price auctions. Collusive agreements are stable in the laboratory. The choices of 
the experimental subjects often closely match the choices predicted by the ranking 
and serial dictator mechanisms. However, a few notable exceptions raise interesting 
prospects for the theoretical development of models of cooperative behavior. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Collusion by bidders is thought to be a prominent feature of auctions for antiques, 
fish, wool, timber, school milk, and oil drainage leases (Cassady 1967, Pesendorfer 
1996, Hendricks and Porter 1988). In fact, from 1979 to 1988, 81 % all of Sherman Act 
cases filed by the U.S. Department of Justice involved auctions (Froeb 1988). Bidders 
have incentives to coordinate their behavior to increase their surplus by eliminating 
competition amongst each other. If they can find an equitable technique for dividing 
the spoils from such collusive behavior, bidder rings can be quite successful. 
In auctions, bidders are asymmetrically informed; they know their own values for 
the objects but not those of the other agents. In order to limit the amount of surplus 
that the auctioneer accumulates, the bidders would like to reach a preauction bidding 
agreement. However, any agreement may reveal the bidders' private information, 
causing their decisions to change. All bidders face a temptation to increase their 
one period profits by defecting from the collusive bidding agreement. Three primary 
questions which need to be addressed in the auction setting are: 
1. Do bidders form cooperative agreements in simultaneous first-price auctions? 
2. If they do, what sort of strategies do they utilize? 
3. How do these strategies affect market efficiency, bidder surplus, and seller sur-
plus? 
The objective of this chapter is to begin grappling with these questions by providing 
a theoretical and experimental examination of cooperative agreements in first-price 
sealed bid auctions. Collusion in single object auctions has been extensively discussed 
(Graham and Marshall 1987, McAfee and McMillan 1992, Giith and Peleg 1996). 
Pesendorfer (1996) suggests some collusive mechanisms for multi-object sealed bid 
auctions, and, recently, Brusco and Lopomo (1999) have examined how multiple 
objects can increase the number of 'collusive' Bayes Nash equilibria in English auc-
tions. Multiple object simultaneous sealed bid auctions are not completely unfamil-
iar. For example, auctions for school milk contracts are held under this procedure 
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(Pesendorfer 1996). Milgrom (1996) has recently suggested that simultaneous sealed 
bid auctions be used for determining the Carrier of Last Resort (COLR) privileges 
by the FCC. 
Collusion is modeled as the choice of a collusive mechanism by the bidders. Given 
that they face a game defined by a series of simultaneous first-price auctions, bidders 
select a mechanism that maps from their valuations for each object to a set of bids in 
the auction. While noncooperative (Bayes Nash equilibrium) bidding is one possible 
mechanism, there are potentially many other, more profitable, mechanisms. When 
side payments are allowed between bidders, an interim incentive efficient mechanism 
that dominates the noncooperative outcome for the bidders is identified. I then ex-
amine collusive mechanisms under the restriction that no side payments may be made 
between bidders. In the multiple object setting, the number of potential incentive 
compatible mechanisms increases significantly. Three mechanisms that, in general, 
are preferred by all bidders to Bayes Nash bidding are presented. On a restricted do-
main, the ranking mechanism of Pesendorfer (1996) is shown to be interim incentive 
efficient. These findings suggest that, if given the opportunity, bidders should be able 
to find a mechanism that they prefer to noncooperative behavior (cooperative agree-
ments will be formed) and that there are some intuitively simple mechanisms that can 
be predicted as possible stable outcomes. Laboratory experiments are then conducted 
that often support these theoretical predictions. However, in a few experiments, bid-
ders appear to deviate from theoretical predictions. They choose mechanisms that are 
not consistent with individual incentives yet lead to higher profits. These deviations 
suggest an avenue for future research. 
In Section 4.2, the general framework of this institution is developed. The tools of 
mechanism design are used to develop a model of cooperative behavior in simultaneous 
first-price sealed bid auctions in Section 4.3. The experimental design is presented in 
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 is a general discussion of the findings of these experiments. 
Proofs of relevant lemmas are provided in Appendix A. 
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4.2 The Model 
There are n bidders bidding on m objects in separate, simultaneous first-price auc-
tions. Bidders are assumed to have independent private values for each of the m 
objects. Bidder i's valuation for object j is drawn from a continuous distribution Fii 
that is assumed to be independent of each bidder's distribution for the other m - 1 
other objects. It is assumed that for all i and for all j, Fij has a common support 
given by [.Y., v] with Q ~ 0. The density, fij, is defined and strictly positive. Assume 
that bidders' valuations in each market are symmetric, or Fij = Fkj for all i, j, k.1 Let 
v ( V1, v2 , .•. , vn) be the vector of individual valuations where Vi = ( vil, vi2 , .•. , Vim) 
is the vector of valuations in each market for individual i. Let b be a vector of bids 
similarly defined. 
The simultaneous first-price auctions determine an allocation x E {O, l}m·n and 
prices based on the bids placed, where Xij = 1 indicates that bidder i has been 
allocated object j. Feasibility requires that :Z:::::~=l Xij 1 for all j. The function 
g : [.Y., vr·n --+ [O, 1 r·n determines the probability that each bidder is allocated each 
object:2 
l b· · > bn· for all£ k ZJ - <-J 
0 otherwise 
where k = #{biilbij ~ bej V£} is the number of high bidders. Thus, each object is 
allocated to the highest bidder with ties broken randomly. The price paid by each 
bidder is given by p : x --+ [Q, vr·n which is defined as 
0 otherwise. 
That is, if a bidder wins an item, then he pays his bid. Let Gij(bij) be the expected 
1 Many of the results presented here are also true when values are drawn from different distribu-
tions, but symmetry is maintained for simplicity. 
2It can be easily verified that no bidder would ever want to place a bid outside of ['.ll., v]. 
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probability that a bid of bij by bidder i is highest in market j. If the bid functions 
for all the bidders are symmetric and monotonic, then Gij(bij) will be the probability 
that Vij is greater than n - 1 draws from the distri bu ti on Fj' or G ij ( bij) = Fj ( Vij r-1 . 
Let Pij(bij) be the expected price paid by bidder i for object j when he has placed 
a bid of bij· Since first-price auctions are being modeled, the expected price can 
be simplified to Pij(bij) = bijGij(bij)· Assume that bidders are risk neutral. The 
expected utility for individual i is given by 
m 
Ui(bi, vi)= L Gij(bij)(vij - bij)· 
j=l 
The auctioneer may want to set a reserve price c > Q to maximize revenue. For 
simplicity, assume that the auctioneer is passive and sets c = Q. Also assume that the 
bidders cannot resell the objects; the allocation decision of the auctioneer is binding. 
The outcome of noncooperative behavior in this environment has been extensively 
studied. The optimal bidding strategy of each player is given by the Bayes Nash 
equilibrium of a game with asymmetric information. Maskin and Riley (1996) provide 
the most general sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Bayes Nash 
equilibrium bid function. Given the assumption that Fij and fij are strictly positive 
and bidders are risk neutral, a unique, monotonic Bayes Nash equilibrium exists. In 
the case of symmetric distributions, the symmetric bid function for each bidder is 
given by the simple bid function 
tJ . y 1v·· ( F. ( ) ) n-1 bij ( Vij) = Vij - Q. F/( Vij) dy for all i, j (4.1) 
where Fj( v) = Fij( v) for all i. 
4.3 Cooperative Equilibria 
If all bidders act noncooperatively, their attempts to outbid each other will give most 
of the surplus to the auctioneer. When all bidders' values are drawn from the uniform 
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distribution, bidders will obtain only 1/n of the surplus. If the bidders can find an 
agreement in which they place very low bids in the auction, they can expropriate most 
of the surplus from the seller. However, finding such an agreement is not necessarily 
an easy task. In single unit first-price auctions, collusion is considered to be difficult 
to sustain. Robinson (1985) shows that, with commonly known values, collusive 
agreements are not stable. However, in an independent private values framework, 
McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that collusion is possible. However, Giith and 
Peleg (1996) note that, by using repeated play to support their collusive equilibrium, 
McAfee and McMillan (1992) diminish the problem of enforcement in their analysis. 
Giith and Peleg (1996) show that no collusive mechanism satisfies both the no-envy 
property and their weaker form of incentive compatibility when the item is being sold 
at the first-price. However, under more general conditions, Giith and Peleg (1996) 
describe equilibrium strategies. They find that when the object is being sold in a first-
price sealed bid auction a ring leads to the same profits for both the buyer and seller as 
in the competitive case. In their view, the inability of collusion in first-price auctions 
to lead to profitable agreements may explain the general predominance of first-price 
sealed bid auctions. In the multiple object setting, however, the opportunities for 
collusive equilibria increase. 
In order to collude in this auction environment, bidders must come to a voluntary 
agreement about what bids are to be placed at the auction (which, in turn, determines 
who will be the winner of each item) as well as what sort of side payments are to . 
be made between members. Assume that bidders can communicate, and that they 
coordinate their bidding in each market in some sort of group decision process. 
How is this group decision process modeled? Assume that bidders formulate a 
collusive mechanism. A collusive mechanism is a game played by the bidders, the 
outcome of which is a set of bids in the auction. As in Laffont and Martimort (1998), 
assume that the objective of the mechanism is to maximize the expected utility of 
each bidder. 3 
3Laffont and Martimort (1998) examine collusive mechanisms in public goods environments. 
They propose that the collusive mechanism is designed by a benevolent planner (or centre). The 
perspective taken here is similar, but I aspire to allow the bidders to select the mechanism themselves. 
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Attempting to characterize the collusive mechanisms that may arise as the out-
come of all possible cooperative games between bidders is a daunting task. Fortu-
nately, by assuming that any collusive agreement must be compatible with individual 
incentives, that search can be drastically limited. The Revelation Principle guaran-
tees that any outcome which can be attained as the Bayes Nash equilibrium of some 
mechanism can also be attained as the Bayes Nash equilibrium of a direct revela-
tion mechanism (Gibbard 1973, Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979). A direct 
revelation mechanism is a direct mechanism which satisfies individual incentive com-
patibility (IC). A mechanism is direct if the strategy space is equivalent to the type 
space. In this case, agents report a vector of valuations ri. Thus, the outcome of 
communication between bidders can be thought of as a mechanism, (/3, s), which 
determines the bids to be placed and the payments to be made between members. 
In other words, /3 : [1L, vr·n --+ [1L, vr·n is a function such that /3ij ( r) specifies a bid 
by i in market j. The function s : [1L, vr·n --+ IRm·n specifies the payment (possibly 
negative) that each bidder pays in addition to his bid price if he is the winning bidder. 
Hence, Bij(r) is the payment bidder i pays in market j. 
If the private information of all the agents were known, then agents could evaluate 
each mechanism with respect to their ex post utility given by 
m 
ui((/3,s)lv) = °L,9ij(/3(v))(vij - /3ij(v))- Bij(v). (4.2) 
j=l 
Throughout this chapter, I assume that bidders decide upon a mechanism in the 
interim stage: after they have seen their own values in each market but they remain 
uncertain as to the actual valuations of the other bidders. No bidder has the ability to 
coerce another bidder to reveal his valuation. Thus, all information about individual 
preferences for markets must come from the mechanism itself. At the interim stage, 
each bidder's interim expected utility is given by 
m 





are the reduced form equations representing the bidder's expected bid and expected 
payment. Gij is given by the rules of the auction; it is the probability that i's bid is 
greater than the n - 1 other bids placed. 
A mechanism satisfies (interim) incentive compatibility (IC) if it is in the best 
interest of every individual to report his true valuation for the objects for all possible 
values that the other bidders might have. 
4.3.1 Definition (Incentive Compatible) A mechanism ((3, s) is (interim) incen-
tive compatible if, for all ri and Vi 
m m 
L Gij(Bij(vi))(vij - Bij(vi)) - Sij(vi) ~ L Gij(Bij(ri))(vij - Bij(ri)) - sij(ri)· 
j=l j=l 
Finally, if bidders were to decide on a mechanism at the ex ante stage, they would 
evaluate each mechanism with respect to their ex ante expected utility: 
A restriction that makes analysis of the various mechanisms substantially easier 
is anonymity, which requires that bidders with the same valuations are treated the 
same under the mechanism. 
4.3.2 Definition (Anonymity) A mechanism ((3, s) satisfies anonymity if for all 
permutations(}": N-+ N, Bi(vi) = Bu(i)(Vu(i)) and Si(vi) Su(i)(Vu(i)) for all Vi, and 
for all i. 
As in Ledyard and Palfrey (1994), when examining situations in which agents' val-
uations are drawn from identical distributions, it is assumed that mechanisms are 
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anonymous (or symmetric).4 Lemmas A.0.4 and A.0.5 in the appendix demonstrate 
that when bidders' values are drawn from identical distributions, there are no non-
anonymous mechanisms that are preferred by all bidders to anonymous mechanisms. 
An IC collusive mechanism that is always feasible is the noncooperative mecha-
nism: bids are placed that are consistent with the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium. 
4.3.3 Example (Noncooperative Mechanism) 
(4.4) 
Let (/3*, s*) denote the noncooperative mechanism. If bidders cannot find a collusive 
mechanism that is preferred to this strategy, there is little hope for successful collusion. 
Laffont and Martimort (1998) examine, in a public goods setting, whether some 
mechanism dominates the noncooperative mechanism. The objective here is to go a 
step further by describing the possible mechanisms. 
Assume that bidders do not deviate from the collusive mechanism. While bidders 
are able to misrepresent their values within the mechanism, once bids are determined 
by the mechanism the bids are perfectly enforced in the auction. This approach 
may be justified by repeated play. If bids are placed that are inconsistent with the 
mechanism, bidders will use a trigger strategy to punish deviant bidders. 
4.3.4 Proposition If Vi(/3, s) > Vi(,8*, s*) and (,8, s) is IC, then (/3, s) can be sup-
ported as a stationary equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. 
Begin by defining the structure of the repeated game. Let 8 E (0, l] be a common 
discount factor. At each time t there are two stages. At the beginning of each date, all 
players observe their valuations (or type) for that period. Stage t 1 is the negotiation 
phase. All players submit a report of their valuations (rf E [Q, vr). A suggested bid 
4In situations in which values are drawn from different distributions for the same market, the 
mechanism should be allowed to vary with different distributions as well as with different values. 
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and side payment (/3(r), s(r)) is announced. Then, at stage t 2 , bidders simultaneously, 
and independently select a bid and side payments (b~, O"f). A mechanism (/3, s) is said 
to be supported as a stationary equilibrium of this game if there exists a 8 > 0 such 
that for all possible type draws the equilibrium outcome for all tis vf = rf, b~ = /Ji ( vt), 
and O"f Bi ( vt). 
Proof: The equilibrium outcome can be supported by the following strategy. At time 
t, 
1. If for all t' < t, /3i(rt') 
Bi(rt) = O"l · 
2. Otherwise all play (/3*, s*). 
b~ and 
First, notice that by the assumption that (/3, s) is IC, if a bidder chooses to play 
/3i(rt) b~ and si(rt) llf it is optimal for him to choose rf = vf. Second, demonstrate 
that deviating from the collusive mechanism (/3, s) is not optimal. For any collusive 
mechanism, each player's one period gain from deviating from the collusive mechanism 
is bounded by (v - Q)m.5 By assumption, Vi(/3, s) > Vi(/3*, s*). Define 
c = Vi(/3, s) - Vi(/3*, s*). 
Then, an agent will not deviate at t if 
00 
L 5T c > (v - Jl..)m. 
T=O 
Thus as long as 
(v- v)m - c 
8 > -
(v - y_)m 
agents will prefer to always play the collusive mechanism. Since c is also bounded by 
(v - Q)m, it follows that there exists 8 < 1 satisfying this condition. I 
5This is the utility of one agent if he has the highest value in all the markets and is able to win 
all of them at a price equal to 1L· 
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McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Pesendorfer (1996) use this approach to find 
profitable collusive mechanisms. Otherwise, bidders' incentives to increase their bids 
cannot be avoided. The negative results of Giith and Peleg (1996) are largely due 
to the fact that they assume that bidders may place any bid in the auction. The 
repeated game approach appears to be consistent with previous experimental evidence 
on cooperative agreements (see Section 4.4). Also, assume that bidders' values are 
not ex post observable. After an auction, bidders cannot observe values in order 
to determine whether bids were truthful. Therefore, collusive mechanisms must be 
independent of actions in previous auctions. 
A first step in determining what mechanisms might be expected is to propose a 
reasonable mechanism and investigate its characteristics. A reduced bidding mecha-
nism is one possibility. Under this mechanism, each bidder agrees to bid some fraction 
( O!j) of his value in each market. 
4.3.5 Example (Reduced Bidding Mechanism) 
f3ij ( r) CY.jT ij 
Bij(r) 0 
The reduced bidding mechanism represents limited competition between bidders. By 
choosing such a mechanism, if the bidders truthfully report their valuations, the 
objects will be won by the bidders with the highest valuations, and, if the a's are 
small, the cartel will capture most of the surplus. The following lemma characterizes 
IC reduced bidding mechanisms. 
4.3.6 Lemma Let rij(rij) = ~:;g:;{. For each market, j, there exists an aj E (0, l] 
such that the Reduced Bidding mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible if and 
only if drij(Tij) = c· for all i where c· E 11l> ·• Furthermore a· is given b1r drij(Tij) 
dTij J ' J JJ."+ ' J J dTij 
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The implication of Lemma 4.3.6 is that the only IC reduced bidding mechanisms are 
those that yield bidder profits identical to noncooperative bidding. 
4.3. 7 Theorem If an IC Cl!j exists for all markets then the resulting bid function is 
equivalent to the non.cooperative mechanism. 
Proof: Let ((3, s) be a reduced bidding mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility 
(and thus the conditions of Lemma 4.3.6). Suppose that bij ( Vij) Cl!jVij is not a 
Bayes Nash equilibrium. In the noncooperative setting the first order conditions for 
maximization are given by 
where 
H ·( ) _ fki(v) 
kJ v - Fki(v) 
is the hazard rate for each individual, and c/>ij(b) is the inverse bid function. If 
bij ( Vij) Cl!jVij is not an equilibrium then it must be that 
for some i and j which implies that 
Note that 
Cl!j # Vij(l - O!j) LHkj(Vij)· 
k:f=i 
9ij(Vij) = Gij(Vij) LHkj(Vij)· 
k:f=i 
Thus, multiplying by Gij(Vij) > 0 leads to 
which is a contradiction with the first order conditions for IC given by Equation A.6. 
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Thus, if the reduced bidding mechanism is IC it is also the outcome of competitive 
behavior. II 
If O!jVij is not equal to the noncooperative bid strategy, bidders have an incentive 
to increase their reported values to increase their probability of winning in the auction. 
Since the cartel members cannot directly observe each other's values, all agents will 
partake in this destructive behavior as long as they are bidding below the Bayes Nash 
equilibrium. Therefore, the only IC reduced bidding mechanism is the Bayes Nash 
equilibrium. This result is similar to Guth and Peleg's (1996): any mechanism which 
allows for positive bidding must be equivalent to the Bayes Nash equilibrium. 
Given that mechanisms of this sort will be no better than the noncooperative 
mechanism, what types of mechanisms might one expect to see bidders select? Holm-
strom and Myerson (1983) suggest that a reasonable class of mechanisms to eliminate 
are those that are interim dominated by another mechanism. 
4.3.8 Definition (Interim Dominated) A mechanism ((3, s) is interim dominated 
by ((3', s') if Ui(((3', s')lvi) 2:: Ui(((3, s)lvi) for all i and for all vi with at least one strict 
inequality. 
If the bidders select a mechanism that is interim dominated then, even before they 
learn their values, bidders would unanimously prefer to switch to a mechanism that 
dominates it. Interim incentive efficient (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983) mechanisms 
are those which are not dominated. 
4.3.9 Definition (Interim Incentive Efficient) A mechanism is interim incentive 
efficient if there does not exist another IC feasible mechanism that interim dominates 
it. 
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) show that if a mechanism is interim incentive effi-
cient, then it can never be common knowledge that another IC mechanism interim 
dominates it. Thus, interim efficiency is a minimal standard for what is expected as 
the outcome of a cooperative process.6 
6It is likely that the cooperative process would lead bidders to actually select a subset of the 
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In order to limit the incentives to misrepresent their valuations that arise in the 
reduced bidding mechanism, bidders might select one bidder as the sole bidder in 
each market. Define (3° as follows. 
f3ij(v) 
:y_ with probability %(v) 
0 with probability (1 - qij(v)) 
where 0 indicates that the bidder does not participate in the auction, 7 and 
n 
L qij = 1 for all j. 
i=l 
The function that determines the side payments as a function of bidders' valuations 
is now given by t. Let the class of mechanisms of this form be indicated by 8°. 
Thus, (q, t) is now a new direct revelation mechanism that defines a bidder's ex post 




and interim expected utility as 
m 
Ui(ri, vi)= L Qij(ri)(vij - y_) - Tij(ri) 
j=l 
where the reduced form probability of being selected as the sole bidder Qij and side 
payment Tij is: 
J qij(ri, r -i)dF_i 
J tij(ri, r -i)dF_i· 
interim incentive efficient mechanisms. For example, Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) argue that 
the appropriate restriction in the face of communication between agents is the concept of durability 
(the bidders would never unanimously approve a change from one mechanism to another). For the 
duration of this chapter, I take the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms to be a good first 
approximation. 
7 A nearly equivalent version would allow one bidder to bid '.ll. + E and all others to bid '.ll.· 
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The following theorem establishes that attention can be restricted to this partic-
ular class of mechanisms. 
4.3.10 Theorem If (/3, s) is an incentive compatible direct mechanism such that 
(/3, s) tf. B0 , then there exists an incentive compatible, direct mechanism (/3', s') E B0 
that interim dominates (/3, s). 




I: Qij(vi)(vij - y_) -Tii(vi) =I: Gii(Bii(vi))(vii - Bii(vi)) - Sii(vi) Vvi Vi. 
j=l j=l 
Since (/3, s) satisfies that necessary and sufficient conditions for IC, then so to must 
(q, t). 
To show the second part assume that S(v) = L~=l 2:::j=1 Sij(vi) and note that 
T(v) = L~=l LJ=l Gij(Bij(vi))(Bij(vi) - y_) + sij(vi)· Thus, since Gij(Bij(vi)) is a 
probability and (Bij(vi) y_) ~ 0 (y_ is the lower bound of the range of Bij(vi)), it 
must be that T( v) ~ S( v) for all v. Thus, we can define a function Cij( v_i) such that 
Cij(v-i) ~ 0 and L~=l 2:::}:1 Cij(v-i) T(v) - S(v). Let 
Then, let 
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be the new expected tax then (q, i) is a new mechanism that is still incentive compat-
ible (since the new term is just a constant for any agent) but yields higher expected 
utility due to the lower expected taxes. I 
The set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms lie within B0 • Bidding leads to 
profits for the auctioneer which necessarily implies losses to the cartel. To achieve 
the greatest possible surplus bidders will allocate the object to the bidder who would 
have won the same object under the mechanism not in B0 • Then, the bidders can 
divide up the gains from not bidding in a manner that does not affect incentives. 
This is the approach taken by Graham and Marshall (1987) when modeling collusion 
in second-price auctions. Noncooperative bidding specifies strictly positive bids for 
all bidders. The noncooperative mechanism is not in B0 , implying that there exist 
collusive mechanisms which dominate it. 
4.3.11 Corollary The noncooperative mechanism is dominated when side payments 
are allowed. 
McAfee and McMillan (1992) provide an insight into possible mechanisms that 
might arise in this setting. 
4.3.12 Definition (Ex post Efficient) A mechanism (q, t) is ex post efficient if 
there does not exist another mechanism (q', t') such that ui((q', t')lv) 2: ui((q, t)Jv) for 
all i, and for all v with strict inequality somewhere. 
That is, a mechanism is said to be ex post efficient if it always assigns bidding rights 
in each market to the bidder with the highest valuation. Thus, the bidder with the 
highest valuation is chosen as the winning bidder with probability one. 
4.3.13 Remark In order for a mechanism to be ex post efficient it must be that for 
all j, mj( v) = 1 if and only if Vij =max{ V1j, V2j, ... , Vnj }. 
Definition 4.3.12, however, did not impose incentive compatibility on the set of fea-
sible mechanisms. It may be possible that the informational constraints prohibit 
mechanisms from always selecting the bidder with the highest value. In the single 
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object setting, McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that there exists an ex post effi-
cient and interim incentive compatible mechanism which can easily be extended to 
the multiple object environment developed here. 
4.3.14 Example (Efficient Strong Cartel Mechanism) 
0 otherwise 
if Vij = max { V1j, Vzj, ... , Vnj} and otherwise 
··( ) _ _ [tik(v) -1l] 
ti3 v - (n _ l) (4.5) 
Under this mechanism, the bidder with the highest valuation in each market is selected 
and splits between each of then 1 other bidders the gain in surplus from limiting 
competition. Since this mechanism is dependent only upon valuation reports for each 
particular market it can be extended to the multiple object setting. 
4.3.15 Theorem (McAfee and McMillan (1992)) The efficient strong cartel mech-
anism is both incentive compatible and ex post efficient. 
When side payments are allowed, there exists a collusive mechanism that allows the 
bidders to capture all available surplus. Since ex post efficiency uniquely character-
izes q (Remark 4.3.13), it must be that an interim efficient mechanism also satisfies 
that restriction.8 Therefore, the strong cartel mechanism must be interim incentive 
efficient. 
8The set of interim efficient mechanisms are a subset of the ex post efficient mechanisms. 
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4.3.16 Corollary The efficient strong cartel mechanism is interim incentive efficient 
when side payments are allowed. 
4.3.1 Weak Cartels 
McAfee and McMillan (1992) also examine collusive agreements in single object :first-
price auctions that prohibit side payments. A justification for this restriction is that 
antitrust laws and the threat of detection make actual side payments extremely risky, 
if not impossible. It is hard to imagine a large firm actually transferring funds to 
another firm. Thus, the only method for collusion is the division of bidding rights 
in various markets. Assume side payments are not possible. Under these weak cartel 
agreements, McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that the best mechanism for a ring 
of bidders is one in which they all place identical bids, or they commit to a rotation 
scheme that randomly chooses an exclusive bidder. Such rotation schemes are often 
called phases of the moon agreements (Bane 1973). In the mechanism design model 
just developed, such a restriction can be implemented by requiring that no transfers 
are made. 
4.3.17 Assumption (No side payments) tij ( v) 0 for all i and for all j. 
Let Bs be the subset of B0 satisfying Assumption 4.3.17. A mechanism with no side 
payments cannot be ex post efficient since the condition given by Remark 4.3.13 
violates IC. The following result is a generalization of the result of Dudek, Kim, and 
Ledyard (1995). 
4.3.18 Theorem Let Gij(r) = Ilkfi Fkj(r). If there is some i such that Gij(vij) =f 
Gij(Vij) for some positive vij, Vij E [Q, v], then there does not exist an IC (/3, s) in Bs 
such that it is ex post efficient. 
Proof: Suppose q is an ex post efficient Bayesian Mechanism without transfers. Let 
vi= (vi1 ,vi2 , ... ,Vim) and vi= (vij,Vi,-j) and agent i is as given above. Incentive 
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compatibility requires that 
and 
Since qij ( v) = 1 only if Vij > Vkj for all k =I i and qij ( v) = 0 otherwise, from ex post 
efficiency, I may simplify, so that fv_;EV-; qij(vi, v_i)dF_i(v-i) = Gij(Vij)· Thus, 
m m 




L VijGij(Vij) ~ L VijGij(Vij) 
j=l j=l 
But for all k =I j Vik Gik(vik)· This allows me to 
simplify the expression to 
and 
Rearranging terms yields 
and 
Since both Vij, Vij > 0, it must be that Gij(Vij) = Gij(Vij), which is a contradiction. 
I 
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Without the extra lever of side payments, the cartel cannot ensure that the bidder 
with the highest valuation is chosen. Every bidder (even the lowest types) must be 
given some positive probability ·of being chosen as the sole bidder. Therefore, there 
will always be mechanisms in S0 that (ex post) dominate mechanisms without side 
pay!Ilents. If, instead of comparing mechanisms in ss to all other mechanisms, atten-
tion is restricted to mechanisms only in ss, then any mechanism is ex post efficient. 
Raising any bidder's probability that he is the sole bidder in some market (given that 
all type information is revealed) necessarily requires lowering other bidders' probabil-
ities of being the sole bidder. The decreased probability of winning cannot be offset · 
by side payments a$ it is in the strong cartel situation. 
There are limitations, however, to this result. ss is assumed to be a subset of S 0 , 
mechanisms that select a single bidder for each market. There are incentive compati-
ble mechanisms in S that do not involve side payments yet are ex post efficient. The 
noncooperatlve mechanism is one. When examining strong cartels, it was shown in 
·Theorem 4.3.10 that any mechanism in i3\S0 was dominated by a mechanism in S0 • 
The result does not hold for mechanisms in ss. In fact, for any mechanism in ss a set 
of value distributions can be constructed such that the noncooperative mechanism is 
not dominated. Therefore, assuming ss C S 0 is a simplifying assumption that could 
potentially eliminate some good mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, examining all possible mechanisms in ss is still a very difficult task 
due to the dimensionality of each bidder's type (each bidder's type is an m-tuple of 
valuations). While Rochet (1987) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
mechanism to be IC in very general multi-dimensional settings, finding the interim 
incentive efficient mechanism in this class is not trivial. I proceed by proposing a 
potential collusive mechanism in ss. In the single object setting, McAfee and McMil-
lan (1992) show that random assignment of a winning bidder is the only IC collusive 
mechanism without side payments other than the noncooperative mechanism. The 
random assignment mechanism generalizes their result to the multiple object setting. 
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4.3.19 Example (Random Assignment Mechanism) 
(4.6) 
The random assignment mech?-nism is IC sillce it does no_t depend upon any individual 
information. Three procedures describe how bidders might arrive at the probabilities 
specified by this mechanism. First, in each market, the group could randomly select a 
sole bidder. Second, if the auctioneer randomizes amongst tie bids, all bidders could 
simply agree to place identical bids of Qin each market. Finally, when Fij = Fkj for 
all i, j, and k and the auction is repeated many times, the assignment mechanism. 
could also be approximated by each bidder bidding in only one market for all periods. 
Is it the case that even this simple mechanism interim dominates noncooperative 
bidding? For a large class of distributions the random assignment mechanism will 
always be preferred to noncooperative bidding. 
4.3.20 Proposition If for all j, Fi first-order stochastically dominates the uniform 
distribution on [12., v], then the random assignment mechanism dominates the nonco-
operative mechanism. 
Proof: In order for Proposition 4.3.20 to be true it must be that 
for all vi, or 
It is sufficient to demonstrate that for all j and Vij, 
(v .. - {3~-(v .. ))F-(v .. r-1 < ~(v .. - v) iJ iJ iJ J iJ _ n iJ - • 
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Substituting Equation 4.4 !or (J[j and simplifying yields 
Fj first order stochastic dominates the uniform distribution, or 
for all y E [Q, v] implying that 
(v - Q) (v!! -Q)n 
n v Q 





An implication of this result is that if Fj is convex for all markets, the random 
assignment mechanism will dominate the Bayes Na;sh equilibrium mechanism. A 
convex Fj implies that higher value draws are more likely, which encourages bidders 
to bid closer to their values in the Bayes Nash equilibrium. 
However, for some distributions there will always be values for which bidders prefer 
the noncooperative mechanism to the random assignment mechanism. Consider an 
example where Vij E [O, 1] and Fij(v) v1/ 3 for all i. The Bayes Nash equilibrium 
bid function is given by 
n-1 
--V·· n + 2 iJ· 
For any Vij, a bidder's expected utility from the random assignment mechanism is 
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~Vij. A bidder will prefer the noncooperative outcome in market j if 
. (. n + 2) n:1 
V"> --
iJ 3n (4.7) 
· For n :> 1, there are feasible values satisfying this condition. As n increases, the right 
hand term of Equation 4.7 approaches 1. In general, as the set of bidders grows, the 
set of values under which the noncooperative mechanism is preferred to the random 
assignment mechanism shrinks. 
4.3.21 Theorem For any collection of distributions, (Fj)f=1 , there exists a i:umber 
of bidders, n, such that th<? random assignment mechanism dominates the noncoop-
erative mechanism. 
Proof: Lemma A.0.6 establishes that there exists an such that 
F-( )n-1 < Y - 1L 
J y - -v - 12. 
for all j and y. Then, apply Proposition 4.3.20. I 
In general, only bidders with high valuations will prefer the noncooperative outcome. 
However, as n increases, it is more likely that there are other bidders with high values. 
This makes. the Bayes Nash equilibrium strategy less profitable. 
The fact that bidders are more likely to prefer the random assignment mechanism 
to noncooperative bidding when n is large is opposed to conventional wisdom on 
·collusive behavior. Both experimentally and empirically, cartelization is thought to 
be much easier in small groups. However, as the group size increases, the benefits 
from noncooperative behavior shrink significantly. 
For the single object case the random assignment mechanism is interim incentive 
efficient. For all distributions, there is a cutoff within [JL, v] between preference for 
the random assignment mechanism and the noncooperative mechanism. However, the 
noncooperative mechanism is the only other incentive compatible mechanism. Thus, 
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random assignment cannot be dominated. 9 
4.3.22 Corollary When the !lumber of objects m = 1, the.random assignment mech-
anism is interim incentive efE.cien,t. 
While random assignment mechanisms are the only IC collusive mechanisms in the 
single object environment, ·other IC mechanisms are available in the multiple object 
environment: Bidders may use more sophisticated rotation schemes utilizing the 
increased dimensionality of the type space to increase efficiency. Bidders are willing 
to trade-off probability of winning a lower valued object for increased probability of 
winning a higher valued object. These mechanisms are characterized by the strategic 
choice of sole bidders for each market based upon their reported values. The serial 
dictator mechanism (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein 1981, Olson 1991) is an example 
of a rotation scheme. 
4.3.23 Example (Serial Dictator Mechanism) For each random permutation of 
bidders: (n1, n2 , ... , nm), where nk = i indicates that bidder i selects in spot k, 
1 j R(nk) 
q(nk)j ( 4.8) 
0 otherwise 
(4.9) 
where R(nk) is defined iteratively as follows. Let R(n0 ) = f/J and fork ~ 1 
R(nk)=arg max {v(nk)j}· 
jE{l, ... ,m}\ LJ~,;;} R(n;) 
The serial dictator mechanism selects the order in which each bidder is allowed to 
select the market in which he is the sole bidder. Each bidder is a dictator over the 
outcomes at a single point in time. Assume that the choice of dictator at any point 
9 Any randomization will be IC, but only the random assignment mechanism satisfies anonymity. 
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Bidder 
1 2 3 4 5 
A 1 3 3 5 5 
B. 2 5 2 3 2 
Market c 3 2 1 1 1 
D 4 1 4 2 3 
E 5 4 5 4 4 
Figure 4.1: An Example with 5 Bidders and 5 Markets 
is random.10 If there are m objects and n bidders, the probability that any bidder is 
selected to be the dictator for market i is 1/m. In the example described by Figure 4.1, 
there are five bidders and five objects. The numbers indicate each bidder's· relative 
ranking of his values. If the random draw of dictators yields the order (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 
then bidder 1 would select first and choose market A, 2 would select market D, 3 
would select C, 4 would select B, and 5 would have no choice but to select market 
E. When the number of objects is less than or equal to the number of bidders, the 
serial dictator mechanism requires that each bidder be selected at most one time. 
The number of possible allocations predicted by the serial dictator mechanism can 
be large. In principle, each different permutation of the dictator order could lead to 
a different. outcome. 11 Thus, the number of possible orderings, n!, acts as an upper 
bound on the number of possible outcomes. 
The serial dictator mechanism is IC because stating one's true valuatio.ns maxi-
mizes the probability that higher valued objects are chosen first. The serial dictator 
mechanism highlights the increased richness of the set of possible mechanisms when 
examining multiple object auctions. More importantly, the multiple object environ-
ment makes the random assignment mechanism an inferior choice. 
4.3.24 Proposition The serial dictator mechanism interim dominates the random 
10This is necessary to maintain anonymity. 
11 Although that is not necessarily true. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which only one 
solution is possible. For example, suppose each bidder's maximal valuation is in a different market. 
Then, for any combination, each bidder will select the market he ranks highest. 
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assignment mechanism. 
Proof: Let QiD b_e the reduced form probabilities given by the serial dictator mech-
anism, and let Qj = ~· Note that "L,7l=i Q~D = "L,J=1 Qj = 1;:. Also, note that QiD 
is a decreasing function of each markets ordinal ranking. Thus, w.l.o.g. let .vi be such 
that Vil ~ vi2 · • • ~Vim· Note that QfiD > Qj = ~ since with probability ~' i gets to 
choose first; however, there is also a positive probability that i chooses at some other 
point but market 1 is still available. This is enough to apply Lemma A.0.7 (multiply 
the whole equation by .;;_ in order to get a linear combination). Thus, it must be that. 
for all vi, vi· QiD ~ vi· Qj. All that remains to be shown is that there exists a vi 
such that Vi • Q~D > vi · Qj Let Vi = (vi1, ... , Vik, '.!Li(k+l)' ... , '.!Lim)· This yields our 
result. I 
Ideally, I would continue examining generi~ weak cartel mechanisms. However, 
the serial dictator mechanism suggests a class of mechanisms that seem particularly 
reasonable as a first guess at the expected choice of mechanism in this setting and are 
easier to analyze. They are ordinal mechanisms which rely only on each individual's 
ranking of his markets. 
4. 3. 25 Definition (Ordinal Mechanism) Let M = { 1, 2, ... , m}. Let f : [Q, vr·n -+ 
Mm·n be a function denned as 
q is an ordinal mechanism if for all v and v' 
f(v) = J(v') :::;. q(v) = q(v'). 
When a mechanism is ordinal, both q and the reduced form probabilities Q can be 
expressed as a function of each agent's ranks of the markets. Since any incentive com-
patible collusive mechanism will not be ex post efficient (Theorem 4.3.18), it must 
be that the mechanism makes limited use of the bidders' information. Also, when 
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m = 1, in order to satisfy IC, the mechanism must not depend on any private informa-
tion. The class of ordinal mechanisms are one class of mechanisms that satisfy these 
constraints. There may be other incentive compatible mechanisms that use more 
information than ordinal mechanisms: However, as a first cut, the possible mecha-
nisms given this restriction are examined. When cons"idering ordinal mechanisms, IC 
is characterized by the follov:ing proposition. 
4.3.26 Proposition Any ordinal mechanism q is Bayesian Incentive Compatible if 
and only if for all i, 
i. Qij is decreasing in the ranks (i.e., Qij(milmij 1) ~ Qij(milmij = 2) ... ~ 
Qij(milmij = m)), and 
11. (Qij(milmij = l) -Qij(milmij = p)) = (Qik(milmik = l)- Qik(milmik = p)) for 
all j, k and for all l, p. 
Proof: Necessity. Let an ordinal mechanism be IC and assume that 1 or 2 do not 
hold. Suppose there exists al <panda j such that Qij(mij = p) > Qij(mij = l). 
Let Vi be such that vil > Viz > · · · > Vim such that # { vil I Vi! > Vij} = l - 1. IC implies 
that 
Qij(mil = l)vi1 + · · · Qij(mij = l)vij + · · · + Qik(mik = p)vik + 
+Qim(mim = m)vim ~ Qij(mil = l)vil + 
+Qij(mij = p)vij + · · · + Qik(mik = l)vik + · · · + Qim(mim = m)vim 
which implies that 
Qij(mij = l)vij + Qik(mik p)vik ~ Qij(mij = p)vij + Qik(mik = l)vik 
Vij(Qij(mij = l) - Qij(mij = p)) ~ Vik(Qik(mik = l) - Qik(mik = l)) 
implying that vii ~ Vik which is a contradiction. 
Suppose there exists Qij(mij = l) - Qij(mij p) =I- Qik(mik = l) - Qik(mik = p). 
W.l.o.g. assume Qij(mij = l) - Qij(mij = p) > Qik(mik = l) - Qik(mik = p). Let 
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- Qij(mij=l)-Qij(m;i=P) > 1 Then choose vi such that #{villvil > vi
1
·} = l - 1 and 
C - Q;k(mik=l)-Q;k(m;k=P) - ' 
#{ vizlvil >Vik} = p - 1 and Vik > CVij· Then, using the same argument as above, IC. 
implies that 
Qij(mij = l) - Qij(mij = p) > Vik 




which is a contradiction. 
Sufficiency. Suppose 1 and 2 hold but the ordinal mechanism is not IC. Then 
there exists j, k such that Vij > Vik and 
Qij(mi1 = l)vi1 + · · · + Qij(mij = l)vij + · ·: + Qik(mik = p)vik + 
+Qim(mim = m)vim < Qij(mil = l)vi1 + 
+Qij(mij = p)Vij + · · · + Qik(mik = l)vik + · · · + Qim(mim = m)vim 




given that 1 and 2 hold it mu.st be that Vij < Vik which is a contradiction. I 
The first condition is a standard IC constraint that says a bidder will be willing 
to place each market in its proper ran.k only if doing so results in an increase in 
his probability of winning that object. The second condition constrains how the 
mechanism may vary across markets. The relative differences in Q between each rank 
must be the same in each market. Otherwise, there may be values for which the 
bidder would prefer to change his reported ranks. 
The random assignment and serial dictator mechanisms are IC ordinal mecha-
nisms. Pesendorfer (1996) suggests another ordinal mechanism that satisfies Bayesian 
incentive compatibility: the ranking mechanism. Each Bidder submits a ;report of his 
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ranking of the markets. 12 Then, the bidder with the highest rank is selected in each 
market as the sole bidder in that market. If more than one bidder happens to report 
the same rank, then the sole· bidder is chosen at random from those bidders. The 
·example in Figure 4.1 is an illustration of such a mechanism. The ranking.mechanism 
would ·select bidder.1 as the sole bidder in market A, either 1, 3, or 5 in market B, 
either 3, 4, or 5 in market C, 2 in market D, and 2, 4, or 5 in market E. Three 
features of the ranking mechanism are apparent. First, bidders can be selected as the 
·sole bidder in more than one market. In this example, bidder 5 could potentially be 
selected as the bidder in three markets. It is possible that bidder 3 not be selected 
at all. Second, the sole bidder's rank can be very low. For example, in market E, the 
potential winning bidders'. ranks are all 4, indicating that their valuations are likely . 
to be quite low. 
4.3.27 Example (The Ranking Mechanism) 
0 otherwise 
where k = #{ .elmej = mij} is the number of bidders who ranked market j the same 
as i. 
The reduced form probabilities for each bidder and each market are given by 
n (1)( (n 1)! )(l)k-l(m-mij)n-k 
Qij(mij) = ~ k (k - l)!(n k)! m m (4.13) 
for mij < m, and for mij m, 
12If one wishes to stick to the strict definition of a direct mechanism, imagine bidders submit-
ting their valuations and some cartel centre ranking their values. Bidders are indifferent between 
reporting their true valuations and reporting any other order-preserving set of valuations. 
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Under the ranking mechanism, each agent's probability of being selected as the sole 
bidder in a particular market is independent of his Tanks for the other markets. 
Obviously, the ranking mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility since the interim 
probability of being selected as 'the sole bidder is decreasing in the ranking. The 
probability that an individual is selected as the bidder in any particular market is 
simply the probability that no one ranked that market higher than he did, which is 
clearly decre.asing in his ranking (for higher ranks (mij) each term in Equation 4.13. 
is smaller). 
For a fixed number of bidders, Pesendorfer (1996) shows that expected efficiency 
converges to 1003 as the number of markets increases.13 The ranking mechanism will 
always select a bidder who ranked a particular. market the highest as opposed to the 
serial dictator mechanism which may, due to .the order of draws, select a bidder who 
does not have a high rank. Thus, in expectation, bidders' valuations should be higher. 
In fact, the ranking mechanism is an interim incentive efficient ordinal mechanism. 
4.3.28 Theorem Ifv > (n-1)'.Q, the ranking mechanism is interim incentive efficient 
in the class of all anonymous ordinal mechanisms without side payments. 
Before showing the proof that the ranking mechanism is interim incentive efficient, 
some additional notation is in order. Since the ranking mechanism is assumed to be 
anonymous, it must be that qij(m) is a function only of the number of individuals 
who have ranked each particular market in each spot. Thus, for simplicity let Ei = 
{ ( n 1j, n 2j, ... , nmj) I I::;,1 nij = n} be the set of possible total ranks for a market 
where nij indicates that nij bidders ranked market j in their ith spot. Thus, E = 
E 1 x E2 x · · · x Em is the set of possible events over which qij may vary. ·Let ?r(e) be 
the probability that e E E occurs. 
Proof: Suppose that there exists another ordinal mechanism such that 'L:j=1 Q~/vi)Vij i 
LJ=l Qij(vi)Vij for all i and for all vi Let Vi be such that vil ~Viz···~ Vim· Then it 
13Bidder surplus as a percentage of the maximum possible surplus can be readily substituted 
for efficiency in these situations since bidders are essentially bidding zero which implies no seller's 
surplus. 
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must be that 
which implies that 
This inequality implies that there exists a k such that Qik ( k) 2: Q( k). If for all 
k :::; m, Qik(k) = Q(k) then for all i the outcome of Q' is identical to Q and they 
are equivalent mechanisms. On the other hand, let j be the first market such that 








where E(j) = {e E EJnii 2: l}. Let E(j) be partitioned into two sets: E(j)1 = {e E 
E(j)Jqij(e) = O} and E(j) 2 = {e E E(j)Jqij(e) > O}. In order for Qii(j) > Q(j) it 
must be that there exists a e E E such that qij(e) > qij· Now, show, by cases, that 
an increas~ in qii for any event in either E(j) 1 or E(j) 2 will lead to a contradiction. 
Case 1: Suppose there exists a e E E(j)1 such that qii(e) > qii(e). 
Let c = qii ( e) Then, since qii ( e) -:--- 0 it must be that there exists a k < j such 
that nki > 0 or some other individual ranks the events lower than you. Let k* = 
min{klnkj > O}. Under the ranking mechanism, it must be that qik•(e) = n!. and 
qi! ( e) 0 otherwise. Thus, since % ( e) 2: 0 for all j and niqik = 1 it must be that 
any change increase in qii(e) must come at a reduction in qik· Thus it must be that 
qik 1-:,,jc. Thus given the choice of j, it must be that 
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which is true only if 
Notice that both nj and nk are greater than zero. This is only true for all e E E(j)i 
if 
1 
ViJ. 2:: --Vik 
n=l 
Let Vi be such that Vi1 = Vi2 = ... = Vi(j-1) = v and Vij = Vi(j+I) ... = Vim = Q. 
If q' is preferred to q it must be that '.Q 2:: n:_l v. Since v > (n - l)Q, it must be that 
12. > 12. which is a contradiction. Thus, Case 1 cannot hold. 
Case 2: Suppose there exists a e E E(j)2 such that qij(e) > %(e). If e E E(j) 2 , 
then it must be that qij(e) = ; .. Thus, it must be that qi1·(e) > ;. which violates J J 
feasibility of anonymous mechanisms (since this implies q~j(e) =f=. qij(e) for some other 
individual who ranks the market in spot j). Thus, Case 2 cannot hold. 
Thus, there cannot exist a q' such that it improves each agent's interim expected 
utility for all values. I 
If 12. = 0, then the condition on the support of the distribution is satisfied for all 
n. This suggests that, if a group of bidders are deciding on how to collude, they 
may very well want to pick the ranking mechanism since no other mechanism can do 
better for all possible values. 14 
There may exist other (non-ordinal) mechanisms which dominate the ranking 
mechanism. Since the noncooperative mechanism is not an ordinal mechanism, it 
is even possible that it may dominate the ranking mechanism. However, since the 
ranking mechanism dominates random assignment, Theorem 4.3.21 can be applied to 
the ranking mechanism: the ranking mechanism is not dominated by noncooperative 
bidding. 
4.3.29 Corollary For any collection of distributions, (Fj)f=1 , there exists a number 
1~A similar result likely holds for asymmetric distributions and a slightly redefined ranking mech-
anism where the probability a bidder is assigned a market when there is a tie is dependent on his 
distribution of values in that market. However, the current version of the proof relies heavily upon 
the anonymity of the mechanism. 
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of bidders such that the ranking mechanism dominates the noncooperative mecha-
nism. 
4.3.2 Durability 
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) suggest a stronger standard that may be more logical 
when a decision .rule is chosen in the interim stage. A mechanism is durable if the 
agents would ·never (for ·an possible draws of values) unanimously approve a change 
from that mechanism to another mechanism. Interim incentive efficiency guarantees 
that, from an ex ante perspective, the mechanism will not be blocked. However, 
once agents have observed their values, one agent (not knowing that the others will 
prefer a new mechanism) may propose a change which is unanimously accepted. 
Proposition 4.3.30 suggests that the ranking mechanism may not be durable. There 
are always distributions such that for some values all agents prefer the Bayes Nash 
equilibrium strategy to the ranking mechanism. 
4.3.30 Proposition For all n and m, there exist distributions such that for a set of 
values of positive measure the noncooperative is unanimously preferred to the ranking 
mechanism. 
1 
Proof: Let Fi(Y) = (~::::~) 2<n- 1 > for allj. Then the n-1 order statistic will always equal 
Fi(Y)n-l = (~::::~)~ for all j. This distribution is strictly concave thus there is always 
some large vQ,lues where agents would prefer the noncooperative mechanism. ·Namely, 
whenever Vij > {6 v, for all j a bidder will pr~fer the noncooperative mechanism. I 
This, however, does not mean that the ranking mechanism is not durable. Holmstrom 
and Myerson (1983) model durability by a specific voting game. It is necessary to con-
sider what the bidders would learn if they unanimously approved a change to another 
mechanism. For example, if all bidders agreed to move from the ranking mechanism 
to the noncooperative mechanism, then each bidder could infer that everybody had 
high valuations. This updated information, however, would cause them to bid higher 
in the Bayes Nash equilibrium, making it a less attractive agreement. Consider an 
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Bidder 
1 2 3 4 5 
A 1 1 1 1 1 
B 2 2 2 2 2 
Mark~t c 3 3. 3 3 3 
D 4 ·4 4 4 4 
E 5 5 ·5 5 5 
Figure 4.2: An Example that is Not Durable 
example where m = 1 and n = 2. Let Vi E [O, l] and Fi(v) = v1/ 2 . Both bidders will 
prefer the Bash Nash bidding only if Vi > 9/16. However, if the bidders condition 
their bids on the fact that their opponent has a value above 9/16, they will bid so 
high that they will no longer prefer noncooperative behavior. 
Are ·these mechanisms durable in general? Holmstrom and Myerson show that if 
a mechanism is uniformly incentive compatible and interim incentive efficient, then 
it is durable. 
4.3.31 Definition A mechanism ((3; s) is uniformly incentive compatible if for all v 
and for all Vi 
Uniform IC is closer to strategy-proofness: an agent must not want to lie about his 
type even after he knows everyone else's types. Unfortunately, the ranking mechanism 
does not satisfy the sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be durable. Consider 
a truthful report of ranks as given in Figure 4.2. Having observed the other agents' 
reports, each agent's expected utility w.ould be I:~=l ~Vij· However, as long as vi2 > 
tvi1 , agent i would prefer to 'flip' his reports for the first two markets. Doing so 
would allow him to capture vi2 for certain. The question of whether there are any 
durable collusive mechanisms without side payments remains open. However, since 
the serial dictator mechanism is strategy-proof, if it happens to be interim incentive 
efficient (in some environments), then the serial dictator mechanism will be durable. 
108 
4.3.3 Coalitional Deviations 
Until this point, I have only examined the incentives for unilateral deviations and 
improvements for the whole group of bidders. Since the situation being rp.odeled is 
. . 
assumed to be cooperative, it m,akes sense to allow for deviations by coalitions of. 
agents. If one can find a collusive mechanism that is better than any .coalition of 
agents can enforce, then· the collusive agreement is considered to be stable and not 
taking advantage of one group of agents for the benefit of another. 
In this setting the profitability of coalitional deviations is greatly affected by the 
assumption on what coalitions can do. In order to obtain some preliminary results, I 
make· the following assumptions on coalitional behavior. 
1. A coalition of any size can form and it can exclude new members from joining. 
2. Coalition membership cannot b~ based upon private information. 
3. The agents not in the coalition bid noncooperatively. 
The first assumption gives power to coalitions. In some models of coalition formation 
with private information (such as the optimal taxation literature (Berliant 1992)) it 
is required that in addition to the coalition preferring its outcome, all members not 
in the coalition would not want to join the coalition. However, given that even simple 
mechanisms will often dominate noncooperative bidding, such a strong condition 
would almost surely mean death for any coalition not of size N. Assumption 2 requires 
that coalitions form at the ex ante stage. The coalition then picks a mechanism for 
itself in the interim stage. This assumption avoids the problem that for some draws 
of values a group of high valued bidders may want to split from low valued bidders. 
The justification is that, if a low valued bidder saw these bidders forming a coalition, 
he would want to claim to be a high valued bidder in order to join the group. Finally, 
3 is similar to the a-core (Aumann 1961). If, instead, one was to assume that the 
N\S bidders formed their own collusive mechanism, the analysis would be greatly 
complicated (at least without specific knowledge of the optimal collusive mechanism). 
If a coalition of bidders use a mechanism that selects a single bidder for each market, 
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then it will be optimal for that bidder to bid as if he were participating in an auction 
with #N\S + 1 noncooperative bidders. Admittedly, many of these assumptions limit 
the power of coalitions, but they are a fir.st step at understanding coalitional power 
in this setting. 
Let s = #S. Then, each bidder's interim expected utility given that he is in 
coalition S ·is given by · 
m 
Ui(qlvi, S) = L Qii(vils)(vii - ,e;i(viiln - s + l))Fi(viir-s ( 4.16) 
j=l 
where ,Bii(viiln - s + 1) is i's Bayes Nash equilibrium bid given that there are n - s 
other non-coalition bidders. Equation 4.16 simplifies to 
Ui(qlvi, S) = £= Qii(vils) 1Vij Fi(Yr-sdy. 
j=l !!_ 
Since coalitions are assumed to form in the ex ante stage, a coalition blocks a 
mechanism if it can find a feasible mechanism that always makes all members of the 
coalition better off. 
4.3.32 Definition A coalition S blocks a mechanism (,B, s) if there exists a mecha-
nism (,88 , ss) such that for all i in S and all vi, 
There are trade-offs involved with coalition formation. Small coalitions may want 
to form in order increase each bidder's chance of being selected as the sole ·bidder in a 
market. However, it is not optimal for any coalition of size smaller than n to bid zero 
in the auction: smaller coalitions mean that the coalition's bid in the auction must 
be higher. As long as Fi stochastically dominates the uniform distribution, coalitions 
will never find it in their interest to block using a random assignment mechanism. 
4.3.33 Proposition Let Fj first-order stochastically dominates the uniform distri-
llO 
bution on [1L, v] for all j. Then there does not exist a coalition S such that the random 
assignment mechanism for S blocks either the random assignment, serial dictator, or 
ranking mechanisms. 
Proof: We want to show that for all Vi 
It is sufficient to show that for all j 
Since Fj first-order stochastic dominates the uniform distribution, or 
for all y in [.'.!L, v] implying that 
- •1 P.(yr-sdy < - -_- dy l 1V" l 1Vij (Y _ .'.!L)n-s 
S '.!!.. J S '.!!.. V-Q 
(v - v) (v· · v)n-s+l 
s(n-s-=i-1) ;_:; 
< (v-v) (Vij-'v) 
n(n - s+ 1) v-:; 
< 




Since the serial dictator and ranking mechanisms dominate the random assignment 
mechanism, they too will not be blocked. I 
The gains from increases in the probability of being selected as the bidder are more 


















Figure 4.3: The Ranking Mechanism form= 5 and n = 5 
However, random assignment is not the best mechanism for a coalition. As in 
the case of the grand coalition (N), the ranking and serial dictator mechanisms will 
dominate random assignment for all coalitions. Likewise, the ranking mechanism is 
interim incentive efficient for each coalition. The reduced form probabilities under 
the ranking mechanism for 5 bidders and markets are illustrated in Figure 4.3. For all 
mij, the interim probability of being chosen as the sole bidder is higher (Qij(mijlS) > 
Q ii ( mii rs + 1)). However, the increased probability is not enough to com pens ate for 
the increased bidding required. As long as m 2: n, coalitions will prefer to be larger. 
4.3.34 Theorem Let m 2: n and Fj first-order stochastically dominate the uniform 
distribution on ['.!!., v] for all j. Then there does not exist an S that blocks the ranking 
mechanism. 
Proof: If we can establish that the ranking mechanism applied to any coalition S is 
dominated by the ranking mechanism for the grand coalition N, it will follow that no 
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incentive compatible mechanism for coalition Swill block. Let Qii(miilS) denote the 
reduced form probabilities of the ranking mechanism for S, and Qij(mij) the reduced 
form probabilities of the ranking mechanism for the grand coalition. We need to 
demonstrate that 
Using the same stochastic dominance arguments as in Proposition 4.3.33, it follows 
that for all j 
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that 
L
m Q· ·(m··jS) Lm 
i
3 23 (v·· - v) < Q··(m· ·)(v .. - v). n _ S + 1 2J - _ ZJ ZJ ZJ _ 
j=l . j=l 








Thus, the arguments of Lemma A.O. 7 can be applied and it is sufficient to show that 
Q;j(llS) < Q· ·(1). Show that Q;j(IIS) is increasing ins. Suppose not. Then for some s, 
n-s+l - 23 n-s+l 





(nc: ~:lsl~sl) [t. m Cs -~)~:~ l)!i) cm - l)'-·] > 
[~ ( s: 1) Cs -k + :;!(k - 1)!)) (m - l)'-k+ll 
[~ [(1) ( (s -1)! ) s-k] ~ k (s k)!(k - 1)!) (m - l) 
( ( 
n - s ) m(s + l) _ (s + l)m(m - 1))] 1 > 0 
n-s+l s+l-k 
The only chance for this statement to be true is if for some k 1, ... , s 
(
·( n s )m(s+l)- (s+l)m(m-1)) >O. 
n-s+l s+l k 
Since this term is decreasing in k, let k = 1 and simplify to obtain 
( s + 1) [ ( n - 8 ) m - ( m - 1 )] > 0 
n-s+l 
which is only true if the bracketed term is positive. Noticing that this term is de-
creasing in s, set s = 1 to obtain 




n > m 
which is a contradiction with the assumption that m;::: n. I 
Figure 4.4 shows the reduced form probabilities divided by n - s + 1 for an example 
with five bidders and five markets. Since the ranking mechanism for coalition S is 











Figure 4.4: Qij(miilS)/(n - s + 1) form= 5 and n = 5 
5 
it must be the case that the ranking mechanism for N is not blocked by any other 
IC mechanism for S. It remains to be shown whether a similar result will hold for 
m < n. At least for a limited class of environments, there will be no profitable 
coalitional deviations. 
4.3.4 Private Measurability 
~n Chapters 2 and 3 incentive problems were largely ignored in favor of examining 
the efficacy of communication restrictions upon the choices of agents. This chapter 
has focused on the incentive compatibility constraint and ignored communication re-
strictions. Is there a connection? In the previous chapters a private measurability 
restriction has played an important role in describing behavior. Koutsougeras and 
Yannelis (1993) have shown that private measurability implies incentive compatibility 
(but not vice versa). However, measurability restrictions have only been utilized in 
exchange economies. The first step is to define private measurability in an environ-
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ment such as this. Let Ji( vlvi) be i's conditional density given vi. 
4.3.35 Definition A mechani~m is privately measurable (in outcomes) if for all i 
and for all v, v E V such that Ji( vlvi) > 0 and fi( vlvi) > 0, then (f3i( v ), si( v)) = 
(f3i(v), si(v)). 
Having observed vi agent i ·cannot distinguish between v and fJ. Thus, his actions 
should not va:ry across these states. Assuming that a mechanism must be privately 
measurable is similar to an assumption that the mechanism be decentralized. Mech-
anism design theory typically assumes a designer (or centre) who takes each agent's 
reported information and aggregates that information and proposes an action. Un-
der that system, the players may appear to act as if they have more information 
than any one individual has. Private measurelibility assumes that agents cannot act 
through such a mediator. Therefore, their actions can only depend on the information 
available to themselves at the time that they make a decision (Vohra 1997). 
Private measurability can greatly restrict the set of feasible mechanisms in many 
environments. In general, decision rules cannot be assumed to take on private el-
. ements (i.e., (/3i(v), si(v)) (/3j(v), sj(v))). 15 However, in private value auctions, 
private measurability simply implies that each bidder's specific element be only a 
function of their own values. 
4.3.36 Proposition Let v and v be such that vi 
(f3i ( V), Si ( V)). 
Proof: By the independent private value assumption, fi(vlvi) > 0 and fi(vlvi) > 0. 
I 
Many of the mechanisms discussed here can be implemented as privately measurable 
mechanisms. The random assignment mechanism is obviously privately measurable 
since it does not depend upon v. The noncooperative mechanism is also privately 
measurable: each bidder's bids in the auction are only a function of his values in the 
15When this is true, and agents' beliefs have full support, the only privately measurable mecha-
nisms will be constant mechanisms. Or, random assignment in the auction setting. 
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markets. Finally, the ranking .mechanism can be operated in a privately measurable 
method. While the proqabilities (q) that were used to describe the ranking mechanism 
depend upon all bidders' values; the ranking mechanism can be translated into a 
privately measurable bidding function in the auction. Let E > 0. The following bid 
function is privately measurable: 
If s bidders rank the market the same, then they will place the same bid in the 
auction. If they happen to have the highest rank, then they will have the highest bid, 
and they can rely on the auctioneer to perform the randomization. Thus, an interim 
incentive efficient mechanism can be devised without any explicit coordination from 
a centre. 
4.3.5 Summary 
Clearly, collusive agreements will most likely involve selecting a sole bidder to bid in 
each market. When side payments are allowed, an ex post efficient mechanism exists. 
However, with no side payments, ex post efficiency cannot be achieved. The fact that 
bidders are bidding on multiple objects allows them to choose a collusive agreement 
that yields.higher expected surplus (and efficiency) than the best IC mechanism in 
the single object case (random assignment). The serial dictator and ranking·mech-
anisms are two ordinal mechanisms which interim dominate the random assignment 
mechanism. This is only a partial analysis of the outcomes of collusive behavior in 
the multiple object setting. There remain many unanswered questions. For example, 
what is the full characterization of interim incentive efficient mechanisms? Also, what 
is the impact of communication and repeated play on the choice of strategies? 
While the ranking mechanism is an interim incentive efficient mechanism (in the 
class of ordinal mechanisms), the serial dictator mechanism may have an advantage 
due to its simplicity. The structure of the serial dictator mechanism is similar to 
a typical description of a bidder ring in which each bidder takes a turn (in a ring) 
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picking what he wants to bid on (Cassady 1967). However, this intuitive simplicity 
is at the cost of expected efficiency. Both these rotation schemes interim dominate 
the random assignment mechanism. On the other hand, .the random assignme:n.t 
mechanism would be extremely simple for a group of bidders to utilize and monitor .. 
An experimental examination of this mechanism design problem will give some initial 
insight into this trade-off between efficiency and simplicity. 
4.4 Experimental Design 
In the previous section, it was shown that different forms of collusive strategies could 
be used in multiple object simultaneous first-price auctions. A few strategies high-
lighted as possible choices by bidders are: 
• Competitive bidding, 
• Reduced bidding, 
• Random assignment, and 
• Rotation schemes (serial dictator or ranking). 
The theory suggests that some of these mechanisms will most likely be preferred to 
others. For example, both the particular rotation schemes examined, the serial dic-
tator and ranking mechanism, interim dominate the random assignment mechanism. 
Reduced bidding agreements are generally only IC if they yield the same profitability 
as competitive bidding. 
In the analysis of Section 4.3, some possible collusive mechanisms are discussed 
given the assumption that bidders have agreed to cooperate. Will bidders actually 
decide to form cooperative agreements? In this vein, the experimental literature 
on cooperative behavior provides some initial insights. As is the case in prisoners' 
dilemma or public goods experiments, there are incentives for participants to coordi-
nate their behavior to increase their overall payoffs. However, each participant also 
has an incentive to defect from any cooperative agreement. While only Isaac and 
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Walker (1985) examine collusive behavior in sealed bid auctions,16 numerous other 
experimental studie.s have highlighted three factors that appear to affect the .ability 
of groups to cooperate: 
1. Communication, 
2. Repeated play, and 
3. Institutional structure. 
In general, participants cannot form successful cooperative agreements unless they are 
given an opportunity to communicate and coordinate their strategies. Isaac, McCue, 
and Plott (1985) found that allowing communication in a public goods experiment 
led to a small but stable increase in the amount contributed to the public good. 
Daughety and Forsythe (i987) found that, with written communication, experimental 
subjects made choices closer to the collusive optimum. In addition, the method by 
which communication is allowed appears to be important. For example, Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1991) found that in a public goods experiment, where binary signals 
were the only form of communication allowed, the resultant behavior was no more 
efficient, despite the fact that participants conditioned their behavior heavily on the 
signals. This suggests that the more extensive the communication that is allowed, the 
more likely it is that stable, cooperative outcomes will be observed. The psychology 
literature has focused on the ability of group discussion to change individual choices 
. (Pruitt 1971). Numerous psychological factors can play important roles in the ability 
of a group discussion to lead to outcomes that are preferred by the group but may 
be contrary to individual incentives (i.e., providing a public good or participating in 
a cartel). 
Repeated interaction appears to be a significant factor in the effectiveness of co-
operation. If participants meet only one time, there is little incentive to choose a 
cooperative outcome. However, cooperative choices can be supported in repeated 
settings through the use of trigger strategies or Tit-for-Tat type behavior. Selten 
16Kagel and Roth (1995) describe a series of in-class experiments that Kagel conducted with 
common values. 
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and Stoecker (1986) report a significant end-game effect in which participants tend 
to defect from cooperative agreements when they know the end of the experimental . 
session is near. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) compare games in which participants in · 
a public goods experiment are repeatedly matched with different individuals to games 
in which participants repeatedly interact with. the same individual. They find that 
contributions increase slightly under the repeated treatment. Andreoni and Miller 
(1993) find a similar result in prisoner's dilemma experiments. 
The institutional structure of the environment can drastically affect the level of 
cooperation observed. The best example of such a contrast is the difference in the 
effectiveness of collusion in double auction, posted-offer, and sealed bid auction insti-
tutions. Isaac, Ramey, and Williams (1984) and Glauser and Plott (1993) report that 
collusive agreements are more successful when sellers can place posted offers. In the 
double auction environment, in which each participant can change the current offer 
at any time, collusive efforts almost always break down. However, Isaac and Walker 
(1985) show that collusive agreements are relatively stable in sealed bid first-price 
auctions. In 7 out of 10 experiments, stable collusive agreements developed. One 
explanation for the contrast in the success of collusion under these various institu-
tions is that in the double auction there is a continuous incentive to defect from the 
cooperative agreement. However, in both the posted-offer and sealed bid auctions, 
participants only make a single, binding decision; if they do not deviate when mak-
ing that decision, it is impossible for them to deviate untll the next period. Recent 
experimental evidence suggests, however, that this problem may not be present in 
one-sided auctions. Sherstyuk (1998, 1999) found that in ascending auctions bidders 
can often learn to coordinate their bids in order to collude. However, in her experi-
ments, Sherstyuk increased the set of (Bayes) Nash equilibria to include these collusive 
outcomes by allowing for tie bids to be placed. In addition to communication and 
repeated play, the overall susceptibility of the underlying economic environment to 
cooperation should also be considered when determining the likelihood of cooperative 
results. 
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The multiple unit simultaneous sealed bid auction combines all of the above factors 
to create a situation that is conducive. to cooperative outcomes. First, bidders are 
allowed to verbally communicate .. Second, bidders repeatedly interact with the same 
individuals and, in most cases, do not know when the experiment will end.17 Finally,. 
the institution is an extension of the sealed bid auctions studied by Isaac and Walker 
(1985), which are susceptible to collusion. 
With. this previous experimental work in mind, stable and successful cooperative 
agreements are expected to form. However, participants can choose among many 
different cooperative strategies that vary significantly in their relative sophistication. 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) note that, despite the increase in contributions from 
repeated play, participants· fail to use sophisticated and more profitable strategies. 
However, when bidders are allowed to communicate, Isaac and Walker (1985) find 
that some groups attempt to use more sophisticated strategies where the bidder with 
the highest value is picked. The primary objective of this experimental study is 
to de.termine what types of strategies bidders are actually using in this environment. 
Also, as shown in Section 4.3, when side payments are not allowed these strategies are 
not expected to lead to ex post efficient auctions. The choice of collusive mechanism 
will affect the final efficiency of the auction as well as the surplus of both the bidders 
and the seller. In order to provide a better understanding of collusive agreements in 
first-price auctions, a series of laboratory experiments was designed that allowed for 
observation of bidders' choice of collusive mechanism. 
In each experiment, five bidders participated in five simultaneous single unit first-
price auctions, in which five objects were sold. An experimental design with the 
same number of bidders as objects was chosen for two reasons. First, I expect co-
operative agreements to be more successful here (as opposed to a setting with fewer 
objects). Since my interest is primarily in the observation of cooperative strategies, 
such a des1gn should maximize the number of observations. Second, when the num-
ber of bidders and objects is the same, bidders may utilize a relatively simple but 
17Two experiments were conducted in which the final period was announced in order to test the 
end-game effect. 
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less profitable strategy of assigning (ex ante) one bidder to each market. In the 
first five periods of each session no communication was allowed. Then, in the next 
12-17 periods subjects were allowed to communicate between each period. In gen-
eral, subjects were undergraduate.students at the California Institute of Technology. 
However, a few graduate students and staff members were participants. Each subject 
participated in only one experiment. Instructions can be found in Appendix B. The 
simultaneous .first-price auctions were implemented using auction software designed 
by Wes Boudeville and Dave Porter. 
Bidders were required to place a bid of at least one experimental dollar (franc) 
in each market. 18 This restriction ensured that subjects were unable to monitor 
adherence to collusive agreements via the sound .of computer keys being hit indicating 
the submission of bids. Also, this allowed the experimenter to easily determine when 
all the bids had been placed. If ties occurred in the highest bids, the computer 
software randomized between the high bidders to determine the winner. 
4.4.1 Symmetry 
In the symmetric environment, valuations for all five markets and bidders were drawn 
from the same distribution. Integer values between 1 and 1000 were drawn using the 
discrete uniform distribution. Under the assumption that bidders are risk neutral, 
the unique, symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function is: 
Since the bid functions are symmetric and strictly monotonic, under competitive 
bidding the auction is expected to be ex post efficient. 19 
18The conversion rate of francs to dollars was either 250 or 500. Thus, a minimum bid of 1 franc 
was generally a trivial amount. 
19 An auction is ex post efficient if the winning bidder has the highest valuation for the object. 
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4.4.2 Asymmetry 
In the asymmetric environment, valuations for four of the markets for each bidder were 
drawn from the same discrete uniform d~stribution with values between 1 and 1000. 
In the fifth market, valuations were drawn from a first-order stochastic dominant 
distribution, F( v) 1;;02 , taking values between 1 and 1000 as well. 
20 In each 
market, one bidder had a valuation drawn from this preferred distribution. The 
. identity <;>f that bidder was announced to all participants. 
The asymmetric environment was used in order to give bidders a stronger incentive 
to use an inefficient but simple cooperative strategy: assign sole bidding rights to the 
bidder with the preferred distribution in each market. The expected efficiency of .. 
such a strategy is 80% (as opposed to 60% under symmetry) but there exist more 
sophisticated strategies which dominate it. 21 
When bidders are behaving noncooperatively, the Bayes Nash equilibrium bid 
function can be estimated numerically. Figure 4.5 is a plot of the estimated bid func-
tions for each market when bidders have values drawn from the above distributions.22 
If bidder 1 has values drawn from the stochastically dominant distribution, b1 ( v) ~ 
bi ( v) for all other i and for all valuations. Thus, competitive bidding will not necessar-
ily lead to full efficiency. However, in this case, the expected efficiency of competitive 
bidding is extremely close to 100% (at 99.983%). 
4.4.3 Communication 
After the fifth period it was announced that communication would be allowed between 
bidders. The following statement was handed out and read to subjects, who were then 
allowed to ask questions. 
Communication with Other Participants 
20The discrete analog to this distribution was actually used. 
21 We say one strategy dominates another if for all possible valuation draws all. agents prefer that 
strategy. 
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Sometimes in previous experiments, participants have found it useful 
when the opportunity arose, to communicate with one another. You are 
going to be allowed this opportunity while the computers are reset between 
periods. 
There will be some restrictions. 
You are free to discuss ~ny aspects of the experiment (or the market) that 
you wisp., except that: 
• You may not discuss any quantitative aspects of the private infor-
mation on your value sheets. 
• You are not allowed to discuss side payments or to use physical 
threats. 
Since there are still some restrictions on your communications with one 
another, an experimenter will monitor your discussion between periods. 
To make this easier, all discussions will be at this site. 
Remember, after the computers have been reset between periods (and 
the next period has begun) there will be no discussion until after the end 
of the next period. 
We will allow a maximum of 4 minutes in any one discussion session. 
In addition to these instructions, in every experiment except the first, subjects were 
also told that the number of rounds had been fixed. This announcement assured par-
ticipants that lengthy communication would not reduce profits via a reduced number 
of periods. In most experiments, subjects had no problem understanding the limita-
tions of their communication and only occasional reminders (or clarifications about 
the form of acceptable information) were required. 
4.4.4 Information Conditions 
The limited information environment was the most restrictive information condition 
utilized by Isaac and Walker (1985). The only information available to participants 
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was the identity of the winning bidders and the prices they paid. A second, more 
limited, information condition not used by Isaac and Walker (1985) is the zero infor-. 
mation condition which reports only the winning bids to the bidders. The identity of. 
the winning bidder in each auction is unknown to everyone except the winner. Under 
the zero information condition, the participant.s can only determine who had placed 
winning bids through voluntary discussion. The increased difficulty.in identifying and 
punishing deviant bidders was expected to make the zero information condition less 
conducive to cooperative behavior: 
4.4.5 End of Experiment Changes 
In order to determine whether communication or repeated play were important factors 
in the success of collusive agreements, two changes at the end of 5 of the 10 exper-
iments were implemented. The first change was intended to determine the value of 
repeated play in this environment. Since it was.not practical to conduct experiments 
in which cartel members did not repeatedly interact as in Palfrey and Rosenthal 
(1994), the end-game effect (EG) was studied (Selten and Stoecker 1986). At the 
end of experiments six and seven, it was announced that one more period would be 
conducted. In this final period, communication was allowed but otherwise complete 
anonymity was induced. Bidders drew their values randomly from a set of five en-
velopes. The identity of the winning bidders and their exact earnings were unknown 
to the experimenter and the other subjects.23 
The second treatment was designed to demonstrate the importance of commu-
nication. In experiments 8 through 10, subjects were told at the beginning of their 
discussion for period 18 that it would be the last period of discussion (the experiment 
lasted for five periods beyond that).24 ·Isaac and Walker (1988) and Daughety and 
Forsythe (1987) report that, while cooperation is greater with prior communication 
(PC) than with no communication, once communication ends the level of cooperation 
23 A third party not involved with the experiments paid the subjects for that period by placing 
their earnings in envelopes marked with an ID known only to the bidder. 
24In experiment 10, discussion was ended after period 17 and 6 periods without communication 
were completed. 
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Number of Information 
Exp. Periods Environment Condition 
1 20 Symmetric Limited 
2 22 ·symmetric Limited 
3 22 Symmetric Limited 
4 22 Symmetric Limited 
5 20 Asymmetric Limited 
6 20 Asymmetric Limited 
7 20 Asymmetric Zero 
8 18 Asymmetric Zero 
9 18 Symmetric Zero 
10 17 Symmetric Zero 
Table 4.1: .Experimental Design 
tends to gradually erode. 25 
Both of these changes were made near the end of the experimental session and 
subjects did not have any a priori knowledge of these treatments. Thus, observations 
of cooperative agreements in earlier periods should not be affected by either the EG 
or PC treatment. 
4.5 Experiment Results 
ren experiments were completed with six experiments utilizing the symmetric envi-
ronment and four using asymmetric valuation draws. Six experiments were conducted 
under the limited information setting; four experiments used the more limited zero 
information condition. A general summary of the experiments can be found in Ta-
ble 4.1. 
Subject earnings averaged $33.75 across all experiments. No experimental session 
25 Actually Isaac and Walker (1988) found that in 3 out of 4 experiments in their first experi-
mental series no participants defected from the collusive agreement after communication was ended. 
However, in their second set of experiments, contributions declined in 11 of 17 experiments. 
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lasted longer than two hours, with the average length closer to one hour and thirty 
minutes. There was no significant variance of subject profits between and within 
periods.26 
The behavior of the bidders ill the first five periods of the auction, when com-
munication was not allowed, was similar to previously observed results. Cox, Smith, 
and Walker (1988) found that bidders often place bids above the risk neutral Nash 
equilibrium prediction. However, for extremely low valuations, where bidders have 
little chance of winning, bidders typically place extremely low bids (often 0). The 
estimation·of a simple linear regression on the bids placed in the auctions with sym-
metric valuations demonstrates these results. Estimating the linear regression of 
bi (31 + (32vi + E for each bidder should lead to estimates of S1 = 0 and S2 = .8 if 
bidders are playing the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. (Cox, Smith, and Walker 1988) 
found that for many bidders S1 < 0 and S2 > .8. We found similar behavior in our 
experiments: 17 out of 30 (57%) subjects exhibited S1 < 0 and 16 out of 30 (53%) 
exhibited S2 > .8. 
4.5.1 Do Bidders Form Cooperative Agreements? 
The results of Isaac and Walker (1985) suggest that successful cooperation is expected 
here. A significant drop in bidding prices is one indicator of collusive behavior. The 
average bid in periods with communication drops to near zero. While the average bid 
in no communication periods was 428 francs, it was only 9.6 francs in communication 
periods. However, a reduction in bid levels is not necessarily an indicator of prof-
itable collusive behavior; Isaac, Ramey, and Williams (1984) found that while prices 
increased when communication was allowed in posted-offer markets, profits did not 
necessarily increase. Isaac and Walker (1985) use an index of monopoly effectiveness 
(M), which is the proportion of maximum total possible surplus captured by the 




where vj is the valuation of the winning bidder in market j and bj is his bid. In these 
experiments, M increases from an average of .265 in no communication periods to 
.912 when communication is allowed. Bidders capture a significantly large proportion 
of the total surplus available. Perhaps the strongest evidence of successful cooperative 
behavior· is that, despite a change in the conversion rate from 250 francs per dollar 
to 500 francs per dollar, average bidder per period profits rose from $ .93 to $ 1.51. 
In comparison, if the bidders were placing bids consistent with the risk neutral Nash 
equilibrium, they would have earned $.33 on average in the communication periods. 
1 Conclusion When communication is allowed, under both environments and infor-
mation conditions, collusive agreements are formed and are stable. 
Few deviations from collusive agreements were evident in the ten experiments. In 
early periods, bidders occasionally placed bids that were not in line with the collusive 
agreement. Excluding the first two periods of communication, there were only three 
out of 129 periods in which bidders made notable deviations from the cooperative 
agreements. In contrast to Isaac and Walker (1985), where collusion occasionally 
broke down, there is no evidence of sustained deviations in these experiments. 27 
Given the apparent strength of collusive agreements, the two changes mentioned 
in Section 4.4.5 were made to try to gain an insight into the source of the strength 
of these ties. Under the EG treatment, 9 out of 10 subjects did not deviate from 
the collusive agreement; only one bidder in experiment seven deviated.28 This seems 
to indicate that even in one shot environments such collusive agreements are fairly 
stable. Thus, repeated play is not a particularly important factor in the success of 
cooperation in this setting~ 
27The graphs of bidders' surplus in Appendix C demonstrate the consistency of the cooperative 
agreements. 
28That bidder placed a bid out of line with the collusive agreement in only one market. 
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However, a second change indicated weakness in collusive agreements. Three 
experiments were conducted with the PC treatment. As expected, in all three exper-
iments, the bidders formulated an agreement on how to collude when discussion was 
not allowed. However, bidders were quick to deviate from their ex ante agreements. 
In the first period of no communication, one bidder deviated in every experiment (see 
Figure 4.6). The number of deviations typically increased and most bidders began 
to bid more aggressively. In one experiment, by the last period four of the five bid-
ders placed bids roughly in line with competitive bidding. However, in the other two 
experiments, a few bidders were· typically able to take advantage of the optimistic· 
behavior of the oth~r bidders. All in all, 12 of 15 bidders placed bids that were signif-
icantly different than the ex ante agreement reached by the group. Bidder surplus as 
a percentage of maximum total surplus dropped from 87.88% in the communication 
periods to 80.64% in the no communication periods.29 
2 Conclusion Communication is more important than repeated play in fostering 
successful collusive agreements. 
These results indicate that one of the most important features of such collusive agree-
ments is the ability to discuss the outcomes and make after plans every period. A 
possible explanation is the need for the cartel to coordinate punishment strategies at 
the end of each period. 
4.5.2 What Types of Strategies Do Bidders Utilize? 
Closer examination of the periods in which communication was allowed reveals hetero-
geniety in the choice of cooperative strategies between some experimental sessions. 
Two distinct strategies can be discerned from the data and observation of preplay 
communication. The first, and most common strategy, was the utilization of bid ro-
tation. Bid rotation strategies can be characterized by the selection of one bidder as 
the·sole bidder in each auction. This bidder placed a low bid greater than 1 franc 
29The null hypothesis that the mean surplus from the communication periods is less than or equal 
to the mean surplus with communication can be rejected at a 903 level of confidence by a rank sum 
test (z = 1.317). 
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(typically 2-5 francs) while all other bidders bid 1 franc in the auction. A second 
strategy observed in the data was a reduced bidding agreement. This strategy entails. 
the agreement by all ·bidders to place bids which are linear transformations of their· 
actual vahiations. Since bidders are required to submit whole franc bids of at least 1 
franc, reduced bidding will, in general, lead to higher average bids than bid rotation.30 
3 Conclusion In 7 out of 10 experiments, bidders used a bid rotation strategy. In 
experiments where bid rotation wa~ not used, bidders used a reduced bidding strategy. 
The easiest method for discerning these two different strategies was observation of 
preplay communication. In the 7 experiments in which bid rotation was used, bidders 
attempted to reach some resolution of who would bid in each market. However, in 
the 3 bid reduction schemes, bidders determined a level of bidding. The difference 
between these experiments can also be seen in the level of bids placed. In the 7 
rotation experiments, the average bid placed was 2.8 francs. In the reduced bidding 
experiments, the average bid was 23 francs. 
Reduced Bidding 
In two of the reduced bidding experiments, the cartel agreed to place bids that were 
1 % of redemption values.31 In the other, bidders agreed to place bids that were 10% of 
valuations. Such agreements violate individual incentive compatibility (Section 4.3). 
Only an agreement to bid 80% of valuations is incentive compatible. Since their 
values are not ex post verifiable, bidders can increase their bids beyond either the 1 % 
or 10% level without detection, and increase their probability of winning the object. 
Therefore, bidders would be expected to bid higher than their particular reduced 
bidding agreement dictates. Figure 4.7 shows the deviations from the agreed upon 
strategy. A deviation of zero indicates that the bidder placed his bid at the whole 
number nearest either 1% (for experiments 1 and 4) or 10% (for experiment 3) of his 
30Bid rotation strategies lead to average bids that are close to 1 franc since all bidders except one 
bid 1 franc. 
31 Bidders in experiment 4 quickly switched from a 10% rule to a 1 % rule after two periods. 
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Experiment 
1 3 4 
Mean DeviatiOn -0.06481 -0.00774 0.167219 
Std. Error 0.131955 0.076929 0.286164 
Observations 375 425 425 
Table 4.2: Mean Deviations from Reduced Bidding Agreement 
value: 
. . Actual Bid 
Dev1at10n = p d. d ff d . re icte i 
A de~iation of 100% indicates that the bidder placed a bid double that predicted by 
the particular linear bid reduction rule. In all three experiments the null hypothesis 
that the mean deviation is equal to zero is rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
Surprisingly, however, in two of the. experiments, mean deviations are significantly 
below zero implying bidders were actually bidding below the agreement. Only in one 
experiment were deviations significantly above zero (See Table 4.2). 
4 Conclusion Bidders choose linear bid reduction strategies that are not incentive 
compatible. However, bidders rarely signifi.cantly misreport their redemption values. 
The fact that these reduced bi.dding agreements are replicated and appear to be 
relatively st.able creates problems for the theory. Why did bidders not shade their 
bids up in two experiments? Bidders seem to ignore individual incentives, despite the 
fact that detection of placing higher bids is very difficult. Section 4.5.3 provides one 
·possible explanation for the choice of this strategy. 
Bid Rotation 
The majority of the experiment sessions (7 out of 10) lead to bidding strategies that 
were classified as bid rotation agreements. There are many different mechanisms 
which are incentive compatible and look like bid rotation outcomes. The choice of 
mechanism by the group has significant implications for efficiency and thus the per-
Experiment 1 (1%) 
200% 
150% 
~ 100% .!I 
& • g, SO'Y. 
.!I 
J 0% •• ~R~ • •• ·50'>'. 
-100% 










~ • • • • • • 
• • • _ ..... • ... ~ 
• • ~ • •• . . .... - • . g, 50% E l 0% . Soo/,. ~ ~ 0% &: • 
·SOo/o -SO'Y. 
-100o/ .. ·100% 
Figure 4.7: Deviations from Reduced Bidding Agreements 
centage of maximum total surplus captured by the bidders. Four behavioral strategies 
which can lead to outcomes similar to those observed in these seven experiments are: 
1. Ranking mechanism (R), 
2. Serial dictator mechanism (SD), 
3. R?-ndom assignment mechanism (A), and 
4. Perfect information (P). 
The ranking (R), serial dictator (SD), and random assignment (A) mechanisms were 
discussed in.Section 4.3. The perfect information (P) strategy describes the possibility 
that bidders may perfectly collude by somehow determining the bidder with the 
highest valuation in each market.32 The objective is to determine which of these 
32This is a highly unexpected outcome given the limitations on bidder communications. However, 
it is still possible that this may be the best predictor of group behavior. 
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possible mechanisms was most likely utilized in each of these experiments. Three 
techniques that shed light on the choice of a strategy by bidders are: 
1. Observation of preplay discussion, . 
2. Comparison of expected efficiencies with observed efficiencies, and 
3. Comparison of.predicted market division with observed choices. 
Discussion 
While observing bidder discussion is not a rigorous test for the predominance of one 
model over the other, simply listening to the conversations of the bidders can provide a 
great deal of insight into the intentions of the bidders. Bidder discussion was typically 
closer to the ranking mechanism than to the serial dictator mechanism. In most cases, 
bidders would begin their discussion by naming what they wanted first (their highest 
rank). If there was no conflict, discussion ended. If there was disagreement, those 
who had chosen conflicting markets would attempt to reach a compromise by naming 
their next best market. It is easy to see that such an iterative procedure leads to 
outcomes predicted by the ranking mechanism under the restriction that no bidder 
be chosen more than once. If the group discussion was consistent with the serial 
dictator mechanism, once a bidder had named a market in which he wished to bid, 
no other bidder could pick that market. Typically, conversation between bidders did 
not take this form. 33 
Efficiencies 
An auction is efficient if the winner of each object is the bidder with the highest 
valuation. Efficiency is denoted by 
'\""'5 * 
L,, ·-1 V· 
Efficiency = 
5 
J- 3 • 
Lj=l maxi Vij 
33However, it is possible that there may have been some first-mover advantage; the bidder who 
made his announcement of preferred markets first got his favored market more often. Since the order 
of discussion was not recorded, this factor cannot be analyzed for these experiments. 
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Behavioral Predicted Efficiency 
Strategy Symmetry Asymmetry 
R 90.60% 92.12% 
SD 85.20% 86.63% 
A 60.00% 80.00% 
p 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 4.3: Predicted Efficiencies 
Experiment 
2 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean Efficiency 90.52% 92.70% 90.48% 92.77% 87.94% 89.94% 90.69% 
Std. Error 
0 bservations 
0.0466 0.0545 0.0985 0.0755 0.1100 0.0729 0.0841 
17 15 15 15 13 13 12 
Table 4.4: Mean Efficiencies Rotation 
The predicted efficiencies for each of the behavioral strategies in this particular set-
ting are given in Table 4.3. If a group is utilizing a particular mechanism, the average 
of the observed efficiencies should converge to the above efficiencies. The null hypoth-
esis that the mean efficiency for each experiment was different than 90.60%, for the 
symmetric environment, and 92.12%, for the asymmetric environment, predicted by 
the ranking mechanism cannot be rejected at a 95% level of confidence in any of the 
seven experiments (See Table 4.4). However, in five of the seven experiments, the null 
hypothesis that the mean efficiency was equal to that predicted by the serial dictator 
mechanism ( 85.20% and 86.63%) can be rejected at a 95% level of confidence.34 The 
observed efficiencies are also significantly different from the 60% and 80% predicted 
by an assignment mechanism. The perfect information model can also be rejected 
under this test in all seven experiments. A simple comparison of observed results 
seems to strongly favor the ranking mechanism as the best determinant of behavior 
in each of the seven experiments. 
34 Comparison of the mean bidder surplus yields similar results since bids placed are close to zero. 
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Comparing the Choices 
An analysis of bidder discussion a11d efficiencies provides some support for the ranking 
mechanism. However, analysis pf discussion is purely ad hoc and relies upon the 
judgment of the experimenter who observed the experimental session. Comparison of 
mean observations utilizes outcomes rather than choices. 
A more rigorous test involves comparing the choices of the bidders to the choices 
predicted by ·each model. Initial examination of choices in each particular experi-
ment indicates that the ranking mechanism is a good predictor of choices; 87% of all 
observed choices are consistent with the ranking mechanism. However, other mecha-
nisms also correlate well with the observed choices. The likelihood-based classification 
procedure of El-Gamal and Grether (1995) provides a more rigorous statistical com-· 
parison of all the proposed models. Let Ct= {(c1, c 2 , c 3 , c4, c 5)I Ci E Z, 1 ~Ci ~ 5, i = 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the class of behavior rules for each period such that each bidder is 
selected as the sole bidder in a particular market. For example, c1 = 2 indicates that 
bidder 2 was selected as the sole bidder in market A. Each model predicts a subset 
Bt c Ct and B = B1 x B2 x · · · x Bp. where Ps is the number of periods completed in 
an experiment. Each experimental session is treated as a single subject, s, and it is 
assumed that each s chooses exactly one behavioral strategy. The error probability, 
c:, is assumed to be the same for all individuals, experimental sessions and choices. 
The choice by individual i in period t for a particular experimental session is denoted 






X1 = :L:Lx~,ti 
i=l t=l 
be the total number of choices predicted correctly for a particular session. The like-
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lihood can be found to be 
for ~ach behavioral strategy.35 Under the assumption that participants in all S ex-
periments are using the same mechanism, the maximum likelihood estimate is given 
by 
s . 
(B, €) = argmax IT JB,e(x5 ). 
B,e 
s=l 
The algorithm suggested by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) is used to obtain the maxi-
mum likelihood estimate for any set of k behavioral strategies. Then, using a penalty 
function given by 
g(k) = kln(4) + kln(3) + Sln(k), 
k is chosen to maximize the information criterion,. 
IC(k) = ln (rr max fil,€(x 8 )) - g(k). 
hE{l, ... ,k} 
s=l 
Using this technique, I can test the ability of the four possible mechanisms to explain 
the observed choices by each experimental session. The choices of the ranking mech-
anism (R) are easily characterized by saying that an error was made in a particular 
market if the bidder chosen was not the individual with the highest rank in that mar-
ket. Unfortunately, the serial dictator mechanism (SD) cannot be characterized as 
easily. Each possible permutation of the five bidders can potentially lead to a differ-
ent choice of market assignment predicted by the mechanism. Almost any observed 
choice can be predicted by the mechanism. For any particular experiment the num-
ber of possible combinations of choices across periods is 120P• (which is 8.92 x 1024 
in the experiment with the fewest periods). The choices predicted by the serial die-
35It is assumed here that, if a bidder made an error, he chose the correct strategy with probability 
one-third and another strategy with probability two-thirds. In reality, a bidder could have a choice 
of between 5 (if he happens to be choosing first or if there is little conflict) to 1 (if he is choosing 
last or there is a great deal of conflict) markets. Since, on average, he will have a choice of three 
markets, ( ~, ~) is selected as an approximation. 
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Experiment 
2 5 6 7 8 9 10 
R 85.88% 90.67% 8'5.33% 93.33% 78.46% 89.23% 85.00% 
SD 84.71% . 65.33%. 62.67%. 64.00% 86.15% 86.15% 86.67% 
A 29.41% 49.33% 40.00% 42.67% 33.85% 23.08% 30.00% 
p 56.47% 58.67% 61.33% 60.00% 50.77% 53.85% 60.00% 
Table 4.5: Percentage of Choices Explained by Models - Individual Experiments 
tator mechanism are limited to a smaller set. It is assumed that each experimental 
group agrees to rotate the order of selection in each period. Thus, if the order of 
choosing was 1,2,3,4,5 in period t then it would be 2,3,4,5,1 in period t + 1. This 
limits the number of combinations predicted by the serial dictator mechanism to a 
more manageable 120 combinations. While limiting the serial dictator mechanism in 
this manner makes it less likely that it will be classified as the best fitting model, it 
is reasonable to assume that no individual bidder woul~ approve of any combination 
that did not evenly spread out the right to pick early since early picking leads to 
higher individual surplus. The assignment mechanism (A) assumes that each bid-
der is selected as the sole bidder in his favored market when distributions are not 
symmetric. Thus, bidder 1 is assumed to always be the sole bidder in market A, 
bidder 2 in B, bidder 3 in C, bidder 4 in D, and bidder 5 in E. Finally, the perfect 
information model (P) represents the choices that would be made if the bidders were 
able to actually aggregate their information perfectly. The bidder with the highest 
yalue is picked in each market. 
Table 4.5 presents the data for each experiment. In all experiments, the ranking 
and serial dictator mechanisms better explain the data than either random assign-
ment or perfect information. Table 4.6 reports the results of the maximization of the 
information criterion to determine the optimal number of rules to choose. Using two 
rules best explains the choices observed in the seven experiments. In experiments 2, 
5, 6, 7 and 9, the ranking mechanism is the behavioral strategy that best fits the 
experimental data. However, the serial dictator mechanism significantly adds to the 
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No. of Models Rule(s) Chosen No. Classified € g(k) IC 
1 R 435 0.39 2.485 -203.101 
2 R,SD 333,108 0.354 9.822 -197.893 
3 R,SD,* . 333,108,0 0.354 15.145 -203.216 
4 RSD * * ' ' ' 333,108,0,0 0.354 
19.644 -207.715 





Symmetric 2 Rotation 
1 Rotation 
Asymmetric 2 Rotation 2 Rotation 
Table 4.7: The Effect of Treatments 
explanatory power of the model in experiments 8 and 10. Using this classification pro-
cedure, it is possible to rule out the random assignment model of collusive behavior. 
Also, bidders were apparently unable to perfectly aggregate information. However, 
the serial dictator mechanism cannot be eliminated. 
5 Conclusion The ranking mechanism is the best description of behavior in the 
rotation scheme experiments. However, the serial dictator mechanism cannot be 
ruled out in some experiments. 
The combination of these three methods of determining which bid rotation scheme 
was used gives strong evidence in favor of the ranking mechanism. The serial dictator 
mechanism, however, still appears to be a strategy which is used occasionally by 
groups in this setting, especially in experiment 8, in which both the observed efficiency 
and the choices of markets correlate well with the serial dictator mechanism. 
6 Conclusion Reduced bidding mechanisms are only observed under the limited 
information and symmetric environments. 
All three instances of utilization of reduced bidding strategies were in experiments 
in which bidders had uniform valuation draws in all five markets and were informed 
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of the identity of the winning bidders (Table 4.7). While Isaac and Walker (1985) 
found no significant patterns between collusive agreements and their two information 
conditions of full information and limited infor'mation,36 this result demonstrates that · 
information matters. While it may not be significant in determining whether bidders 
collude, it does alter their choice of strategy. Bidders seem to be less willing to 
select a strategy which violates incentive constraints when they have less ex post 
information. Second, the switch to a less cooperative strategy in the asymmetric 
environment has some precedence. Isaac and Walker (1988) found that asymmetries 
in public goods experiments tended to decrease the level of voluntary contributions. 
While a complete breakdown of cooperation is never evident here, this result suggests 
that bidders' choices of strategies are affected by the environment. 
4.5.3 What Effect Do Different Strategies Have on the Out-
come of the Auction? 
The choice of cooperative strategies can drastically affect the results of the auction. 
The differences between mechanisms can best be seen by examining the efficiency of 
the auction and the amount of surplus accruing to the bidders. 
Efficiency 
Despite the apparent problems with enforceability, reduced bidding agreements have 
advantages from a social welfare standpoint. In the three experiments which ex-
hibited these collusive agreements, average efficiencies were 99.26%, 99.38%, and 
98.36°%. A rank sum test shows that the mean efficiency for these experiments is 
significantly different than the mean efficiency of experiments in which bidders used 
rotation schemes. 37 
7 Conclusion Reduced bidding yields higher average efficiency than bid rotation. 
36The full information condition was a less restrictive environment which reported all the bids 
placed in the auction. 
37The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with correction for ties yielded z = 8.267, which is greater 
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This result is due to the ability of reduced bidding to select the highest bidder (as-
suming people do not deviate from the agreement). Figure 4.8 shows the efficiencies 
for the experiments in which reduced bidding was observed and the efficiencies for the 
experiments in which bid rotation was observed. Efficiency is also fairly stable under 
the reduced bidding agreements. When bidders are using rotation schemes, efficiency 
varies significantly due to the imprecision of the ranks. However, the reduced bidding 
agreement consistently yields efficiencies near 100%. The variance of the observed 
efficiencies for the seven non-reduced bidding experiments was always higher than 
the variance for the three reduced bidding experiments. 
Bidder Surplus 
The overall level of profitability for the bidders is best described by the index of 
monopoly effectiveness which reports the proportion of total possible surplus captured 
by the bidders. In experiments where bidders used rotation schemes, the average M 
was 0.898. The two 1 % bid reduction experiments yielded an average effectiveness of 
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0.970, and the 10% bid reduction experiment averaged M = 0.885. 
8 Conclusion The index of monopoly effectiveness is highest for the bidders under 
the 1 % reduced bidding rule . . 
The 1 % reduced bidding agreement was the most successful (profitable) collusive 
agreement. This result highlights the apparent trade-offs between these strategies. 
If bidders do not lie abqut their values, reduced bidding yields a much higher effi-
ciency than rotation schemes. This increase in the size of the available surplus more 
than accounts for the increased level of bids required by a 1 % agreement. The 10% 
agreement, on the other hand, entails too high a level of bidding to actually increase 
profitability over rotation schemes. 
These two conclusions are the best argument in favor of a reduced bidding mech-
anism. Bidders select reduced bidding because it is more profitable than rotation 
mechanisms; despite the fact that it is not consistent with individual incentives. It 
appears that something in the nature of communication in the group decision making 
process allowed the bidders to ignore this problem. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The two primary contributions of this chapter are: 
1. A description of possible collusive mechanisms when the number of objects is 
greater than 1, 
2. An analysis of experimental data to identify the strategies chosen by bidders. 
While incentive compatibility constraints severely limit the set ofpossible cooperative 
strategies in single unit auctions, there are many more sophisticated and profitable 
possible mechanisms when multiple objects are being auctioned simultaneously. Ro-
tation schemes take advantage of bidders' willingness to trade-off probability of win-
ning in lesser valued markets in return for an increased probability in higher valued 
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markets. Of all rotation schemes that use only ordinal information, the ranking mech-
anism is interim incentive efficient and provides outcomes strictly preferred to those. 
that are possible when only one item is being auctioned (random assignment). 
Previous experimental investigations of cooperation in a wide variety of settings 
(auctions, markets, public goods, prisoners' dilemma) have almost solely focused on 
the formation of cooperative agreements. It has been well established that, in envi-
ronments similar to the auction environment discussed here, experimental subjects 
will agree to cooperate. In this chapter, I examine the choice of cooperative strategies. 
Bidders can choose from a variety of strategies (including noncooperative behavior) 
that vary significantly in their complexity, profitability, and adherence to incentive 
constraints. Subjects exhibit behavior which is often consistent with strategies pre-
dicted by theory. 
However, deviations in three of the experimental sessions from the choices pre-
dicted by theory suggest that a better theory of the cooperative choice of a decision 
rule needs to be formulated. In these experiments, bidders used a strategy that is 
not incentive compatible, but leads to higher profits when bidders do not lie about 
their values. The theory developed here assumes that bidders do not voluntarily 
communicate and that any information that is used must be consistent with their 
incentives. However, if, a priori, bidders could agree to credibly reveal their infor-
mation, then reduced bidding agreements become possible. A complete theory of the 
choice of strategies when bidders are asymmetrically informed will treat the level of 
communication as an additional choice variable. Wilson (1978) proposes versions of 
interim efficiency that assume different levels of information sharing (coarse and fine). 
Interim efficiency is a very weak standard on the strategies chosen. Potentially, there 
are many interim efficient mechanisms .. Since the behavior being modeled is explic-
itly cooperative, a more cooperative solution concept is in order. In many domains 
that concept is the core. However, finding core allocations in this setting is more 
difficult. For example, the feasible set of strategies for each coalition depends upon 
the actions of those outside the coalition, and the question of information sharing 
within coalitions becomes relevant. Myerson (1984) provides some initial insights by 
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defining threat points as minimal levels of expected utility that each coalition must 
receive. 
The indusion of durability may ·also lead to a more satisfying theory. If a mech-
anism is not durable,. then there will be instances in which bidders will reject it in . 
favor of another mechanism. ThiS behavior might be observable experimentally. Is 
there evidence of a move away from one mechanism based upon the values drawn? In 
terms of collusion, durability might even·predict when collusion breaks down. In this 
experimental design, the random assignment, serial dictator, and ranking mechanisms 
dominate the noncooperative mechanism (due to the choice of distributions). 
Finally, the auctioneer was assumed to be completely passive. In reality, the 
auctioneer can take steps to.combat collusive behavior. Graham and Marshall (1987) 
highlight some techniques that the auctioneer may use in an English auction. In 
sealed bid auctions, the use' of a reserve price becomes even more important for the 
auctioneer to earn revenue. Collusive strategies are also easily identifiable by a lack 
of bidding. If the auctioneer can punish collusive behavior, then bidders may need 
to formulate agreements that are less obvious. A full ·understanding of collusion in 
auctions requires an analysis of the steps an auctioneer can take to combat collusion. 
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Appendix A Lemmas 
A.0.1 Lemma Let J'* be a O"-fi.eld such that J'* = O"(LJiEN J'i)· If a function f 
(X, J'i) -+ (Y, 'By) is J'i measurable for some i E. N, then it is also J'* measurable. 
A.0.2 Lemnia cp(w) is closed. 
Proof: Let.{pn} be a sequence oflinear functionals in cp(w) such that Pn-+ p. Suppose 
p (j_ cp(w) or p · z(w) < p · e(w) for some z E (3(w). Then, p · (e(w) - z(w)) > 0. Let 
x = e(w) - z(w) and let c E JR++ such that p · x = c. Let E = 2.1fxll » 0. Since Pn -+ p 
there exists a N such th.at for all n' > N, 
which is a contradiction. 
II Pn' - P II < E 
II Pn' - P II · II X II < E· II X II 
II Pn' · X - P · X II < E· II X II 




The lower inverse of a correspondence is defined by 
I 
A correspondence is said to be weakly measurable if for all open subsets G of Y, cpe( G) E 
J'. 
A.0.3 Lemma <p is weakly measurable. 
Proof: Let G be an open set of Y'. If there does not exist an w E n such that 
cp(w) n G :f. 0 then cpe(G) = 0 E J'. Let w be such that cp(w) n G :f. 0. Then for all 
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w' E F(w), cp(w')nG =I= 0, since e(w) = e(w') and f3(w) = f3(w'). Thus, F(w) ~ cpe(G) 
and cpe(G) = Uw's.t.cp(w')rJG=/:0F(w') E :J' since it is the union of at most countable many 
distinct atoms . •• 
. A.0.4 Lemma Let (Q, T) ={(Qi, Ti)}f=1 and (Q', T') = {(Q~, Tf)}f=1 be two generic, . 
feasible, IC mechanisms. Then for all a E [O, 1], (aQ + (1 - a)Q', aT + (1 - a)T') is 
also a feasible, IC mechanism. 
Proof: Since (Q, T) and (Q', T') are IC 
m m 
L Qij(vi)vii - Tij(vi) 2:: L Qij(vi)vii - Tij(vi) VvVi (A.l) 
j=l j=l 
m m 
L Q~j(vi)Vij Tfi(vi) 2:: L Q~i(vi)vii - Tfi(vi) VvVi (A.2) 
j=l j=l 
which implies that 
a (t Qij(vi)Vij - Tij(vi)) + (1 - a) (t Q~j(vi)Vij - Tfj(vi)) 2:: 
J=l J=l 
a (t Qij(vi)vij Tij(vi)) + (1 - a) (t Q~i(vi)vij - Tfi(vi)) (A.3) 
J=l J=l 
Rearranging and bringing the a inside the sum yields the desired result 
m 
L(aQij(vi) + (1- a)Q~j(vi))vij - (aTij(vi) + (1- a)Tfj(vi)) 2:: 
j=l 
m 
L(aQij(vi) + (1 a)Q~/vi))vij) - (aTij(vi) + (1 - a)Tfi(vi)) (A.4) 
j=l 
Feasibility follows by simply allowing each agent to report their types Vi and using 
a public randomization device to choose (Q, T) with probability a and (Q', T') with 
probability (1 - a). I 
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A.0.5 Lemma If Fij = Fki for all i, j, k and ( Q, T) = {(Qi, Ti)}i=1 is feasible and 
where .A is a social welfare weight on types, Qi and Ti are j x 1 vectors and Fi is the 
joint distribution of the j values of each agent. Then there exists (Q, T) such that . 
Qi = Q1c and 't = Tk for all i, k and 
j (.A(v)Q(v)v - T(v))dF(v) = w 
Also, if (Q, T) is IC then (Q, T) is IC as well. 
Proof: Since values for all individuals are drawn from identical distributions and util-
ities are of an identical form, if (Q, T) is feasible and IC then for all <J: {1, ... , n} -t 
{1, .. ;, n} one-to-one (permutations) { Qa(i)i Ta(i)}i=I is also feasible and IC. By Lemma 
· A.0.4, every mechanism in the convex hull of all permutations of (Q, T) is feasible 
and IC. Let ( Q, T) be the mechanism created by the convex combination of all n! 
permutations of ( Q, T) equally weighted by ~!. Thus, since each (Qi, Ti) appears 
exactly (n - 1)! times, Q = ~ L:~=l Qi and T = ~ L:~=l Ti. Thus, given .A, we have 
that 
j (.A(v)(Q(v)v - T(v)))dF(v) 
w (A.5) 
Thus, (Q, T) is symmetric, feasible and IC and leads to the same ex ante social value. 
I 
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Proof: Let the Reduced Bidding mechanism be IC. Then given the first order condi-
tions for maximization of each agent's expected utility, it must be that 
gij(Vij)Vij(1- aj) - cij(Vij)aj 
f ij{ Vij) 
0 





Since this must b.e true for all Vij E [1!., v], differentiating with respect to Vij yields 
Obviously, the other direction can be trivially shown to hold by setting O:j = dr· ·<~"-> 
'7 '1 +1 
dv;j · 
•• 
A.0.6 Lemma ·Let F(y) be any continuous distribution on [1!., v]. There exists a N* 
such that F(y)w first-order stochastic dominates the uniform distribution on [Q, v]. 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that for some N*, F(y)N* :::; ~=~for ally E [.Y., v]. 
First, note that at 1!. and v, F(y)w = ~=~· For all y E (.Y., v), F(y) < 1 and 
~=~ > 0. Then, limn__.00 F(yr = 0, or there exists some N such that for all n 2: N, 
Let N(y) be the function which maps from y E [1!., v] to the natural numbers satis-
fying this condition. Let N* = maxN(y) which exists and is obtained since [Q, v] is 
com pact. Then for all y E [.Y., v], F ( y) w :::; ~=~. I 
In order to prove Proposition 4.3.24, we need the following lemma. 
A.O. 7 Lemma Let a, a' E JR~ and L':::~=l O:i = L':::~=l a~ = c where c > 0. If there 
exists a k such that for all j :::; k, O:j 2: o:j and for all j > k, O:j :::; aj, then for all 
x E ]Rn such that X1 2: X2 2: · · · 2: Xn, a· x 2: a' · x. 
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Proof: Assume there is ax such that a· x <a'· x. Then it must be that 
Since a and a' both sum to c, 
which implies the contradiction that Xk < Xk+i· I 
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Appendix B E:x:periment Instructions 
Experiment Instructions 
In.trod uction 
You are about to participate in an experiment in the econoIIJ.ics of market decision 
making in which you will earn money based on the decisions you make. All earnings 
you make are yours to keep and will be paid to you at the end of the experiment. In 
this experiment you are going to participate in a market in which you will be buying 
units in a sequence of independent market days or trading periods. You will each 
receive a sequence of numbers, five for each period, which describe the value to you of 
any decisions you might make. These numbers may differ among individuals. You are 
not t9 reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. From 
this point forward, you will be referred to by your bidder number. You are bidder 
number ___ in this experiment. In each trading period you will be able to place bids 
to purchase a single unit in all of five markets (labeled A-E). 
Redemption Values and Earnings 
During each ·market period you are free to purchase a unit in any of the five markets 
if you want. If you purchase a unit in that market, you will receive the redemption 
value indicated on your redemption value sheet for that period and that market. Your 
earnings from a unit purchase, which are yours to keep, are the difference between 
your redemption value for that unit and the price you paid for the unit. That is: 
Your earnings = (redemption value) - (purchase price) 
Suppose for example that you buy a unit in market A and that your redemption value 
is 200 in market A. If you pay 150 for the unit then your earnings are 
Earnings from unit = 200 - 150 = 50 
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You can calculate your earnings on your accounting sheet at the end of each period. 
The currency used in the markets is francs. The conversion rate of francs to dollars 
will be listed on your redemption value sheets. Your total earnings in any period are 
given by the sum of your earnings· in each market. For example, if you purchased a 
unit in market A for earnings of 50 and a unit in market B for earnings of 80, then 
your total earnings that period would be 130 francs. Remember, if you purchase a 
unit in a partkular market, you must use the redemption value from that market. 
Market Organization 
In each period five markets will be open. There will be 5 participants in each market. 
In the markets, buyers may submit bids by entering bids into the computer. The bids 
will be arranged from the highest bid to the lowest. The highest bid in each market 
will be announced by the computer as the buyer in that market. The identity of the 
highest bidder will not be announced. The buyer will pay a price equal to the bid 
and as a result will earn the difference between his/her redemption value for the unit 
and the highest bid placed. The bids of all other bidders are nullified. They receive 
. no redemption value and pay nothing and so have earnings of zero for that market. 
If more than one bidder submits an identical high bid in a market, the buyer will be 
determined randomly (each tied bidder has an equal chance) and the price paid will · 
be equal to their high bid in that market. 
Submitting Bids 
On your screen you will see a window titled, Make A Bid. In this window you select 
the market you want to bid in by clicking the square beneath an item's letter. When 
you click on a market the button will appear to be depressed in order to indicate that 
the market has been selected. Once you mark the desired market, you can enter the 
amount (in francs) you are willing to bid in the box with a dollar sign. Bids should 
be in whole francs only. After your order is specified, you can send it to the market 
by selecting save. Each bid you make must have only one market selected. You must 
place a bid of at least 1 franc in every market. However, you may bid as much as you 
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choose in any period and any market. You will have approximately two minutes in 
order to submit your b~ds. The period will end when all bidders have placed a bid in 
each market. You may view your bids by clicking on the Bids button in your main · 
window. Once all bidders have submitted their bids, the period will be closed and the 
results calculated. When the results are available, you may view the bids by clicking 
on the Results button in your main window. Selecting Show will display the results. 
Determination of Redemption Values 
For each buyer the redemption value for each market and each period will be between 
1 and 1000. In four of the five markets, each number from 1 to 1000 has equal chance 
of appearing. It is as if each number between 1 and 1000 is stamped on a single ball 
and placed in an urn. A draw from the urn determines the redemption value for an 
individual. The ball is replaced and a second draw determines the redemption value 
for another player. The redemption values each period are determined the same way. 
The following is a table in which the probability of getting a value in a certain range 
is listed: (It is for your reference) 




















In the fifth market, redemption values are drawn in a different manner. Redemption 
values close to 1000 have a higher chance of appearing than do those close to 1. It is 
as if the number 1 is stamped on a single ball, 2 is stamped on 3 balls, 3 is stamped 
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on 5 balls, and so on. For any value n between 1 and 1000, the number of balls 
equals 2n-l. All the balls are placed in an urn. A draw from the urn determines the 
. . 
redemption value for an individual. The ball is replaced and a second draw determines 
the redemption value for another player. The redemption values each period are 
determined the same way. The following is a table in which the probability of getting 
a value in a certain range is listed: (It is for your reference) 





















There will be one bidder whose values are drawn from this set of draws in each market. 
Bidder 1 will receive redemption values drawn in this manner in market A. Likewise, 
2 in B, 3 in C, 4 in D, and 5 in E. For each bidder, the redemption values in the four 
other markets will be given by draws determined as previously described. 







This indicates that you would receive a redemption value of 520 in market A if you 
place the highest bid in that market. Likewise, your value in market B would be 128 
and so on. The first period will be practice. You will receive no earnings for this 
period. If you have a .question; please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to 
answer your question. 
To be read after round 5 
Communication with Other Participants 
Sometimes in previous experiments, participants have found it useful whe~ the 
opportunity arose, to communicate with one another. You are going to be allowed. 
this opportunity while the computers are reset between periods. There will be some 
restrictions. You are free to discuss any aspect of the experiment (or the market) 
that you wish, except that: 
• You may not discuss any quantitative aspects of the private information on your 
value sheets. 
• You are not allowed to discuss side payments or to use physical threats. 
Since there are still some restrictions on your communications with one another, an 
experimenter will monitor your discussion between periods. To make this easier, 
all discussions will be at this site. Remember, after the computers have b~en reset 
between periods (and the next period has begun) there will be no discussion until 
after the end of the next period. We allow a maximum of 4 minutes in any one 
discussion session. 
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Experiment 4 
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Figure C.10: Experiment 10 
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